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AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

REFERENCE

OCTOBER
1944

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

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America at War: The End Begins . . . . . *Hanson W. Baldwin* 1
The Mikado Must Go . . . . . *Sun Fo* 17
Czechoslovakia Plans for Peace . . . . . *Eduard Beneš* 26
International Monetary Plans: After Bretton Woods *John H. Williams* 38
The Frontiers of Italy . . . . . *Gaetano Salvemini* 57
Watch Japanese Air Power . . . . . *Alexander Kiralfy* 66
Political Ferment in Canada . . . . . *Blair Fraser* 79
Can the Philippines Stand Alone? . . . . . *H. Foster Bain* 93
The New Colonial Policy of France . . . . . *P. O. Lapie* 104
Iceland, Greenland and the United States . . . *Hans W. Weigert* 112
The Third Spanish Republic . . . . . *José Bergamín* 123
China's Mineral Wealth *Charles H. Behre, Jr., and Kung-Ping Wang* 130
The Future of French Indo-China . . . . . *Gaston Rueff* 140
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Robert Gale Woolbert* 147
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 162

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 23 OCTOBER 1944 No. 1

AMERICA AT WAR

The End Begins

By Hanson W. Baldwin

IN the summer of 1944 the American Army came of age.

The successful invasion of Normandy and the quick capture of Cherbourg in June meant the negation, in a strategic sense, of all Hitler's hopes and marked the beginning of the end for Germany. In rapid succession, in late July and August, the forces of the Allies broke out from the Cotentin peninsula, smashed much of the German Seventh Army, overran Brittany, captured Paris and reached the Meuse at Sedan. Simultaneously, they invaded southern France. Coupled with great German defeats on the Eastern Front, the defections in the Balkans and convulsions within the Nazi Reich, these victories put the unmistakable stamp of success on an American "amateur army," raised, organized, trained and equipped within five years.

The summer of 1944 was also a season of American triumphs in the Pacific. The conquest of the Marianas was almost as important a milestone in the history of the Pacific war as the invasion of France was in the European struggle. In the South Pacific, the advances in New Guinea put our forces on the doorstep of the Philippines; and in Burma, despite the monsoon, British, American and Chinese forces won remarkable and still growing victories.

The reactions expressed in Germany in the machinations of the Hitler "assassination plot," and in Japan by the fall of the Tojo cabinet, were direct reflections of the Allied successes. Both in the East and the West the end was beginning to be clearly defined.

II

The invasion of western Europe was the greatest and most successful combined operation of its type in military history. Some 8,000 Allied planes gave direct or indirect support to the

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landings, and 800 fighting craft, ranging in size from trawlers and motor torpedo boats to 16-inch gunned battleships, supported an invasion fleet of more than 3,200 transports and landing craft. The initial airborne operations involved the landing of three divisions by parachute and glider, probably the greatest airborne operation ever undertaken. In sheer magnitude, there has been nothing in the history of amphibious operations to compare with the Normandy invasion.

Some of the superlatives applied to it have been exaggerated, however. Far larger and more modern fighting fleets than the Anglo-American task forces that steamed across the Channel have operated in the Pacific. Many of the techniques of amphibious war in the Pacific are more advanced than those applied in the Bay of the Seine; indeed, our whole magnificent concept of amphibious war and combined operations is a product of our Pacific experience. Some of the weapons used in the early fighting in France were not as new or effective as those this correspondent has seen in other theaters and in the United States. Despite some pre-D-Day misgivings of this and other observers, nevertheless, the forces and weapons employed proved to be more than adequate for the job; the first stage of the invasion was far easier, and Allied casualties far lighter, than had been expected.

German opposition was not so strong as foreseen. In retrospect, it appears certain that the removal of Marshal von Rundstedt, the German commander in France at the time of the invasion, was for cause; he had had two years to strengthen the defenses of the French coast, and yet until Marshal Erwin Rommel's inspection in the winter of 1943–44 many obvious measures of defense were not taken. At the time of the invasion, the beach and coast defenses had been considerably improved since the winter, and troops had been shifted to the Normandy region. Fortifications were still in progress; in one 500-yard strip of beach this correspondent saw three heavy reënforced concrete casemates still under construction, and in numerous pastures "Rommel's asparagus" — heavy wooden posts up-ended in the earth to prevent airborne landings — were in course of installation.

The German defenses, though formidable, were not so dense on D-Day as the Japanese obstacles encountered at Tarawa or in the Marshalls, in the opinion of this correspondent and of officers who had served in the Pacific. But in the Pacific we had never assaulted a continental land mass, or a beach dominated by high cliffs, as we did in one landing in Normandy. So far, the Japa-

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nese opportunity for counteroffensive has been limited, since our naval and air superiority has enabled us to cut the sea-lanes by which Japanese insular positions could receive reënforcements. In Europe we attacked a continent and faced the danger that the enemy's land-based lines of communication might give him a chance to smash our beachheads. His inability to launch that large-scale counteroffensive which was so much feared prior to D-Day has been due to the same factors of sea and air superiority that have won us success in the Pacific; of course it was also a result of the great Russian offensive, which so threatened the German position that the process of shifting troops from east to west, actually begun in June, had to be halted and reversed.

The victories of D-Day and the immediate weeks thereafter had their antecedents, therefore, in the months of bitter struggle that broke the back of the German submarine campaign, and in the great air battles that raged over the Reich in 1943 and 1944. Perhaps the most significant date in the history of the air war is the week of February 20–26, 1944, when the great bombers of the Eighth Air Force dealt a well-nigh mortal blow to the German aircraft industry. The limited scale of German air opposition in June of 1944 gave it pregnant meaning. The pre-invasion bombings not only defeated the Luftwaffe, but smashed so heavily at German land communications that the enemy's ability to reënforce and supply his divisions in Normandy was greatly impaired. And after D-Day we dominated the daytime skies so completely that the vaunted power of the German Army to manœuvre was also greatly weakened.

The clue to the victory, then, is to be found partly in the months of struggle on the seas and in the skies before the invasion proper began. It also is to be found in the careful planning during that period, and in the wise and skillful leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who fashioned out of "SHAEF" (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) a cumbrous but on the whole smooth-working instrument of Anglo-American coöperation. General Eisenhower's friendly but dynamic personality is the key to the success of SHAEF; perhaps no one else but "Ike" could so rapidly have welded together such a diffuse and often clashing group of personalities and nationalities. In Africa he was sometimes described as a figurehead. Occasionally, in his effort to emphasize the Allied point of view rather than his American nationalism, he has seemed to "bend over backward" and to do less than justice to the Americans under his command.

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But just before D-Day, in one of the most momentous decisions of this or any war, he proved his wisdom, his strength and his willingness to accept responsibility.

A study of the weather record in the Bay of the Seine, Normandy and contiguous areas for the past 45 years had shown that there were likely to be two "quiet periods" during June which would best meet the various conflicting weather requirements of Navy, Air Forces, airborne troops and ground troops. One of these, it was predicted, would start on June 5 and might end within three or four days; another would start about two weeks later. June 5, therefore, was the original D-Day for the operation. All the vast fleets in most of the ports of England were loaded and ready before that time. But June 4, the day on which many of the ships had to leave port, dawned overcast and blustery; in one of the south coast ports of England where this correspondent was aboard an invasion flagship the weather was patently impossible. A postponement for one day was ordered; a longer delay might have meant a two-weeks' postponement to the next "quiet period." Such a delay would have had bad effects upon morale and might have resulted in a leak to the enemy. Had it actually been ordered it would, as things turned out, have put our forces ashore in Normandy just on the eve of the great storm which swept the Bay of the Seine from about June 19 to 22. The results would almost certainly have been disastrous. General Eisenhower's courageous decision to start the invasion on June 6 despite continued unpropitious weather has already received the approval of history.

Pre-invasion bombings had hammered many of the German coastal batteries in the landing area from Cherbourg to Le Havre. The Germans could not be certain of our intentions, however, since two batteries were bombed on other parts of the coast of northwestern France in the weeks before D-Day for every one attacked in the Bay of the Seine area. The direction of our assault was further masked by feints. A small naval demonstration was made on D-Day in the Pas-de-Calais area; troops of the American Third Army climbed into landing boats in Harwich and other British east coast ports, feinting an attack upon the Low Countries; and in Scotland some Allied planes and troops feinted assaults upon Norway. But we wasted none of our strength in diversionary landings. The full force of Allied might was funneled against the Cotentin peninsula.

The assault and covering forces were divided into two prin-

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cipal task forces — a western group, mainly American, and an eastern group, mainly British. Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay was "ANCXF" (Allied Naval Command, Expeditionary Forces) under General Eisenhower, and though handicapped by the arbitrary division of the waters around the British Isles between his own and various British home naval commands, he did a good job of coördination. The Eastern Task Force was under Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian, R.N., and the Western Task Force under Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, U.S.N. The former landed forces which were largely British, under the command of Lieutenant-



General Sir Miles C. Dempsey; and the latter landed forces which were largely American, under the command of Lieutenant-General Omar N. Bradley. General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery exercised the joint ground command (under General Eisenhower) for the initial assault period and still retained tactical command of all Allied land forces on the date of writing, almost three months after D-Day, a considerably longer period than originally planned.

The original landings from the sea were made in four separate areas on the Bay of the Seine between the Isles St. Marcouf and the Orne River (see above map). Landings from the air were

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made in three separate areas, extending from the town of Ste. Mère-Eglise and the Merderet River (a tributary of the River Douve, on the Cotentin peninsula) eastward to the vicinity of Cabourg. The assault forces were divided about half and half between British and American troops,[1] and this proportion remained about the same until D-Day-plus-20 when the American ratio, as planned, commenced to increase. The subsequent build-up was largely composed of American troops. The British, who have combed out their manpower more thoroughly than we have, and have even transferred men from the Royal Navy to the Army to provide needed replacements, contributed their maximum effort to the reconquest of Europe early. The follow-up forces of the invasion had to be largely American.

The purpose of this article is not to describe the combined Anglo-American invasion of the Continent, but rather to outline the American part of the operation. But it is necessary to point out that the retention of General Montgomery as ground commander well beyond the initial assault phase, when the American contribution in men had become far greater than the British, was productive of considerable criticism and was a psychological and perhaps a tactical mistake. In all operations by Allies there is a human tendency for the men of one army to blame the commanders of another for their own leaders' mistakes; this is always accentuated when the actual tactical command is exercised by a foreigner. This tendency was noticeable in Normandy. The American Army has a splendid field soldier in General Bradley; by its accomplishments and its size it deserved its own leader. General Montgomery has been criticized in both the British and American press for overcaution. This correspondent subscribes to these criticisms, yet must at once emphasize that in the plans for the invasion the Americans were assigned the offensive rôle in Normandy, the British the defensive. The British were to seize and hold the vital Caen area — the hinge of the whole Allied position in Normandy. They did so, and they protected firmly the American flank while American troops cut across the base of the Cotentin peninsula, captured Cherbourg and subsequently broke through into Brittany.

The first task on D-Day and immediately thereafter was the linking up of the various disconnected landings into one great

[1] The actual initial seaborne assault was made by the British in somewhat greater strength than our own, due to the more favorable configuration of the British beaches, but we landed two airborne divisions as against the British one.

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beachhead. The western, or American, task force was subdivided into two principal assault forces — one under the late Rear Admiral Don Pardee Moon, which made and supported the seaborne assault on a part of the long strip of beach between Quinéville and the mouth of the Douve River; the other under Rear Admiral John Leslie Hall, Jr., which made and supported the principal American landing between the Pointe du Hoe and Ste. Honorine. The naval support forces in the Western Task Force included the old but still serviceable battleships *Texas* and *Arkansas*, the *Nevada* (reconstructed after she was sunk at Pearl Harbor), the cruisers *Augusta* (flagship of Admiral Kirk) and *Tuscaloosa*, and many American destroyers and miscellaneous craft, in addition to British ships.

The landings started very early in the morning of June 6, when parachute troops of the 101st and 82nd American Airborne Divisions, followed later by glider-borne infantry, started dropping from the skies near Ste. Mère-Eglise and Carentan, and across the Merderet River. The 101st Division was commanded by Brigadier-General Maxwell D. Taylor, who made his first parachute jump above the dark fields around Ste. Mère-Eglise. He had succeeded Major-General William C. ("Bill") Lee, probably the finest of our airborne leaders and the "father of American paratroops," who was taken seriously ill with a heart attack sometime before D-Day. The division's operations showed that Brigadier-General Taylor filled the job ably.

The mission of the 101st Division was to capture Ste. Mère-Eglise and to secure the landward approaches to a causeway which ran across an area which the Germans had inundated. The western American seaborne landing was to be made upon the beach near this causeway. The paratroopers' mission was successfully accomplished, and seaborne troops were able to penetrate inland swiftly. The mission of the 82nd Division was to seize bridgeheads across the Merderet River and, in unison with the 101st Division, to divert and occupy the German 91st Division and to prevent it from interfering with our seaborne landings. The American 82nd was strung out over large areas when dropped; a few of its paratroopers landed outside Cherbourg and some came down on the eastern American beach; yet in time, aided by increments of the division transported to France by sea, it too accomplished its mission admirably. Both airborne divisions lost heavily, but the work of both was essential to the success of the landings. The glider troops were less successful

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than the parachutists; many gliders were cracked-up in landing, some on "Rommel's asparagus" and others against hedgerows.[2]

About 6:30 A.M. June 6, shortly after dawn, while the airborne troops were still fighting ashore, the seaborne landings began. They had been preceded by a heavy air bombardment, which was intended to neutralize, or partially neutralize, the beach defenses. Because of a low overcast, however, most of the planes bombed "blind," and little damage was done to the beach defenses. But the bombardments of the two months prior to invasion, and the pre-landing naval bombardment, had neutralized some of the enemy's coastal batteries, though by no means all of them. These batteries, in particular six 155 mm. guns emplaced on the commanding bluff of Pointe du Hoe near Grandcamp, were especially feared; the Navy had calculated that we might have to reckon with the fire of as many as 120 enemy guns 3 inches in size or larger in the Western Task Force area alone. Opposed to them would be at least 200 naval guns 4.5 inches in size or larger. The naval gunfire support was particularly effective on D-Day and the days immediately following, but in retrospect it seems likely that not as many batteries opposed us in the invasion area as we had expected. And many of them directed their fire against our landing craft and the troops on the beaches instead of against our shipping. Only one American destroyer and some smaller combat craft were sunk by enemy gunfire during the assault phase.

The seaborne landing on the western American beach was preceded by seizure of the Isles St. Marcouf by a cavalry reconnaissance detachment which met with no opposition. The main landing in the west was made on a strip of low-lying beach, called for convenience "Utah beach," in front of the areas inundated by the Germans near Ste. Mère-Eglise. A regimental combat team of the 4th Infantry Division, Major-General Raymond O. Barton commanding, conducted this landing and made good its foothold, with relatively light opposition from second-line troops of the German 709th Division. The penetration inland was rapid because of the work of our airborne troops, as noted above.

But in the eastern American landing, on "Omaha beach," from Vierville to St. Laurent, we ran into a hornet's nest. Here the German 716th Division, a second-line unit with a considerable

[2] The crack-ups were probably due in part to use of British instead of American gliders; the pilots were inexperienced in the use of these types in night operations. The results also indicated that Americans need better navigation in the use of airborne troops. Other needs are a quick-release parachute harness and weapons easily employed by parachutists while still in the air.

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proportion of foreigners, had been reënforced some weeks previously by the 352nd, a first-line division, and some of these men were in the beach defenses on June 6. Cliffs 90 to 100 feet high in some instances, into which the Germans had tunnelled, dominated most of this beach, and there were only three "draws" or gulleys which led up to the plateau.

The weather made this hard job still tougher. On D-Day morning it was still rough and some of our amphibian "ducks" swamped — some with 105 mm. guns and full cargoes in them. A number of the troops and landing boats had a hard time in the surf.

The German underwater beach defenses — four-pronged devices of steel and timber, great timber ramps, steel rails up-ended in concrete, mines and other obstacles designed to disembowel landing craft — also caused difficulties. The landings were purposely made shortly after low tide, so that Army and Navy demolition parties could "blow" these obstacles with specially placed hand charges. But the fire from the German beach defenses was so fierce that some of the gaps were not immediately blown. The assault troops, pinned down to the beaches, took shelter behind the obstacles and made the task of the demolition parties even more difficult. The tide was rising, and on that D-Day morning the landing on "Omaha" of combat teams from the "Fighting First" Division, Major-General Clarence R. Huebner commanding, and from the 29th ("Blue and Grey") Division, was behind schedule.

And it was then that leadership, courage and devotion paid their dividends. Some men already honored and some who will remain forever unsung brought victory from a possible defeat. This correspondent inspected Omaha beach on D-plus-2 when it was still enfiladed by enemy fire and when the corps command post was a ditch on top of a bluff 800 yards inland. It was a welter of smashed boats, vehicles and equipment, and some bodies still unburied — a battlefield closely won. It deserves a proud place in the memories and traditions of the United States. These men who died on Utah and Omaha beaches on D-Day, and those who still survive, broke the thin crust of the much-vaunted German Atlantic Wall.

III

The initial assaults were successful. The immediate objective thereafter was to build up the strength of our forces ashore and to

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deepen and link up our footholds. This phase of consolidation proceeded rapidly (though behind schedule) despite poor boat handling, some inefficiencies in unloading, and failure by the Navy to employ all of the available landing craft to maximum advantage. It was pressed through enfilading fire, bad weather, rough seas, beach obstacles and nightly attacks upon the invasion fleet by small numbers of enemy planes, including mine-laying planes and, later, one or two torpedo planes.

The 1st Division on the left flank of the American front broke the resistance of the enemy's 352nd Division and by D-plus-10 had advanced 19 miles inland to Caumont. At this time, the division had virtually no Germans in front of it, and the United States 2nd Armored Division was ashore. Some observers felt that an opportunity was missed, and that these two divisions might have punched inland to threaten the whole German position in Normandy. But at that time we were still expecting a strong German counteroffensive, our eyes were upon Cherbourg, and the 1st Division, a hard-fighting, efficient outfit which had driven a deep salient into the enemy's lines, was worried about its flanks. So the 1st was ordered to hold at Caumont, and there it remained in a defensive position until about D-plus-45 when it was relieved for other operations.

The 1st rapidly connected with the British beachhead to its east; and pockets of enemy resistance left behind on the coast were cleaned up. At the same time concentric attacks were started against Carentan, the town which controlled the communications from the eastern to the western American beachheads. Carentan fell to the 101st Airborne Division and the 2nd Armored after a brief but fierce struggle, and the four separate Anglo-American landings became one great beachhead.

Almost immediately the 9th Division (Major-General Manton S. Eddy commanding), which in Normandy has proved itself to be one of America's finest, and the 82nd Airborne, commenced to push westward across the base of the peninsula from Ste. Mère-Église and Pont-Hébert. The peninsula severed, the advance upon Cherbourg began, while the rest of the American line remained more or less static, except for slight improvements of its position. Cherbourg fell to Major-General Joseph Lawton Collins' 7th Corps, then composed of three infantry divisions — the 9th, 4th and 79th (Major-General Ira T. Wyche) — in a whirlwind campaign which was a minor military classic.

Thus, on D-plus-21 — somewhat behind official schedule, but

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nevertheless well ahead of most expectations — the new American Army had landed in France, had broken through the Atlantic Wall, smashed four to five German divisions, taken thousands of prisoners, and by its quick capture of Cherbourg had made our foothold in France secure. Cherbourg's capture nullified all German strategy for the past 18 months: it meant that Germany could no longer hope to throw us back into the sea and that Germany's defeat was certain, barring a secret weapon of undreamed-of potentialities.

The next phase of the Battle of France was virtually positional warfare. The month of hedgerow fighting that lasted until late in July brought some of the bloodiest and bitterest minor engagements ever fought by the American Army. All our divisions and many commanders were tried on the testing ground of the Normandy *bocage* country — terrain endowed by nature with all the attributes of defense — and some were found wanting. Casualties were heavy and progress was by yards. Too often we fought terrain instead of Germans; too often we showed overcaution. But there were other reasons for the relatively slow progress. A great storm swept our supply beaches from June 19 to 22, destroying hundreds of landing craft, practically cutting off the flow of supplies and reënforcements for a time, and badly damaging the artificial ports which Prime Minister Churchill mentioned in a recent address to Parliament. Moreover, a fire in the Cotentin peninsula destroyed 1,000 tons of badly needed ammunition; and a profusion of German mines in Cherbourg harbor delayed the opening of that port.[3]

The fact that the First American Army had not broken out of the Cotentin peninsula and into the northern part of Brittany, coupled with all these difficulties of supply, brought a major change in our plans. The original blueprint of invasion called for a second landing, to be made on the southern part of the Brittany peninsula, near St. Nazaire and Nantes (see map on page 12) on D-plus-41. The Brittany landing was now abandoned and all our available forces were concentrated in Normandy.

The inching advance of "hedgerow war" finally gave us jumping-off positions for a break-through offensive. St. Lô was at last captured on July 18 by the 29th Division, which had been in action continuously since D-Day.

On July 25 the 9th, 4th and 30th Divisions attacked on an

[3] Great gallantry was displayed by British divers wearing plastic helmets who went below the surface among magnetic mines in attempts to clear wrecks.

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8,000-yard front, preceded by a very heavy air bombardment (which struck some of our own troops). The massed armor of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions drove through the partial gaps made by the infantry, and accompanied by the 1st Division smashed deep into the German rear areas toward the sea. Coutances, Granville and then Avranches were quickly reached, but many of the German elements west of St. Lô were not trapped by the original drive. General Bradley unleashed more armor, however, and soon spearheads were running wild across Brittany and turning toward Paris. Some units drove ahead as much as 40 miles a day against scant opposition: the Germans had virtually stripped Brittany to reënforce Normandy. This was blitzkrieg, American style. The Brittany ports — Brest, St. Nazaire, Nantes, St. Malo — were soon invested (at St. Malo, the resistance directed by a German colonel, called the "madman of St. Malo," was bitter). Then American armor turned inland toward Le Mans, which was entered on August 9. As one armored spearhead turned north toward Alençon, the British and Canadians near Caen moved south in a coördinated attempt to encircle the German Seventh Army. By August 13 this thrust had moved south almost to Falaise, and the encircling American armor had reached Argentan. This trap was finally closed, but not until the German Seventh Army had extricated most of its armor. The 12th SS Panzer Division, already badly mauled in prior fighting, was virtually destroyed in the Argentan-Falaise pocket, together with German infantry and other units. The German casualties in this trap were estimated at from 50,000 to 100,000.

But this escape of the battered Seventh Army, which by mid-August had been reënforced by some few elements of the Fifteenth Army from north of the Seine, did not free it from danger. Another encircling movement was begun, this time by the British and Canadians pushing north toward Le Havre and by another American armored spearhead pushing west from Evreux. Several American bridgeheads were established across the Seine, one at Mantes, another east of Paris, as American armor ran wild across France. As a result, another sizeable segment of the retreating and disorganized Seventh Army was pinned back against the Seine. The Army Commander, SS General Hausser, was wounded; thousands of vehicles were lost — strafed by Allied planes or shelled by Allied guns. As these lines are written, the battle of the Seine pocket is still in progress. Though German losses have been heavy, considerable parts of the Seventh Army appear to

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have escaped across the Seine to join the Fifteenth. From D-Day to August 25, however, the Germans had lost in northern France an estimated 400,000 casualties; the "meat-grinding" process made famous on the Eastern Front was in action in the West.[4]

The rush through Brittany and Normandy and the capture of Paris were accomplished, under General Bradley's direction, by the armor of the Third American Army, operating under Lieutenant-General George S. Patton. This Army formed part of the first U. S. Army Group ever to take the field in American military history. General Bradley relinquished command of the First — the hard-fighting "break-through" Army — to Lieutenant-General Courtney Hodges, and assumed command of the group of two American armies, called the Twelfth Army Group. This group continued to operate under the tactical command of General Montgomery, who in an official announcement on August 21 was called for the first time "overall commander of Allied ground forces." General Montgomery also commanded the Twenty-first Army Group, which in August consisted of the Second British Army and the First Canadian Army. At the end of the month it was reported (though not officially) that General Bradley had been given parallel operational status with General Montgomery, who was promoted by King George to the rank of Field Marshal.

As a result of the blows described above, and particularly the outflanking operations across the Seine, Paris fell to Allied troops on August 24. An American armored column moved to Troyes, threatening to cut France in half. On August 31 the First American Army crossed the Meuse and the Third was reported in the Argonne Forest.

To complete the demoralization of the German defense, American, French and British forces, with seaborne and airborne troops, had landed on August 15 along a 100-mile stretch of the Mediterranean coast of southern France. Their object was to thrust up the Rhone valley and sever communications between the Germans in France and those in Italy. The landings were in the Toulon-Cannes area, and were made by the Seventh Army (Lieutenant-General Alexander M. Patch commanding), com-

[4] Preliminary figures of the cost of the invasion of western France and of the subsequent operations in Normandy and Brittany were as follows up to July 20, before the big break-through: the United States had lost 11,026 killed, 52,669 wounded, 5,831 missing; the British had lost 5,646 killed, 27,766 wounded, 6,182 missing; the Canadians had lost 919 killed, 4,454 wounded, and 1,272 missing — a grand total of 105,765. Naval losses of the invasion for the United States were three destroyers, one destroyer escort, two mine-sweepers, a fleet tug, a transport, various small craft, and numerous landing craft.

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posed of French and American troops, from and supported by a fleet of some 800 ships.

These landings in the south of France had been delayed for some time because of differences between the British and the Americans as to whether the Balkans or southern France should be invaded. They came too late to be of much assistance to the major operation in northwestern France or to trap many German troops. The German forces remaining in southern France probably did not consist of more than from seven to eleven divisions of the Nineteenth German Army and other formations; and perhaps the number was even less. From the start these did not offer much opposition, though one of our landing attempts, near Frejus, was repulsed.[5] Grenoble, Marseille, Toulon and Cannes were taken in quick order. Nice was occupied August 31. At the time of writing, our troops were in control of the southern Rhone valley, and most of the passes across the Alps from Italy were in our hands or cut by the French Forces of the Interior. These victories in the south, supplementing the major strategical successes in northern France, clearly meant that all of the country would soon be cleared of Germans.[6] As August ended the enemy's defense was crumbling fast in every part of the west. His armies were still in being, however, and it was thought that he possessed secret weapons of new types which he would bring into use.

IV

The victories in France during the summer were paralleled by triumphs elsewhere. In Italy the German positions below Rome were finally smashed by overwhelming power on the ground; two new American divisions, the 85th and 88th, bore their burden creditably. After the capture of Rome on June 5, the Germans fought skillful delaying actions up the length of the peninsula to the vicinity of Florence and Pisa, where in late July and early August their resistance stiffened as they fell back upon their "Gothic line" of fortifications north of Florence.

The strategic bombardment of Germany from the air continued. The most important targets during the summer were German synthetic oil plants or oil refineries. Allied bases were established in Russia and three-way shuttle bombing between

[5] Preliminary U.S. Army casualties to August 20 in the landings in southern France were 1,221 killed and missing and 1,754 hospitalized.

[6] The Brittany ports, however, were still in German hands at the time of writing, a fact of some concern, since these ports will be needed when the fall gales start. The assault on Brest, garrisoned by perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 Germans, started on August 25.

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Britain, Russia and Italy was inaugurated. Enemy antiaircraft opposition increased, but fighter opposition fell off in effectiveness. Much of our air effort was diverted to tactical support of the ground armies in France, and much to bombardment of the German robot-plane and rocket launching sites in France.

In the Pacific, during the months of June and July, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions and the 27th Army Division took Saipan in the Marianas; and the Marines subsequently took nearby Tinian. Guam was captured by the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 77th Army Division. In these operations 44,956 Japanese dead were counted and about 100 military prisoners taken. Our casualties were 4,470 dead, 20,345 wounded, and 721 missing. At the time of the fighting in the Marianas, our Navy and Air Force had a brush with the Japanese Fleet, which resulted in the sinking of four Japanese ships and the damaging of ten others.

Later, American task forces, both naval and air, bombed Japanese bases and convoys in the Bonin Islands; and in August, preinvasion bombing of Mindanao in the Philippines started. In New Guinea, American footholds were extended to the extreme western tip, and the remnants of the trapped Japanese Eighteenth Army were encircled and further reduced.

In Burma, despite the terrors of the monsoon, a mixed American and Chinese force finally captured Myitkyina on August 4. And in China, the 14th Air Force supported the Chinese in their attempts to halt Japanese drives. New super-bombers — B-29's — bombed Japan five times and targets in Sumatra once during June, July and August. The ring of steel was closing around the Oriental enemy also.

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THE MIKADO MUST GO

By Sun Fo

THERE are indications, so far as a writer in Chungking can gather, that an influential section of public opinion in the United States inclines toward a policy of "hands off the Mikado." This section of opinion cannot be accused of partisan motives, nor can it be reproached for being ignorant of the true conditions in the Far East. If it should prevail, however, incalculable harm may result. A discussion of the differences of opinion as to how the Mikado should be treated could have served no useful purpose in the early stages of the Pacific war; but now that Japan's defeat in the coming months is inevitable frank speaking is timely and necessary.

Among those who have adopted the thesis that the Mikado should be retained is Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the former United States Ambassador to Japan. Mr. Grew is of course a man of wide experience. Before going to Japan he served in Turkey. A republican form of government operated successfully in that country, which for centuries had been ruled by a sovereign who was part and parcel of the religious system of the Moslem world. Solicitous sympathizers the world over had earlier been concerned about what would happen to the discipline of the Moslems if their religious head, the Caliph, disappeared. Kemal Ataturk settled that with little ado by ejecting the effete old man from both his spiritual and temporal jobs. In Japan Mr. Grew had opportunity to obtain first-hand information as to the way the Mikado functions as part of the Japanese political machinery. He has declared publicly that the part of Shintoism which embraces emperor-worship will be an asset and not a liability in a reconstructed Japan.

The thesis of this section of American public opinion is, then, that the principle of the divinity of the Mikado shall exist unimpaired after the war. The corollary of this thesis seems to be a present policy either of avoiding mention of Hirohito in short-wave broadcasts and propaganda leaflets from America, or of referring to him in such terms as to suggest to the Japanese that the United States has a reverent attitude toward him. For the Japanese leaders, the further corollary is that American diplomatic and military forces have been ordered to take no action, verbal or otherwise, against the Emperor.

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If these are the facts, then the Mikado and his advisers may certainly draw the conclusion that their enemies are confused as to the extent of the Mikado's responsibility for the unprovoked and aggressive war which Japan has waged against China since 1931, and for the premeditated attack on the United States and Great Britain in December 1941. And out of this evidence of uncertainty, they may conclude that there is indecision in the councils of the United Nations as to the concrete measures to be taken for uprooting Fascism in Japan and destroying all its works.

I take it that there is no uncertainty, however, about two primary principles. The first is that the Japanese people are to be left free to choose their own form of government. The second is that under the principle of non-interference with the internal affairs of a defeated enemy, Japan's choice of a form of government is not to be so free as to leave the possibility of a resurgence of the very Fascist-Bushido power which so many of the sons of China, the United States, the British Commonwealth and Soviet Russia have died to eradicate. That is why I would like to say, as emphatically as I know how, that if there is to be an end of militarism and a beginning of democracy in Japan — if, in other words, the war with Japan will not have to be fought over at some later date — the Mikado must go.

II

The Mikado must go because the imperial idea is the essence of Japanese aggression. Japan's policy after the Meiji Restoration took her along a road which demanded revenues out of proportion to her resources. The swift industrialization of the country produced profound social and economic problems. Industrialization was based on an impoverished and landless peasantry, and its unsoundness was aggravated by enormous expenditures on an army and a navy. The groups in control of the Japanese Government could imagine no solution for these social and economic problems save the conquest of territories belonging to other peoples. These groups were composed of the aristocracy and the large landowners, headed by the Mikado, the big financiers (the foundation of whose fortunes was laid by the indemnity paid by China after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5), and the militarists pure and simple.

An empire demands an *imperator* — an emperor. The historical fact is that the doctrine of emperor-worship was deliberately

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conceived and propagated in Japan within comparatively recent years to make possible this imperialist policy. Emperor-worship is not a centuries-old dogma of Japanese religious faith. Prior to the Meiji era the Japanese people regarded their emperor as an unimportant adjunct of their feudalist system. There are probably men in Japan now who remember the days when the Mikado was a political nonentity. Militarism, the power of the military caste, and the institution of the Tenno are inextricably interwoven in Japan. The point which must be stressed and should not be evaded is that the militarists depend upon the Mikado for their existence. Their overwhelming and all-embracing power over the Japanese people stems from the Mikado. The Mikado himself is the very essence of expansionism.

The average pupil in a Chinese school regards the idea of the divinity of a living man as pure nonsense. People who advocate a policy of "hands off the Mikado" actually ask these school children to coöperate in upholding this fairy tale. They not only ask the school children of China and of the other United Nations to pamper the deluded Japanese people by pretending that there is truth in this myth; they ask statesmen — and the parents of soldiers killed in the Pacific war — to sanction a policy which validates the naïve yet cunning beliefs of a social caste which plunged the world into catastrophe. This is a plain statement of what the policy advocated by Mr. Grew and others adds up to. The substance of the thesis is so palpably wrong, reactionary and dangerous that it seems to me correct to call it "appeasement." Until 1941 the Japanese policy of imperialist expansion was pursued mainly at the cost of China. Why should we appease the Japanese after their defeat? We could have appeased them by recognizing Manchukuo. We fought them. And Americans are fighting them until their unconditional surrender because Americans know that they are an arrogant, brutal and treacherous nation. The very education based on Shinto and all its chauvinistic trappings has rendered them arrogant, brutal and treacherous.

The pro-Mikado school argues that Shinto, the state religion of the Japanese, has in fact made the masses of the Japanese people believe that their Emperor is a god and that for the sake of realism we must base our program on this actuality. I am disposed to maintain that the Japanese people are not quite so stupid as commonly assumed, and that they themselves will repudiate the emperor myth, given an opportunity to do so. But it is indeed true that in recent years the masses of the Japanese

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people have been taught that when they become soldiers they become the "four limbs" of the God-Emperor, and that as soldiers they have embraced this doctrine. Thus, they believe that they are the means of Divine Punishment, and that as Divine Soldiers they themselves also become gods. Through their affinity with the Mikado they are in their own eyes a race of supermen — a greater *herrenvolk* than the German Nazis.

No one denies that through this deliberately inculcated self-deception the free will of the individual in Japan is repressed, his thoughts controlled and every aspect of his life restricted and regimented. Mr. Grew tells in his book "Report from Tokyo" how the Japanese ruling castes achieved this "hypnotism" of the masses. His summary is pertinent and important: "Long ago, while Germany and Italy were still picturesque agglomeration of petty states, Japan was governed by dictatorship, secret police, élite guards, suppressors of 'dangerous thoughts,' summary courts and hidden executioners. The Tokugawa shogunate, which preceded the present modernized government, was effectively totalitarian and authoritarian." [1] This is a correct description of the machinery which enabled Shintoism to prevail over truth even to the present day. The argument of those who favor upholding the power of the Emperor turns on the assumption that under a peace-seeking ruler Shintoism can be an asset in a reconstructed Japan. Presumably Japan will be a democratic nation. But Mr. Grew himself tells us that Shinto has been developed and maintained through the aid of summary courts, hidden executioners and so on. Its machinery is the very negation of democracy. Brutality is the essence of it. I cannot but agree with the American editorial writer who said: "The notion of using him [the Mikado] usually implies using him to establish democracy by imperial command. And that, perhaps, is the all-time high in the confusion of modern 'democratic' thinking." [2] If democracy is to be imposed from above by Imperial Rescript, it will have to be backed up by these various instruments which are now used to put the fear of a synthetic god into the minds and hearts of the Japanese people. Would it not be better to try the proper instruments of democracy: rational thought and common sense?

Is the present Mikado the "peace-seeking" ruler who is needed? His advocates suggest that the adventures embarked on by the militarists since 1931 were undertaken without his sanc-

[1] Joseph C. Grew, "Report from Tokyo." New York: Simon and Shuster, 1942, p. 15.
[2] "What To Do With Japan." *Fortune*, April 1944.

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tion and possibly against his wishes. It is suggested further that the Imperial General Headquarters is the real power in Japan and that the Mikado is a puppet entirely under their control. Mr. Elmer Davis expressed this thought in the dark days of the Pacific war when he was quoted as saying in a press conference: "There is every evidence to show that he [Hirohito] has had nothing to do with the military for a long time. He is regarded as a god. Attacks against him would be resented, and would serve no useful purpose." [3] This supposition has been contradicted by certain observers who hold that the Emperor is equally guilty with the Imperial General Staff, which is directly responsible to him. Mr. Edward Hunter reports [4] that in a broadcast on March 8, 1943, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters frankly stated that the plan of the war against the United States and Great Britain had been submitted to the Emperor for his approval. When the present writer discussed the future of the Mikado in a newspaper article later in 1943,[5] however, a broadcast from Tokyo hastened to deny that the Mikado was responsible for the decision which opened hostilities.

The Japanese Government certainly guides the efforts of the Japanese people against the United Nations by means of Imperial Rescripts. They are issued in the name of Hirohito. In the eyes of the Japanese people he is the "leader-warrior." If Hirohito must be absolved in the eyes of the Japanese people from the guilt for a disastrous war by admitting that he was powerless to correct the errors of his subordinates, what will be the value of the Imperial Rescript for the introduction of democracy by the Will of Heaven? On the other hand, if from our point of view the Emperor is in fact blameless but nevertheless so powerful a force that he must be kept and "used," why was he not able to rally the better elements among his people during the past decade and to check the militarists who were imposing policies of which he disapproved? He did, supposedly, thwart the militarists once. According to reports, the mutiny of February 26, 1936, was suppressed by an Imperial Rescript. The "hands-off-the-Mikado" school cannot have it both ways. The Mikado is either a puppet and is useless for the purposes of democracy; or he is powerful and should have disciplined his militarists. He cannot be both. Either way he is a malevolent factor.

[3] *The New York Times*, December 10, 1942.
[4] *The Nation*, March 4, 1944.
[5] *The New York Times*, October 10, 1943.

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III

The main hope of those who advocate retaining the Mikado and "using" him is that they will thereby be able to get rid of the militarists the easy way — that is to say, by a peaceful revolution. They fear the social and political disorders which might take place if the fountain head of Japanese discipline — the Tenno — disappeared overnight. They would therefore keep the Mikado in reserve as a puppet for the time when defeat and invasion fling Japan into disgrace, so that he may be used to give authority to civilian leaders who may come forward to establish a government with which the victorious nations could deal. This, I think, was the idea which Mr. C. Burnell Olds had in mind when he discussed Japanese religion in the pages of this review.[6]

The flaws in this policy are two, and they are fatal indeed. The first is that if any group "uses" the Mikado in the future, it will not be a group of liberals, Japanese, Chinese or western; it will be the group which designed the institution of the Tenno and knows how to use it — the Japanese expansionists. The second defect of this policy is that it would prevent the Japanese people from taking the government into their own hands. It would, in other words, effectively blanket the possibility of Japan becoming a democracy.

What would be the effect if, after the occupation of Japan by our victorious troops, a representative of the Allied forces should be granted an audience by the inviolate Mikado? After that audience, the Mikado would supposedly issue an Imperial Rescript abolishing the military dictatorship and putting the blame for the defeat and the failure of divine protection for their home islands upon the militarists. Then this representative would retire, and the Mikado, after worshipping at the shrine of his ancestress, the Sun Goddess, would pick up the reins of government and rule in the style of the Meiji Restoration. It does not require any special knowledge of the Japanese people to figure out the mental processes of the awestruck inhabitants of Tokyo who witnessed this miracle. The legend would pass like wild-fire that the God-Emperor, although surrounded by enemies on all sides, was so powerful that, under the cloak of his divine protection, his enemies could not do him harm or diminish his power.

Add to this magnificent demonstration of imperial inviolability

[6] C. Burnell Olds, "Japan Harnesses Religion in the National Service," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1943.

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the certain fact that the Japanese in defeat will be bitter; that their hatred will be intense and lasting. And remember that the myth of the Divine Emperor is the creation of the militarist caste. What more perfect set-up for plans for revenge could be devised? The progressive elements of Japan who talked in terms of reason and common sense would be overwhelmed by this manifestation of the Will of Heaven. The obscurantist elements who talked in terms of race and mission and mythology would be vindicated. Obviously, they would say, the Emperor whose acts cannot be analyzed or questioned by human minds is planning for the day when Japan will be great again. Sufficient that he is planning in the Japanese way. Democracy by Imperial Rescript would be nothing less than continuation of the old Japanese game of hoodwinking the world.

There is no short cut to democracy. Democracy lies in the will of the people to rule themselves. Its source cannot be the will of a Mikado, whether or not he is thought to be a god. The Chinese people found this out for themselves. For centuries they were ruled by Sons of Heaven. When revolutionary forces, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, swept away the Chinese myths, China began her march to democracy. It cannot be otherwise in Japan. A democratic Japan can be born only when the invention of the feudal vassals who took power 76 years ago has been discredited. To destroy the present generation of militarists is not enough; the whole political, educational, and military machinery which enabled the militarists to hypnotize the masses of the people must be destroyed also. That can be done only by puncturing the myth of the divinity of the Mikado. If democratic forces are to be released there must be a revolution. In their fight on Japan the United Nations are firing the first shots in the Japanese revolution. And we should not deceive ourselves with the notion that revolutionary social change can be brought about in a neat and convenient fashion.

I believe that there are progressive and democratic elements in Japan which will welcome the opportunity to free themselves from the shackles of the Mikado and his gangsters. Perhaps the leaders are men who are now imprisoned for their devotion to freedom and truth. We should let them know that the overthrow of the Mikado will be the evidence of their country's readiness for its place in the postwar world.

What kind of Japan do we want? The Cairo Declaration of last November made clear that Japan's 70,000,000 people will have to

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live upon the islands which have been their homelands through ages past. They will be expelled from all territories they have conquered. In order that these people may not starve, they must have industries as well as agriculture. The industrial plant should be commensurate with the scale of Japan's own natural resources, as supplemented by the raw materials which the Japanese can import in the process of legitimate international trade. The punishment of the Japanese people must be severe and terrible while the war lasts. But certainly neither China nor other countries of the United Nations intend to prolong it.

The demilitarization of Japan can be accomplished only through control of Japanese heavy industry and the chemical industries. The United Nations supervisory commissions can function effectively only if these industries are centralized in some type of state industry. The light industries will need less stringent control, but supervision of some sort will be necessary, at least for a time.

The purchasing power of the Japanese peasantry will have to be raised in order to provide internal markets for Japanese light industries. The markets of China will be open to a fully democratic Japan; but Japan's ability to sell in China will be measured by her ability to buy in China. To increase the purchasing power of the Japanese peasant will require far-reaching agrarian reforms.

The Japanese people will have to choose the measures which will effect this reconstruction of their economy. No clairvoyance is required to see that in the course of this reorganization groups and classes of Japanese which stand close to the present rulers will be deeply affected. They will unquestionably resist these changes tooth and nail. If the Mikado is still available for "use," these are precisely the elements that will make use of him for the maintenance of their power, their wealth and their land. The Mikado himself, incidentally, is the greatest landholder in Japan.

The United Nations may have to give economic assistance to the Japanese people while they are getting on their feet; it is to the advantage of all countries to help them perceive the advantages of a democratic way of life. We must, however, insist on severe and irrevocable military and political settlements. All war criminals must be brought to trial. The evidence will show whether Hirohito should be among them. We shall have to suppress all so-called patriotic societies which might be used to train fanatics for a new war. The secret police must be disbanded and dispersed. The educational system must be altered,

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so that it trains the youth of Japan in the ways of peace and democracy, instead of turning out fanatical "limbs of the Emperor." There must be universal suffrage. Such a democratic Japan cannot be created until the Mikado has been removed.

IV

There is one further reason why the Mikado must go. China would never cease to believe that a Japan which retained the Mikado and the system of Emperor-worship was dangerous to her peace and security. In her eyes, such a Japan would be comparable to a Germany which was allowed to retain the Führer and the substance of Nazism. And an authoritarian Japan would inexorably evoke an authoritarian China.

To retain the Mikado in Japan would be to strengthen the hands of Chinese reactionaries. The preservation of the Japan of the Meiji Restoration, with its emphasis on sacrifice in battle and imperial sanctity, would mean that Japan had been given another chance to succeed where this time she failed. China would never dare forget that danger. Instead of being able to think of the peaceful development of her own resources, she would be forced to think primarily of arms and of war. The fulfillment of China's own democratic promise would suffer a heartbreaking setback.

The people who want to gamble on their ability to "use" the Mikado are not justified in taking such chances with the future of democracy in the Far East. Democracy, indeed, is on trial throughout the whole world. Would it survive another world war? To the Chinese people the proposal to save the Mikado is simply a signal to prepare for another conflagration.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA PLANS FOR PEACE

By Eduard Beneš

CENTRAL EUROPE, with its great number of small sovereign states, has always seemed in some American eyes a strange mass of various and sometimes conflicting tendencies and hence a constant danger to peace. The outbreak of the First World War was linked with little Serbia, just as the beginning of the Second World War will be connected with the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938. And yet the causes of these two world conflicts are not to be found in those small states alone. During the 20 years of her free and independent existence Czechoslovakia endeavored sincerely to make herself a point of stabilization in Central Europe. Her whole foreign policy was based on coöperation and understanding between nations. She regarded this policy as the only real guarantee of security and peace.

By means of treaties Czechoslovakia reinforced old friendships and made new ones. She found a way to establish correct relations even with her former enemies. With republican Austria she was on good terms from the beginning. With Germany she concluded a commercial treaty as early as 1921, the first of the Allies to take such action after the war, and until Hitler came to power she never had the smallest sort of conflict with that nation. Through the Little Entente she helped neutralize the dangerous aspirations of irredentist Hungary. The conflict with Poland over Těšin and Javorina was solved by the peaceful method of arbitration by the Supreme Allied Council and the Hague Court. With Soviet Russia she entered into de facto relations in 1922, and concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with her in 1935. She accepted the system of collective security as the guiding principle of her foreign policy and never violated it. The League of Nations and intimate collaboration with democratic France and England formed the basis of her foreign policy. In the struggle to lay the foundations for lasting peace the Allied Great Powers are now returning, after most painful experiences, to the principles which Czechoslovakia strove for 20 years to put into practice.

Even in her internal policy Czechoslovakia tried to apply the principles of coöperation and equal rights among nations. Despite certain shortcomings and minor mistakes, mainly of an administrative character, she provided much more protection for her minorities than was enjoyed by minorities anywhere else in

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Europe. In fact, taking into consideration the German psychology and the manner in which the Weimar Republic developed, we gave our minorities more rights than were compatible with our security. Nazi Germany eventually utilized the Germans inside our territory as an instrument for the disruption of our state.

The sincerity of Czechoslovakia's efforts was not fully understood either in the international sphere or at home. This was not her fault. Essentially, the reason was that the whole political development of the world in the period between the two wars was along lines which discredited rather than fulfilled the principles which we had expected would rule the future.

The United States cut itself off from Europe before the old world had been consolidated in its new form. The Soviet Union was isolated from the beginning, and remained in isolation even after the revolutionary period was over and the stage of constructive work had begun. The Western Powers feared the chaos natural in times of transition and radical change after a great war and consequently did not adopt an energetic enough attitude toward the preparations to introduce a "new order" made by the dictators who appeared on the Central European scene.

While the western democracies were discussing disarmament, the Nazi and Fascist states were preparing themselves for military aggression. The economic crisis further weakened the democracies, while it furnished the dictatorships with a *raison d'être* for carrying out their aims. The dictators abolished unemployment by simply putting their workers into uniform and converting their factories into war industries. The balance of power altered steadily to the disadvantage of the democracies, which became so conscious of their weakness that they did not draw any conclusions from the provocative attempts at expansion undertaken by both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

After the fall of independent Austria in 1938 all attempts to pacify the dictatorships — Germany especially — proved vain. Germany deliberately worked up a crisis in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of the same year, and inevitably won her demands. This was partly because the statesmen responsible for the policy of the western democracies at this time had insufficient knowledge of the real nature of the crisis and completely ignored Germany's true aims, partly because they no longer exerted sufficient influence on the development of European affairs. At Munich the last bastions of Central European democracy were surrendered and the way was opened to Hitler for a victorious advance on Europe

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as a whole. Horthy's Hungary and Beck's Poland facilitated Hitler's work. The annexation of Austria had provided sufficient reason for military intervention against Hitler; but it was the attack on Czechoslovakia which was the start of the new world crisis. The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia did not preserve peace; it only postponed the war by 11 months.

The experience of 20 years of peace and five years of war has defined our line of policy for the future. Political developments have proved us entirely right. The formation of a group of Allied Great Powers consisting of the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China, and the principles those Powers accepted at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, only confirm, in our eyes, the accuracy of the Czechoslovak political attitude since 1919. In coöperating with the Soviet Union, the great western democracies have accepted a principle which guided Czechoslovakia for 20 years. When we signed our new treaty with Soviet Russia in December 1943 we merely followed the lines of our earlier policy. It did not mean that we were cutting ourselves off from the democracies of western Europe. We simply underlined what Great Britain and Russia had effected in May of the year previous. We have not changed any of our basic principles and will not need to change them in the future. We have simply adapted ourselves to the developments of the war and prepared ourselves for the probable course of events after it is won.

II

In this her second struggle for freedom Czechoslovakia naturally has not abandoned her political tradition. From the start she associated herself closely with the democratic west; and she never ceased to believe in the active intervention of the Soviet Union in the war. The activities which we undertook abroad immediately after March 15, 1939, were in complete harmony with the will of the Czechoslovak people. In the first months of the German occupation there were anti-German demonstrations in Bohemia and Moravia and the resistance movement was organized there. Nor were political refugees the only ones to flee; soldiers also left their country to fight for freedom. Our tasks abroad have been to organize a fighting military unit and to ensure the legal continuity of the Republic.

The declaration of war on Germany by Great Britain and France and their recognition of the status of Czechoslovakia as an ally meant that they no longer recognized what had preceded

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the occupation of Czechoslovakia and in particular that they repudiated Munich. But it was of essential importance to us that the repudiation of the Munich dictate should be formal.

Among the Great Powers, the United States had never recognized Munich and therefore did not need to take formal action. The same was true of the Soviet Union, which had not been invited to the Munich Conference. In addition, Moscow expressed itself quite clearly in favor of preserving the pre-Munich frontiers of the Republic. Great Britain repudiated the Munich agreement formally and completely in August 1942, and on the third anniversary of that agreement France did the same. Munich was thus formally declared to be null and void. Czechoslovakia received moral satisfaction and her international political status was confirmed. Today she once more has her President and her Government; and in the State Council she has an advisory and controlling body fulfilling abroad some of the tasks of Parliament.

One reason for my undertaking the two official journeys which, at the wish of my Government, I made as President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the United States and the Soviet Union, was to make clear to the Czechoslovak people at home that, contrary to the allegations of German propaganda, the United States fully recognized the Czechoslovak Government abroad as their authoritative mouthpiece and the representative of their efforts. The reception accorded me as the head of an Allied state by President Roosevelt and by the Senate and Congress of the United States entirely fulfilled the expectations of the Czechoslovak Government abroad as well as of the people at home. Moreover, the conversations which I had with official persons showed once more that the United States recognized nothing of what happened at the time of Munich and afterward, and that all frontier changes, whether they concern Slovakia, Hungary or the so-called Sudeten Germans, are invalid. It filled me with confidence, also, to know that on all other questions, both political and non-political, our views did not differ in principle from those of American statesmen and of the American public.

My journey to the Soviet Union had a similar object and was planned at the same time. I wished before the end of the war to discuss personally with the responsible statesmen of the Soviet Union all the fundamental questions regarding the future position of Czechoslovakia.

I have always realized that without the participation of the Soviet Union in the postwar settlement of the world there is no

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guarantee of lasting peace in Europe. After this war the Soviet Union will be the immediate neighbor of Czechoslovakia. Its vital interest to make itself secure against the German *Drang nach Östen* coincides with the vital interest of Czechoslovakia, placed by geography right in the pathway of this drive. Our alliance with the Soviet Union is therefore quite natural. It represents a great change from our position after the last war, and a great change also for the whole of Central Europe. It will, in particular, enable Czechoslovakia to find new markets for her industrial exports in a country traditionally friendly to her.

III

The lines of Czechoslovakia's future foreign policy, determined by her geographical position and her needs, follow clearly from the preceding statements. The pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia have been shown to be a primary condition for her existence as an independent state. Without her natural frontiers and without the territory which she lost at Munich she is a distorted body incapable of independent political and economic life. A cornerstone of our foreign policy will be the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Collaboration of December 1943, because it brings us security. The fact that Great Britain and the United States of America were fully informed about it, and that it is in accord with the British-Soviet Pact — the main pillar of the whole postwar structure of Europe — shows that it fits well into the general framework of European security. But our postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union must be completed by collaboration with the western democracies, including the United States of America. This corresponds to our national and economic interests, our traditions and to the fact that in the struggle for freedom our soldiers have been fighting both on the British-American front and the East European front.

In addition, we are deeply interested in removing the obstacles standing in the way of sincere and lasting collaboration between the Poles and the Soviet Union. If there is to be complete security against the *Drang nach Östen*, Poland must play an active part in coöperation with Czechoslovakia and Russia. In negotiating the Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact we kept in mind the need for collaboration with Poland. If Poland associated herself with the common anti-*Drang nach Östen* policy, then there would be an opportunity to carry into effect the principles laid down in the joint Polish-Czechoslovak declaration of November 11, 1940.

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The military collapse of France in 1940 did not alter the fact that she belongs to the concert of European Powers and that we need her participation in European reconstruction. After she has been rehabilitated internally, she certainly will regain her former position and will play her equal part in determining the development of Europe. This is Czechoslovakia's belief, and she views sympathetically the efforts of France to gain recognition of the rights which belong to her as a member of the family of European nations. We have an equally positive attitude toward Jugoslavia. Like France, she fought on after defeat to win back her freedom and to establish internal unity by all the means at her disposal.

It goes without saying that Czechoslovakia accepts the principles of the postwar system of security envisaged at the Allied conferences in Moscow and Teheran. As a small state, she desires to carry out, in agreement with the other Allies, the obligations which arise from the decisions there reached.

After this war, as in the past, Czechoslovakia will strive to collaborate with all her neighbors to the extent that she encounters good will and the conditions that would make such collaboration possible and fruitful. This applies primarily to Austria and Rumania. Once these states have solved their main international problems I see no reason why Czechoslovakia should not be able to follow her prewar Good Neighbor Policy toward them.

Events have not yet developed to the point where it is possible to indicate exactly our future relations with Germany, Hungary and Italy — that is, with the countries directly responsible for the present sufferings of the Czechoslovak people and of the other nations of Europe. They will depend mainly upon the thoroughness and sincerity with which those nations execute the necessary internal changes, upon the nature of their new régimes and upon the reality of their efforts to make good the devastation they have caused. They also will depend, of course, upon the conditions imposed on those states and on a host of other circumstances which cannot yet be foreseen.

IV

There are many ways of ensuring peace, none of them easy. After the last war the League of Nations was founded. The idea was right. No nation, small or great, can live by itself, without contact or collaboration with others. A realization of the interdependence of nations is a prerequisite to our living together in peace. At the same time the vital interests of the individual

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nations must be kept in view, for if these are not coördinated and made mutually complementary, then no single world organization can achieve lasting success.

Intimate collaboration for peace between two friendly and neighboring states with common vital interests is a very natural and practicable way of forming the larger groupings which must be always considered as an inevitable complement to any world organization of collective security. For in addition to being conscious of the community of their interests, the members of such an organization are guided also, and indeed first of all, by their own immediate interests. On the other hand, to forget this unifying principle of the interdependence of all, and of the need of coöperation of all, would be a perversion of the fundamental idea and would lead slowly to the formation of two or more opposing blocs with differing and mutually exclusive interests, and this, in turn, would sooner or later result inevitably in a clash.

Between the two extremes — between the abstract idea of the unification of all nations and the need of two or more states to associate themselves to achieve the maximum satisfaction of their more direct material interests — lies a middle way. This way is to harmonize the idea of human unity and the idea of vital interests by slowly developing from small units to larger ones. This is the way of mutual respect and mutual concessions and agreements, the natural process of mutual understanding.

No one will desire to restore the League of Nations in the form which proved ineffective. This fact led, soon after the beginning of the present war, to a discussion of the idea of federations as a possible solution of the question of postwar security. At this point the danger of blocs with opposing interests tended to create an atmosphere of new distrust. At the Moscow Conference the Soviet Union pointed out that the tendency to talk of federations sometimes created the impression that a new attempt was to be made to isolate the Soviet Union, or at least to create a single Central European zone which would act as a kind of *cordon sanitaire* between the western democracies and the Soviet Union.

It would be a new tragedy not merely for Europe but for the whole world if the Soviet Union were again driven into isolation and deprived of an influence on the course of European events. That is why what I have called the middle way has been chosen — the natural way which does not abandon the principle of federation for the future and meanwhile permits friendly agreements for mutual assistance and postwar collaboration such as the

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Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact. This agreement is not merely defensive, merely regional, merely based on self-interest. It leaves room for collaboration with all the Allied nations and in essence serves world peace and helps lay the foundations of the new world which is to be free from the fear of want and the fear of war, free from the curse of Nazism and Fascism in all their forms, a world based on principles of individual and national liberty. It does not mean that we shall be an instrument of Soviet policy; but it certainly means that we shall not be an instrument of anti-Soviet policy. Internally we shall be completely free, with quite different cultural, economic and social conditions than exist in Soviet Russia. And in our external affairs we shall not abandon our efforts to reach the same relations with Poland as we have established with Russia and to maintain our traditional relations with western Europe. This path fully accords with Czechoslovakia's national tradition of humanitarian democracy.

V

There remains for me to explain the internal political development of Czechoslovakia, as I see it, when Germany collapses and we enter the period of transition to the new life of independence. There are two possible ways in which the country may be liberated: either Germany will collapse all at once and the whole of Czechoslovakia will be liberated from German and Hungarian domination without a long struggle at the frontiers; or different sections will be liberated gradually, with resistance on the part of the Czechoslovak people keeping pace in the rear of the enemy.

The Red Army's approach to the easternmost tip of the Republic has increased the resistance movement and produced new sabotage activity in that whole region. Guerrilla formations are increasing in numbers and strength in Ruthenia, Slovakia and in the mountainous region of northeastern Moravia.

Throughout the whole Czechoslovak territory national committees are being formed. When the time for change comes, these will take over the administration of the liberated territory in agreement with the Government and its representatives. This is the same form of administration as the one used by the Czechoslovak people in the transitional period of 1918. In practice, these national committees, formed from the representatives of the people in every village and town, will be the first democratic instruments to exercise legal and executive authority. They will be the exponents of our political system and symbols of our political rights.

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Regional committees will be formed, by free vote, from the local and district national committees; and from these, in turn, a kind of provisional National Assembly will be formed.

It will be the duty of the national committees to collaborate with the Government as soon as we have come back to our territory. This Government will be newly appointed. It will be composed of certain members of the Government now in London, but, above all, of leading members of the underground movement, thereby ensuring complete unity between the resistance at home and the resistance abroad as well as continuity in national political affairs, both internal and external.

I calculate that within six months after liberation we shall succeed in normalizing conditions to the extent of being able to hold fresh parliamentary elections and a fresh presidential election. For the time being, the original Constitution of 1930 will provide for the establishment of internal order. However, it will be revised as soon as possible and adapted to postwar needs so that Czechoslovakia in her new decentralized shape shall be the true home of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Ruthenians.

Though for centuries they were divided and lived under different régimes, the Czechs and Slovaks were brought closely together in the 20 years of their peaceful life in the united and democratic Czechoslovak Republic. The division since forced upon them has not lessened their definite resolution to remain together in a common republican state. The Slovak people were misled by unworthy leaders into forming an alliance with the pagan and pan-German Nazis and into the war against the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The vast majority of them are now definitely opposed to the puppet government of Slovakia and determined to fight for the united Republic.

It is significant that from the very outset Slovak elements were linked with the underground movement organized in Bohemia and Moravia in the spring of 1939 and that they did invaluable service to the Czechoslovak soldiers and political émigrés escaping from Bohemia and Moravia across Slovakia. The trend of Slovak public opinion was well expressed when a whole Slovak division, including its officers, went over to the Russian side at Melitopol in December 1943. When I was in Moscow its members asked me to make it possible for them to join the Czechoslovak Army fighting on the Eastern Front.

I have not the slightest fear, then, that any disagreement in principle will arise between the Czechs and Slovaks in the liber-

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ated Republic. The reproaches which really serious Slovak circles from time to time voiced against the Czechoslovak Government before Munich never involved the common life of the two peoples in one state. I feel sure that certain measures of decentralization, freely determined by the Czechoslovak people in a democratic spirit of agreement, will remove once and for all every possible source of misunderstanding between Czechs and Slovaks. None of the Czechoslovak émigrés has a right to make final decisions in matters which are the sovereign right of the people at home. It is the people themselves, too, who will purge their own ranks and punish the collaborationists and those who deliberately and for personal profit betrayed the Republic. This does not apply only to the Slovaks and Carpathian Ruthenians, but also and in the same degree to Czechs and, of course, to the Germans and other citizens of the Republic.

The punishment of the Czechoslovak Germans is connected with the solution of our minority question. After the First World War, in accordance with the idealistic tendencies of the time, a clause in the Peace Treaty imposed upon the Czechoslovak Republic the protection of national minorities. It is generally recognized that, as was noted above, Czechoslovakia treated all her minorities, including her Germans, more generously than any other European state in her position. (The federal character and long historic tradition of Switzerland shaped that nation so differently that it cannot be compared in detail with Czechoslovakia.) The Germans in Czechoslovakia enjoyed all the rights proceeding from the Constitution on the one hand and from the treaty for the protection of minorities on the other. At the first opportunity, nevertheless, the great majority of them became Nazis. They abused their position in the state, they abused the democratic freedom of its institutions and they deliberately became the instrument of a foreign Power in working to break up the Republic which was their home. Under the enemy occupation they became a Prussian tool for the brutal and sanguinary oppression of the Czech nation, surpassing in their hate and hostility anything known in all the long centuries of German domination.

Experience has shown that the system established by the minorities treaties can be abused by an imperialistic state to promote its policies of expansion. Nazi Germany did just that. No nation — and least of all a small one like Czechoslovakia — can in future afford a policy which would lay itself open to this sort of disruption by an alliance of enemy forces without and traitorous ele-

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ments within. Czechoslovakia wishes to avoid any recurrence of the situation which led to Munich. She is therefore considering the transfer of the greatest possible number of her German inhabitants, especially those who have publicly declared their solidarity with German National Socialism, who have worked for it and identified themselves with it, accepting Nazism as their faith and behaving accordingly. If this were not done a most serious civil war would sometime be inevitable.

Czechoslovakia will not deny the right of domicile to anyone who has remained faithful to the Republic, kept its laws and helped defend its independence. The protection of the democratic and human rights of every citizen are guaranteed in Czechoslovakia forever. This applies to those members of the minority races who may remain within the Republic. There is no doubt, however, that the Czechoslovak people do not believe that the internal conditions which prevailed before Munich can be reëstablished after the war.

Czechoslovakia wishes to carry out loyally the provisions of the peace treaties which are to be agreed upon in the international forum. She expects the Allies not to repeat the mistakes made at the Peace Conference in 1919. But whatever is decided at a new peace conference and imposed on all nations by a common agreement she will accept, sign and faithfully fulfill.

The tasks of the new government will be immense. Economic life in all its forms — trade, handicrafts, agriculture and industrial production — has been ruined in large measure by the Germans and will have to be set on its feet. Work will have to be found for all our workers, and we shall have to arrange for the return of those who have been forcibly snatched from their families and sent to work in Germany or in the Todt formations. We shall have to reorganize properties which have been thrown into disorder by German interference, whether through "Aryanization," Germanization or confiscation. The Czechoslovak Government abroad is fully cognizant of all these tasks and is preparing a far-reaching plan to meet them. It will have to intervene not only in the sphere of economics, but also of social policy, education and cultural policy in order to repair the damage done during Germany's five years of occupation and deliberate destruction of values.

It is not merely a question of restoring things as they were before. Ideas have not stood still. Our people participated in Europe's first religious and social revolution in the fifteenth cen-

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THE FRONTIERS OF ITALY

By Gaetano Salvemini

WHEN Prime Minister Churchill stated in the House of Commons on September 21, 1943, that the Italian Empire "has been lost — irretrievably lost" he no doubt referred to all the territory which since 1936 has been termed "Italian East Africa," that is, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. From 1936 to 1943 these territories formed King Victor Emanuel III's "empire." On November 30, 1943, the Italian Cabinet headed by Marshal Badoglio officially stripped the King of his title of "Emperor," officially acknowledging the doom of the East African Empire.

Cyrenaica, the eastern section of Libya, seems destined to become part of Egypt, under one guise or another. The southern sections of Libya, *i.e.* Tibesti and Fezzan, will most likely go to France. The latter are the most wretched spots of the Sahara Desert, but they are wide and they make a big show on maps, to the satisfaction of empty-headed imperialists. What will happen to Tripolitania, the western section which borders Tunisia, is still the secret of the gods. Some Italians hope that Tripolitania at least will be left them as *fiche de consolation*. Neither Tripolitania nor any other Italian colony ever brought any economic advantage to the Italian people. They swallowed up enormous sums of taxpayers' money and only civil and military bureaucrats and contractors profited.

None of the colonies would ever solve, or even help to lessen, the Italian problem of overpopulation. The few thousand farmers who by 1940 were eking out a meager living in Libya had been transported there at public expense and were supported by heavy subsidies. Each of them would have become a prosperous landowner in Italy had he been given that money at home. Economic delusions, strategic fancies and above all a hankering after prestige prompted the Italian colonial enterprises. Colonies were like the jewels with which millionaires deck their mistresses; but the Italian people never were rich enough to afford such luxuries and they will be even less able to afford them when this war is over. Railways, roads, bridges, harbors, land reclamation works, water power stations, aqueducts and cities by the hundreds will have to be rebuilt. Large sections of Milan, Turin and Genoa, the wealthiest cities of Italy, have been reduced to heaps of ruins.

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Hundreds of years of labor have been annulled. Only a man who was out of his senses would advise the Italian people to squander more money on Tripolitania or any other colony. Italians who worry about the former colonies are like a man who fusses over the looks of his necktie while falling from the top of Giotto's Tower. Since I love the Italian people from whom I came, I pray that all the former Italian colonies will be handed over to someone who hates the Italian people and therefore has to be punished for his unchristian sin.

The Italian Government has to get out of the Dodecanese Islands and Albania not only because Italy lost this war, but because she never had any right to administer either of those territories anyway. The Dodecanese will no doubt go to Greece. And the Italian Cabinet stripped the monarch of his title, "King of Albania," at the same time that it admitted that he was no longer an Emperor.

Dalmatia lies outside the frontiers of Italy no less than do the African colonies, the Dodecanese and Albania. To be sure, there are Italian nuclei along the seaboard of Dalmatia, last remnants of mediæval Venetian settlers — about 15,000 people in all in the midst of 600,000 Slavs. Of those 15,000 Italians, about 8,000 were in the city of Zara when the present war broke out. What has happened to them and the other Italians in Dalmatia during these last months Heaven alone knows. What should be done with those who still are left when the war is over?

The Nazi mentality is spreading outside of Germany, thanks to the moral degradation brought about by war. Nowadays we speak calmly of tossing millions of human beings from their homes to nowhere in order to get rid of troublesome "racial minorities" and to create "national uniformity" everywhere. Hitler set the example in the countries that came under his control, and we seem to be ready to do the same even though we boast that we are fighting to prevent Hitler from Hitlerizing the world. If this brutal frame of mind prevails among the "peacemakers" of the United Nations, the Italians of Dalmatia will be uprooted and chased out so that some politicians of Belgrade or Zagreb may grab their houses, lands and shops.

Let us hope that the Slavs are more intelligent than certain of their western advisers and that they will allow the last remnants of Venetian civilization to die out little by little, year after year, where they are now. If Italy and Jugoslavia ever learn how to become friends the Great Powers will no longer be able to make use

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of them as toys in their games. If they go on quarreling about a few fig trees and some nests of lizards, the Great Powers will always find among them suitable clients for their balance of power policies at the expense of the "natives."

In addition to Dalmatia, the eastern section of what the Italians term "Venezia Giulia" and the Slavs call "Julian Mark" should go to Jugoslavia. This eastern section is inhabited by a compactly Slav population. The Triple Entente promised it to Italy in the ill-contrived Pact of London of April 26, 1915, and it became part of the Italian Kingdom as a result of the Treaty of Rapallo, November 12, 1920. (For the frontier of 1914, the Pact of London line of 1915, the line favored by President Wilson in 1919 and the boundary as established in 1920 see accompanying map.) This territory should never have been annexed to Italy. Populations which are tied against their will to an alien nation, and which look longingly across the boundary toward their own kinsmen, are a source of weakness and not of strength, of disgrace and not of prestige, to the dominant nationality.

The policies of the pre-Fascist régime toward the Slav population of this area were clumsy and incoherent. They could not have been much better, since the Slavs did not wish to be ruled by Italians either well or badly. However, the pre-Fascist régime was not criminal, as the Fascist régime was to be. Of the latter, nothing but shame can be recorded. The day on which these Slav people are united politically with their parent stock will be an auspicious one for the Italians themselves. A stain will be washed from Italy's face. And let us hope that the blunders and crimes of these last 25 years will as soon as possible be forgotten, or at least forgiven.

As I have said, the eastern section of Venezia Giulia must go to Jugoslavia. But what of the western section, *i.e.* the part which includes the cities of Gorizia and Trieste, and western Istria? Austrian language statistics, in 1910, indicated that while the eastern section of Venezia Giulia was inhabited by a compactly Slav population, the western section was inhabited by a mixed Italo-Slav population. In this western section the Italians predominated in the cities, while the Slavs occupied the countryside and filtered into the cities. It would have been impossible to split the cities from their countrysides. And even in the cities one could not split Slavs from Italians in adjoining houses or in the same apartment houses. The Italian census of 1931 took care to ignore national differences and gave only the total population

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

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for each city and its district. On the other hand the Fascist régime did not shrink from the most sordid means to force Slavs to flee to Jugoslavia and to make those who remained adopt Italian names and display Italian feelings. At the same time it imported from Italy as many people as it could to replace those who were thrown out from their jobs or forced to emigrate. During the present war, there has been wholesale murder. What the present situation is we do not know.

However, to take it as the basis of Italian claims would be to reward crime. The only honest way of approaching the problem is to take the situation of 1910 as basic and to assume that from that time to 1940 the Italians and the Slavs increased at the same rate as previously. If we make this assumption, and if Jugoslavia or any other political organism which takes the place of Jugoslavia receives the districts which have a Slav majority, that is, if a total of about 400,000 souls go to Jugoslavia, then an area inhabited by a mixed Italo-Slav population of about 500,000 would remain to be allotted. To whom should it be allotted?

Among those 500,000 people, 300,000 are Italians and 200,000 are Slavs. But figures do not tell the whole story. The problem to be solved is not to count noses and hand over the land to the more numerous noses. The problem to be solved is whether the administration of that mixed territory would have to overcome greater difficulties if the Italians or the Slavs were in control. Would a city like Trieste with 119,000 Italian inhabitants (in 1910; the figure was presumably 170,000 by 1931) be easier to manage if 54,000 Slavs (in 1910; the figure was presumably 80,000 by 1931) got control? According to the 1943 "Statesman's Year Book" Gorizia had 46,000 inhabitants and Pola 46,000; Monfalcone had 18,000, Pirano 19,000, Capodistria 13,000, Parenzo 12,000, Dignano 11,000, Rovigno 10,000. Most Slavs, even when they appear in statistics as forming part of municipalities with populations not much below 10,000, are scattered in small nuclei over the countryside; whereas the Italians are all gathered in the cities. There is no reason to think that city dwellers are more intelligent or honest than peasants, be they Italians or Slavs. But under present social conditions who can expect a city like Trieste to be ruled by the Slav minority of its suburbs and the Slav peasantry scattered over the neighboring stony and sparsely inhabited Carso? Can any sensible man expect the Slav peasantry to administer the Italians in Gorizia and the cities of western Istria? Or do those Italians have to be thrown into the sea?

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The American scholars who in 1918, on behalf of President Wilson, traced what would have been the most suitable frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia, were not moved by any bias in favor of Italy. Yet they drew a line (see map) that almost perfectly coincides with that which divides the mixed Italo-Slav territory from the Slav territory. Obviously they took into account not only dead figures but social conditions; they thought that the solution most conducive to peace, *provided the rights of national minorities were respected*, was to establish Italian rule over that mixed territory. Perhaps the present writer will be allowed to record that before the American scholars produced that solution, he himself, in coöperation with an Italian geographer, had reached an identical conclusion,[1] to the great scandal of Italian nationalist firebrands. Nor would it be amiss to remember that in the fall of 1914 the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pashitch, spontaneously admitted that Trieste and Istria should go to Italy; that in March 1915, while the Treaty of London was being negotiated, Mr. Sazonov, the Russian Prime Minister, energetically and rightly protested against Italian claims to Dalmatia, but did not raise any objections against Italian claims to Trieste and Istria; and that in the summer of 1917 Pashitch again offered Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino a compromise, accepting his claims to Trieste and Istria but not the claim to Dalmatia. And though Augustus would understand very little indeed of today's mess, he would perhaps remind us of the fact that he established the eastern administrative boundary of Italy precisely at the Arsa River (see map).

When the eastern section of Venezia Giulia goes to Jugoslavia, the city of Fiume (Rijeka) will become a small enclave surrounded by territory which is Slav not only ethnically but also politically. Before 1914 the city contained 24,000 Italians intermingled with 15,000 Slavs. It is divided, by a ditch hardly worthy to be termed a river, from Sušak, which before 1914 was inhabited by 11,000 Slavs and 1,500 Italians. If those who make the peace put aside the brutish thought of chasing the Italians from their homes, and if they devise a suitable system for the protection of the rights of minorities in Jugoslavia (as elsewhere), no sensible man will object if Fiume is transferred from Italian to Jugoslav sovereignty. The case of Zara is analogous to that of Fiume.

The Wilson line of 1919, slightly improved in favor of the Slavs, would be the best frontier today, provided the personal and

[1] C. Maranelli and G. Salvemini, "La Questione dell'Adriatico." Rome: La Voce, 1920.

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political rights of the Slav minority were respected by the Italians and provided the Slavs respected the rights of the Italian minority in Dalmatia, Fiume and their part of Venezia Giulia. Unfortunately, neither the Italians nor the Slavs nor any other European people deserve to be trusted in such matters. The history of all mixed territories in Europe, if one excepts Switzerland, is the history of hatreds and crimes. The problem can be solved only by the method which has insured its solution in Switzerland and in the United States — by granting equal personal and political rights to every man, irrespective of his nationality. And some external force must be in existence to protect minorities against majorities until the time comes when everybody, after trying the wrong way, realizes that honesty pays best.[2]

The national problem of Italo-Slav cohabitation in Venezia Giulia, Fiume and Dalmatia has nothing to do with the economic problem of Trieste and Fiume as ports. Trieste and Fiume serve a Middle European hinterland. Even if there were no local national Italo-Slav problems, the international economic problem of these two ports would still exist. A right or a wrong solution of the local national problems would not lead to a right or a wrong solution of the international economic problem, and vice versa. It is absurd to say that Trieste and Fiume have to be politically annexed to their hinterland. First of all, that hinterland is not only Jugoslav but also Hungarian, German, Czech and Polish. Moreover, there is no greater reason for a port to be politically annexed to its hinterland than for its hinterland to be politically annexed to the port. Switzerland is the hinterland of Genoa. Has Genoa to be annexed to Switzerland? Has Switzerland to be annexed to Genoa? If there are national or other reasons for politically annexing the port to the hinterland, all right. But let us not mix up economic necessities with national rights.

The economic problems of the ports of Trieste and Fiume are problems not only of local facilities but above all of customs tariffs and railway rates in Central Europe. They would not be solved through handing over Trieste and Fiume either to Italy or to Jugoslavia. The key to these problems has to be found also in the arrangements made for the ports of Constanza, Saloniki, Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, Hamburg and Danzig — for all of which Central Europe is a hinterland. If they refuse to coöperate and endeavor to kill each other off by cutthroat competition, no

[2] The present writer and Professor George LaPiana outlined a solution of this problem in their book, "What To Do with Italy" (New York: Duell, 1943).

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solution of the local national problem will prevent the two ports and cities from going to rack and ruin. They can be brought to coöperate only by an international administration.

Besides the problem of the Italo-Jugoslav frontier, that of the



Italo-German frontier will have to be confronted (see accompanying map). South Tyrol — that is, the territory between the Brenner and the Salorno gap — was allotted to Italy by the Pact of London of 1915, and in 1919 President Wilson endorsed that

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single point of the Treaty of London. The American experts were dismayed by the decision, but they could do nothing about it. This territory was inhabited by a population that was almost completely German in language and national sentiment. The two ranges of mountains that go from the Stelvio Pass and the Dobbiaco Pass toward the Salorno gap would have been an almost perfect line of division between Germans and Italians. Professional soldiers and others who worry about what the proper strategical frontier would be have not yet realized that the airplane and the robot bomb have obliterated all "strategical frontiers." There no longer are strategic frontiers. There are geographical positions, economic resources and alliances.

The national feelings of the populations are also realities. Those feelings should not be deeply wounded if mankind is to prepare for peace and not for fresh carnage. If things today were what they were in 1939, there would be no doubt in my mind that South Tyrol should be severed from Italy. But in 1939 Hitler and Mussolini agreed that those Germans who did not wish to become Italians should move to Germany. In all, 179,083 German-speaking inhabitants chose to leave their homes rather than live under Italian rule, and 89,000 remained. The Italian Government paid for the property and possessions of the emigrants, who were to be compensated by the German Government with bonds.

Under such conditions I have to confess that I am doubtful what would be a fair solution of this problem. The Hitler-Mussolini deal of 1939 inflicted great sufferings upon those thousands of men, women, children and old people who were uprooted from the land on which they had been born and where their ancestors had lived from immemorial times. But can they be brought back to their homes? On the other hand, would not the 89,000 Germans who remained in South Tyrol be as restive and stubborn under a free Italian régime as they were under the Fascist régime? Was their choice of Italian citizenship the result of sincere feelings or was it wrapped up in mental reservation? Italians have stepped into the places of the evacuées. Must they be ousted in favor of people who made the great mistake of showing their confidence in Hitler and who left for Germany? Perhaps the only way of solving this riddle wisely will be to entrust some commission of honest men with the task of finding out on the spot what situation prevails at the present time and of devising some method of mending the evil already done without adding fresh sufferings to the old ones.

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WATCH JAPANESE AIR POWER

By Alexander Kiralfy

JAPAN went to war because she believed that her air power was dominant in the Far East and that her air coverage of the seized territories could be made secure. Failure to appreciate the primary rôle assigned to air power in Japanese plans has been the source of much western confusion about the campaign in the Pacific, and could be a serious danger to the peace.

For many years it has been popularly assumed in the west that a war in the Far East would be decided by a great naval battle between Japanese and western fleets, and that in that battle the Japanese fleet faced certain destruction. More careful students of Pacific strategy concluded as far back as 1922, the time of the first naval limitations treaties, that the Japanese Navy would remain close to its base and would risk a major naval engagement only after the enemy fleet had been cut down by submarine attacks and weakened by having to fight far from its own bases. Later it became apparent that the Imperial Japanese Navy would probably engage the enemy fleet only if it were assured of the support of land-based aircraft. But not until the war was actually in progress did it become plain that Japan had assigned her Navy third place among the branches of her armed services. The expanded empire which Japan coveted was to be seized by the forces of all arms, with the Army and the Air Force taking the leading parts. It was to be defended from counter-attack principally by air power.

Before the war began, westerners complacently believed that the Japanese were incapable of using air power effectively. Actually, the Japanese militarists had for many years planned to employ it as their chief weapon. To conceal their strategy, they took great pains in the years between the wars to publicize their supposed reliance upon their Navy. Devotion to sea power was used as a mask to cover aerial planning and preparations.

The future course of the war against Japan cannot be properly understood except against this background of Japanese reliance upon air power. Japan's selection and employment of air power as her prime weapon was strategically sound. Air power is peculiarly applicable to the geographic conditions of the Pacific and the Far East. Though the Japanese strategy has failed, due especially to the ability of American airmen to destroy Japanese

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aircraft in ratios much greater than the two-to-one losses which Japan might have taken and survived, the problems which our forces will face as they press into Japan's home waters will be even greater than those they have already overcome. Americans at home are still inclined to underestimate the degree to which Japan is airminded. We shall do well to expect that in coming months the Japanese will be able to employ masses of planes operating from adequate airfields such as they have lacked in other regions of the Pacific.

And since we wish no further surprises in the Far East after this war is over, we must never forget that as air power grows in strength and range it will become an even more appropriate weapon for aggressive warfare in this area. The merits of the Japanese plan to dominate the Far East by means of air power, and the shrewdness with which the plan was developed, warn us that it will be many years before we can afford to relax our guard. Indeed, if the "liberation" of Japan brings an end to regimentation and introduces better health services, that may result in turn in the correction of the very defects most noticeable in Japanese fliers — lack of individual initiative and deficiencies of sight and hearing caused by poor diet. It was probably the existence of those defects which in large measure enabled our airmen to nullify the Japanese plans this time.

To understand the lessons of this Japanese war, and to teach us how to prevent another, the nature of Japan's strategy during the past 25 years must be analyzed carefully.

II

Paradoxically, the Japanese began to search for some means of "defense" other than their Navy as a consequence of their victory over the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905. The Japanese people gloried in this triumph, but their leaders took a more sombre view. They dwelt upon the fact that they had had to meet *two* Russian fleets — the squadrons which were in the Pacific at the start of the war, and a second fleet which arrived in the Far East some months later. If Russia could send a second fleet to the Pacific, they reasoned, then the United States and Great Britain, thanks to their command of raw materials and production facilities, could send a third or a fourth.

During the London Naval Conference in 1935 the Japanese delegate, Admiral Osami Nagano, revealed this reasoning clearly, if subtly, when he said:

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Even if the Power with a superior navy sends only a part to engage the inferior navy of its enemy in such decisive battle, the part of the superior navy remaining in other areas will serve as a latent force which constitutes a definite menace, direct as well as indirect, to the defenses of the weaker naval Power. We need only recall the naval engagements of the Russo-Japanese and World Wars to be convinced that this is a truth to which history itself bears witness.

Admiral Nagano had previously declared: "I am not taking into consideration the total force of the aggressor, nor the element of distance. I have put a case in which one nation is actually exerting a pressure of 50 against another which is defending with only 40." This was another way of saying that the United States, if it wished, could overcome the obstacle of Pacific distances and apply a superior naval force against the Japanese Navy in the Far East — a truism now in course of demonstration. At the time these statements were made, Japan had already decided to relegate her Navy to the place of third importance among her armed forces.

The decision was strategically sound. Air operations of the type Japan proposed to undertake were well suited to the territories she planned to dominate. The Far East is isolated from all nations capable of putting her plans in jeopardy. The distance from the northernmost Japanese main island, Hokkaido, across the Sea of Japan to the Soviet-Korean border and thence through China to Burma is more than 6,000 miles. This "front" could be approached from the west only by a long trip over the Transsiberian Railroad, or by the lengthy "silk route" through the wastes of central Asia, or from India.

From all other directions the Japanese positions could be reached only by sea. The seaward "front" was tremendously long; from the northern tip of the Kuriles, past the Philippines to the eastern extremity of New Guinea, and thence along the outer boundaries of Indonesia to the Indo-Burmese border, is a distance of upward of 12,000 miles. If we extend it to include the islands in the Pacific which Japan dominated at the beginning of the war, we add nearly a thousand miles more. Though the Japanese continental front was fairly defensible, the oceanic front was vulnerable to Allied sea power. The outstanding military-geographic feature of the expanded Japanese empire, however, would be the proximity of the various Asiatic islands to one another and to the continent. The wall of "coastal" islands, extending from within ten miles of Soviet Kamchatka in the Pacific down through the main Japanese islands, the Philippines

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and Indonesia to Singapore, is broken by only four gaps from 100 to 135 miles in width, and six from 50 to 70 miles wide. The other openings are appreciably smaller, and many of them may be dominated by coast artillery. The development of the airplane meant that the gaps between these islands might be hermetically sealed.

In 1921 the only flaw in the prospective Japanese "defensive" system was that the ocean islands, extending southward from Tokyo Bay to the region of Guam, and thence eastward through the Caroline and Marshall groups, were too widely spaced for the effective use of the land-based fighting and torpedo planes then in existence. Japan could not safely strike until the range of these types of warplanes had been increased. She had to play for time. Her scheme, meanwhile, was to prevail upon foreign Powers not to strengthen their Pacific and Far Eastern bases, and if possible to induce them to freeze the design of their warships so as to keep them as vulnerable to air attack as they then were.

Japan's program for aggrandizement and her quest for invulnerability through air power were hidden throughout the interwar period by a series of contradictory statements, puzzling at the time but now clear. When the Japanese delegates came to Washington in 1921 to attend the naval limitation conference the battleship-airplane controversy was at its height. In England, Admiral Sir Percy Scott was insisting that "the battleship is dead." Admiral Sims, General Mitchell and others were expressing comparable opinions in the United States. There were, of course, contrary opinions — especially in official naval quarters — as to the susceptibility of the capital ship to air attack, but the vulnerability of lighter vessels, notably of supply ships and transports, was scarcely disputed.

Japan was already strong in the air and studying the possibilities of air warfare profoundly. A large air base had been established near the southern end of Formosa, only a few hours' flight from the Philippines. Numerous German experts had been brought to Japan. According to official figures, the Japanese Air Force had as many planes or "units" as that of the United States, more than that of Italy, half that of Britain, and somewhat less than one-third as many as that of France, the leading air power of the day. In trained manpower it was the weakest of them all; yet, curiously enough, it had more training units than any other nation. This aspect of the Japanese program was wrapped in secrecy.

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In Washington, the Japanese delegation willingly agreed that there should be no limitations on aircraft, but asked for three carriers of 27,000 tons each. Admiral Baron Kato, the leader of the delegation, said he would raise no objection to a proportionate increase in this category for the United States and Great Britain. In abandoning parity in carriers and standard warships he obviously had in mind the possibility of developing Japanese land-based aircraft. Uninstructed public opinion in Japan criticized the naval treaties of limitation, but those who knew the country's real scheme of strategy rewarded Kato for his distinctly "aerial" success by making him Prime Minister.

The use of land-based aircraft and mobile bases — aircraft carrier forces — now superseded the Battle Fleet in Japanese plans for war with the west. The world speculated on the activities, actual and promised, of the Imperial Navy. New naval developments were emphasized and "loud-spoken" naval secrecy was imposed. Meanwhile the air arm was progressively though secretly strengthened for its mission. Terminology for the Air Force was adopted which suggested that it was merely a subordinate arm of the Navy. Hypersensitivity began to be shown to foreign air projects in the Pacific area and throughout eastern Asia. Japan refused to be represented at any conference in which aircraft limitations might be broached.

Western suspicion was awakened to some degree by the fact that the economies which the naval limitation treaties had supposedly effected were not reflected in subsequent Japanese budgets. An American aviation journal observed: "As the naval ratio of Japan is, under the Washington treaty, 60 percent of the American naval strength, it may be seen that Japan is spending money on her naval air force far in excess of her allotted ratio of naval strength, aiming in that service evidently at parity with that of the American Navy." [1]

In the 1923 Japanese budget a considerable portion of the sums saved by the cessation of battleship construction were described as appropriated for the building of "smaller warships" — an elastic term which undoubtedly included aircraft. In that budget increased appropriations were made for gunnery, torpedo practice, anti-submarine and mining operations, and for "scientific research," another phrase which could conceal aerial developments. As in subsequent years — with rare exceptions — Japan's direct appropriations for the air arm were remarkably low; the

[1] *Aviation*, January 15, 1923, p. 67.

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true amounts were obviously hidden under other headings. It was disclosed in 1924 that German-made airplane parts were being assembled in German-controlled factories in Italy for Japanese aircraft able to carry a ton of bombs "from the nearest Japanese base to Manila and return." [2] Specialists from the Dornier and other German aircraft plants began to supervise the construction of airplane factories in Japan.

The British and the Americans attempted to institute further disarmament talks in 1925. In the United States a Special Naval Board had come to the conclusion that "Aircraft attack, when met by equal aircraft or good antiaircraft guns, will not be able to prevent the transport of troops." [3] As the fulfillment of Japan's "destiny" was predicated upon troopship movements and the ascendancy of land-based aircraft over carrier-based planes, Tokyo displayed no interest in discussing the subject, particularly since London had become highly sensitive to the question of aerial weapons. Baron Hayashi, Japan's Ambassador at London, preferred that the problem of further disarmament "be talked over slowly." When, however, President Coolidge proposed that reductions of naval armament be discussed separately from questions of land and air armaments, the Japanese responded with alacrity. Yet their approach was odd. Other nations wanted to consider what categories of ships might be reduced; Tokyo concentrated its attention upon what it did not want to reduce, namely, small submarines and aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons displacement. Such carriers are a particularly satisfactory vessel for staging operations.

A remarkably revealing article appeared shortly thereafter in the Tokyo *Nichi Nichi* stating that "Air forces . . . must assume the important rôle of tactical [*i.e.* fighting] operations, while the army and navy ought to take up strategical [*i.e.* non-fighting] duties, so that they may afford the air forces bases of operations." This article and several others which passed the Japanese censor were critical in nature, calling attention to alleged defects in the Japanese air force, and therefore, perhaps, were officially inspired. For this reason, presumably, they did not receive the attention abroad which they seem to have warranted.

At the London Naval Conference in 1930 the Japanese pressed for the reduction of battleship displacement from 35,000 to

[2] *Washington Post*, July 13, 1924 (quoted in "United States Naval Institute Proceedings," September 1924, p. 1539).

[3] Report of Special Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., January 17, 1925, Section 207, p. 65.

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25,000 tons, and for an increase in the age limit from 20 to 26 years, stipulations that would have rendered battleships more vulnerable than ever to bomb or torpedo attack. The Japanese also requested smaller aircraft carriers. At Geneva two years later the Japanese, now in occupation of Manchuria, suggested the complete abolition of fleet aircraft. Their motive is now readily discernible. Since they were prepared to operate from land bases, abolition of carriers would decisively handicap the western Powers.

That year their manœuvres were held among the mandated islands for the purpose of testing "new equipment." This must have largely meant aircraft, and the testing undoubtedly involved the shuttling of planes among the atolls, operations between ship and island, bombing of targets stationed in the lagoons and practice landings. In May of that year a unit of the Tateyama Flying Corps flew in one day from Japan to Saipan and back, with a stop at Chichijima in the Bonin Islands. The earlier flaw in the Japanese strategy caused by the short range of light planes had evidently been repaired. In 1934 Admiral Yamamoto even offered to accept the abolition of submarines, provided the United States and Great Britain would abandon the aircraft carrier. Japan was no longer thinking of fleet action. If she controlled the skies of the Far East, submarines would be as relatively unimportant to her as surface warships. When this demand was refused, the Japanese delegation, headed by Admiral Nagano, quit the London Naval Conference of 1935–36 and Tokyo refused to renew the Washington Treaties of 1922. In March 1939, the Japanese announced a naval expansion program, Admiral Yonai declaring that "one of the governing principles of the Japanese Navy was the maintenance of a fleet equal to that of the strongest naval power." Yet at this writing there is no evidence that after the termination of the naval limitation treaties on January 1, 1936, Japan enlarged her Navy significantly in any category except carriers.

To obtain supremacy in the air the Japanese sought high speed and great range in their planes. The basic theory, propounded by Admiral Baron Kato in 1921, was that rapid concentration of the air forces must be possible. The Japanese planned to hasten their troops to the perimeter of the area they intended to overrun under cover of an aerial umbrella. The Imperial Navy was to coöperate in the conquest by crushing inferior naval forces and furnishing artillery support for landing forces. Thereafter it would

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in general operate under cover of its land-based aircraft. Its function, a purely defensive one, would be to link the outposts by means of aircraft carrier task forces. These were to be amphibious, in that the carriers would act as staging points for land-based aircraft flying to and from Japanese strongholds. The Japanese were theoretically justified in assuming that such a combination of land and carrier-based aircraft would be superior to hostile warships and aircraft carriers.

In 1936 the Japanese claimed that they had brought out a long-distance plane embodying "new aeronautical principles." Their use of detachable fuel tanks, to obtain increased range, is now well known. Night flying, another element in the plan of achieving rapid concentrations, was emphasized, as was practice in aerial acrobatics. Although Lieutenant-Colonel Adachi had observed in 1932 that "the number of airplanes is less important than their quality," the Japanese seem to have been wedded to the theory of quantity. Their grand strategy was built around large numbers of land-planes which, they assumed, would overwhelm the relatively few planes that could be brought against them by carriers. Japanese fliers were regarded as aerial infantry rather than specialists and, like the expendable land forces of militaristic states, depended for success upon the crushing power of mass attacks. This doctrine probably explains certain of the weaknesses of all Japanese planes until very recently. The bombers and torpedo planes were to prevail by sheer force of numbers; the fighting planes were to depend upon numbers, heavy fire power and the acrobatics made possible by their high manœuverability.

III

After seizing Manchuria and northeastern China and providing these areas with numerous airfields, the Japanese moved into the next stage in their preparations for war against the United States and Great Britain. The ports of China and French Indo-China were absorbed into the Japanese system. They would thereafter serve as bases and distribution centers, and their facilities would provide aircraft cover for the amphibious moves to come.

The war in the Pacific began with the air attack upon Pearl Harbor, which was followed by the speedy seizure of airfield sites around the perimeter of the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma — all according to plan. The barrier islands and continental areas from within gunshot of Kamchatka to the Indian frontier be-

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came a chain of Japanese airfields; large forces of warplanes could be transferred quickly to any one of them, with a minimum number of refueling stops. Japan acquired an immense potential supply of gasoline, bauxite, rubber — the essentials for war in the air. She seemed in theory to have attained invulnerability. Allied positions in eastern New Guinea and India were still a threat to her; otherwise Japanese-held territory could not be reached except by slow-moving, seaborne forces, travelling over great distances and depending for protection upon the most vulnerable of all types of warship, the aircraft carrier.

The Japanese had planned shrewdly and well for this war which they hoped to wage by means of a western weapon, snatched from under unsuspecting western eyes. But there are imponderables in war. In the Coral Sea, off Midway Island and in the Solomons the Japanese began to experience them.

American and Allied qualitative superiority in the skies was definitely established. In the Solomon Islands and later in New Guinea the Japanese discovered that the limited number of airfields they had cut out of the jungle did not permit them to concentrate air forces sufficient to contend with the qualitative superiority of their enemies. The mandated islands, because of their smallness, were likewise insufficiently provided with airfields. These regions became bottlenecks. The American strategy of keeping them under steady assault was the equivalent of turning off the valves through which the supposedly overwhelming streams of Japanese aircraft were to flow to threatened points. These checks on the Japanese plan of aerial defense were severe setbacks. The failure of the Japanese Navy to turn back hostile naval forces which included carriers, and its inability to protect its own sea-lanes, as demonstrated in the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, were serious matters also. In these engagements the Japanese were met by forces which they were unable to overwhelm, and by which, contrary to their expectations, they were themselves destroyed or routed. These task force reverses, however, did not impugn the general Japanese strategy.

The battle which followed the seizure of Saipan island by United States amphibious forces was a worse blow. It struck at the heart of Japan's theory of defense of the outer islands. The Japanese carrier task force that steamed out of the channel between Formosa and the Philippines to relieve Saipan was theoretically able to dispatch an endless flow of aircraft, which it would receive from the numerous, well-developed airfields in its

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rear. The American aircraft opposing it were borne entirely by carriers operating at a great distance from their main bases. The Japanese carriers were supposedly invulnerable, in that they would not need to come within range of United States carrier planes. The fighting range of American planes was, in theory, only half of their full range, since they had to husband enough gas to get back to their carriers. The Japanese seaborne planes were to operate between ship and shore. They could thus take off at points beyond the range of enemy aircraft, deliver their attacks and alight upon islands under American assault, or others in their neighborhood. Then after replenishing their supplies they could deliver another attack and continue on to their carriers; or they could remain on island airfields as replacements.

This important Japanese operation was defeated by American intrepidity, a sufficiency of the right kind of equipment, and skillful tactics. Some American fliers simply disregarded their fuel supplies and pressed their attack straight home to the hostile carriers. We had an astonishingly large number of carriers of our own. And the disposition of American warships and planes was bold and effective. Some American carriers apparently launched their planes directly against the Japanese reserve centers in the Bonin Islands, thus cutting off the reënforcements of planes which were supposed to reach the Japanese carriers. Others kept Saipan under assault and a third group of carriers steamed toward the Japanese carrier force which, no longer "invulnerable," was compelled to retire.

The fact that the Japanese strategy has been sound magnifies the skill and courage of those who have overcome it. American and Allied troops have had to fight bitterly for sites upon which to construct the very airfields that, in principle, should have been there in the first place to protect them. Their airmen have had to struggle against serious odds and to improvise measures against an enemy who had been preparing for two decades. The United States Navy, built to combat other ships, has been faced with the problem of amphibious assault on "unsinkable" and scientifically defended islands and beachheads.

Perhaps the most serious flaw in the theoretically perfect Japanese strategy of conquest and defense through air power has been, in the last analysis, the inferiority of the Japanese fliers. Defective vision and hearing seem partly responsible for this. The Japanese are suffering from having long neglected sound principles of nutrition. Though their aptitude for mastering modern

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technology cannot be questioned, their fliers seem also to have suffered from improper methods of instruction, coupled with a certain inherited unwillingness to exchange the individual daring of the samurai for the scientific attitude of the machine age. The tactics of air fighting adopted by Japan produce recklessness rather than good judgment and blind courage rather than skill. Their tactics have nonetheless been deemed worthy of official American study. The fundamental reason for Japanese individual and group inferiority in the air can probably be found in the fact that unregimented human beings react more intelligently in a crisis than those who have all their lives waited for orders. Japanese fliers have been *commanded* to use initiative; such men are certain to come off second best when put up against men accustomed to use their own wits in the face of an unexpected problem almost as instinctively as they breathe.

IV

Tokyo's sole hope now lies in the possibility of destroying seaborne expeditions by means of land-based aircraft. We would be wrong indeed to discount this possibility cavalierly. The size of the fleets which are being thrown into the Pacific — not to mention the new B-29 Superfortresses — suggest that the Allied Command, at any rate, is not making that mistake. Henceforth our forces will meet Japanese planes over or near spacious, well-developed territories equipped with numerous airfields that cannot be as readily destroyed or isolated from one another as were the Japanese airfields in New Guinea and the mandated islands. The Japanese can concentrate their aircraft at will in the main Japanese islands, in Korea and Manchuria, and to a lesser degree in the Philippines, Formosa and parts of China. They will be able to attack Allied amphibious expeditions with much greater forces than hitherto. Their airmen will be fanatically determined to reach their targets regardless of losses. And the huge size of our seaborne forces, and hence the more numerous targets offered to Japanese planes, may give added point to the Japanese theory of mass attacks.

The Allies will have the power to assault Japanese territory from numerous directions, and will surely use heavy land-based planes as well as carrier-based aircraft. But the likelihood that the Japanese will be able to launch really powerful attacks upon relatively slow-moving or anchored amphibious expeditions constitutes a hazard that should not be underestimated. The

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Japanese may be expected to exercise all their cunning in the climactic aerial battles that have been the subject of so many years of thought. They concealed the very fact of their reliance upon air power for a long time; conceivably they may now be attempting to conceal their true strength until a decisive opportunity to use it occurs.

Estimates as to the number of planes with which Japan began the war range from less than 4,000 to upward of 6,000, with a replacement potential of all types of, at the most, 15,000 to 20,000 a year. Recent Chinese reports have raised this figure to 24,000. Certainly, they are substantially higher than would have been conceded a year before the war. The losses to date are a significant indication that production is heavier than we supposed. On June 29, 1944, it was disclosed that American airmen had destroyed more than 12,000 Japanese planes since December 7, 1941. To this total should be added a proportion of the large numbers of planes "probably destroyed," as well as the losses inflicted by the British air forces. The mild interest displayed in the United States in this important item of information was characteristic of our constant underemphasis of the strength of Japanese air power. The figures are shown in their true light if they are contrasted with the statistics of Axis planes destroyed. Shortly before the landings in Normandy, the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. had shot down and bombed on the ground 26,000 German and Italian planes in the course of the Battles of France and Britain, the North African campaigns, the invasions of Sicily and Italy and the continuous air attacks upon Germany and Nazi-dominated Europe. The Japanese Air Force has survived losses equivalent to approximately one-half those suffered by the European members of the Axis in the decisive operations mentioned. This suggests a large Air Force and a heavy replacement capacity.

The Japanese are unquestionably bending every effort to increase production of the weapon which they consider so important. Japanese aircraft are produced both in Japan and, since October 1933, in Manchuria. Aluminum in sufficient quantities is derived from minerals obtained in the Malay States and the Dutch East Indies; in the thirties the Japanese discovered aluminous shales in Manchuria and are reputed to have other aluminum ores in Korea. They are dependent upon Indonesia for gasoline, but were working on synthetics before the outbreak of war. How much damage can be done to their aircraft industry by bombings is as yet an open question. We must also take into

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account that their planes are being armored and otherwise improved; and new tactics may also be expected. The pattern of warfare that has been developed in the Far East in the past is by no means a complete guide to what we may expect in the future.

Finally, we must keep our attention alive to the possibility of future Japanese attempts to use air power for purposes of aggrandizement in the Far East. Developments in aeronautics such as the jet-propelled plane and the robot bomb, and progress in the manufacture of synthetic rubber and gasoline, will be a source of comfort and temptation to those Japanese who retain dreams of imperial glory. Improved dietetics and improvement of health standards may diminish and eventually eliminate some of the physical handicaps of Japanese airmen. And, as was noted above, the weakening of the totalitarian spirit in Japan and the transfer of more freedom to the people might tend to increase physical efficiency and individual initiative and hence produce more proficient aviators. The implications of this ironical possibility need not be surveyed here, but should be kept in mind.

Construction of any type of aircraft in Japan should be totally forbidden in the future. Commercial aviation has been entirely subordinate to military aviation in Japan. If the Japanese are allowed to possess any commercial planes at all, they must be manufactured elsewhere. And continued supervision of all Japanese industry will be required. But the best safeguard against future Japanese aggressions will be our own realization that land-based air power is the decisive military weapon in the Far East, and our awareness that the Japanese understand this fact thoroughly.

Postwar precautions against Japan should include the maintenance of adequate naval strength in the Far East, with proper bases. Starting from scratch, Japan could develop her land and air power much more rapidly than the United States and Great Britain could build new navies, which will always be the sine qua non of the amphibious operations necessary for a counterattack upon Japan. Allied land and air forces should be permanently allocated to the Far East and there should be sufficient air facilities in China and the Philippine Islands. Major American air bases should be maintained in the Aleutian Islands and in Guam, with staging points in the mandated islands. Only a keen and enduring sensitivity to Japanese strategic thought, and the willingness and power to act quickly when it manifests the slightest signs of aggression, can preserve peace in the Far East.

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POLITICAL FERMENT IN CANADA

By Blair Fraser

UNTIL quite recently, Canada presented to American eyes a pleasing, if specious, appearance of simplicity. Like honest little Finland who always paid her debts, friendly little Canada had her place in the album of American folklore — the northern home-from-home, the foreign country that was indistinguishable from a 49th state. Even her political parties seemed directly and precisely comparable to those in the United States. There were the Conservatives, counterparts as their name implies of Hoover Republicans. There were the Liberals, just like Democrats without That Man in the White House. Liberals even had their Solid South, represented by the French-Canadian Province of Quebec; but they were refreshingly devoid of anything resembling a New Deal.

This simple, two-tone picture, if it still exists in the American mind, is soon to be shattered. Canada today is in a political ferment which has no exact precedent in her 77-year history as a nation. Talk about "revolt in Canada" is nonsense — nothing has happened or is likely to happen to justify such a phrase. But far-reaching political changes are in progress, changes which in the course of years may come to warrant the milder sense of the word "revolutionary."

At the moment, with a national election due as soon as hostilities end in Europe, two salient facts are discernible. One is a surge to the Left, strongest and most general that Canada has yet experienced, even stronger than the agrarian Progressive movement which sprang up after the last war and which captured 65 of the 200-odd seats in the federal Parliament. The other is the fragmentation of Canada's old party structure. Her two-party system has cracked irrevocably. There is strong possibility that the next Canadian Parliament may comprise three major and several minor parties, with none commanding an over-all majority.

Of the Leftward surge there can be no doubt, and it will make itself felt no matter what party or coalition of parties may emerge as the next Canadian Government. Last year, to the Gallup Poll question "Do you want to see great reforms in this country after the war?" more than two-thirds of all Canadians answered "Yes" — 71 percent, to be exact, compared to only 57 percent

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who said "Yes" in radical Britain and to the 58 percent of Americans who voted "No."

Every party has taken cognizance of this fact. At the last session of Parliament the present Liberal Government brought down an impressive docket of social legislation, including not only a veterans' reëstablishment plan described as "the most generous in the world," but also a Family Allowances Act which ten years ago would have sounded like Bolshevism. No party voted against these measures. The Conservatives, desperately fleeing the tag of Tory, asked only "Why didn't you do this long ago?" or "Why don't you do it better?" They had already sought to divest themselves of the taint of Big Business by changing their name to Progressive Conservative Party, and by importing as national leader an agrarian Progressive, John Bracken, one-time professor of agriculture and for 20 years Premier of the wheat-farming, free-trading Province of Manitoba.

Threatening the supremacy of both older parties is a third major group, the Socialist farmer-labor organization which bears the unwieldy title Coöperative Commonwealth Federation, usually shortened to CCF. Founded in 1932, it languished through eight years of depression but began to pick up amazingly as the war boom waxed. By 1941 it was strong enough to become a powerful official Opposition against a coalition of both old parties in the Pacific Coast province of British Columbia. It has since become the official Opposition in Manitoba against another coalition, and in Ontario against a minority Conservative Government which depends on Liberal support; while in the prairie province of Saskatchewan it has actually taken power. In the next Federal Parliament it will probably be official Opposition, and has even a slight chance of becoming the Government of Canada.

But Canada's political crevices and cross-fissures run in more than three directions. Six of her nine provinces have held elections within the past year, and victory has gone to five different parties. The elections returned two Liberal Governments, one Progressive Conservative, one CCF, one Social Credit — the only one of its kind in the world — and in Quebec the government of Maurice Duplessis and his *Union Nationale*, which has no counterpart anywhere. To make any sense of this complicated picture it is necessary first of all to forget the oversimplification that identifies Liberals with Democrats, Conservatives with Republicans, and which lumps both as "the Right" against a Socialist

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Left. Canada's political picture is extremely complex, so complex that even most Canadians do not understand it as a whole.

Both the older parties have deep roots, traditions that go back more than a century, for they are older than the Dominion itself as now constituted. The Liberals of today are lineal descendants of the Reformers and *Les Patriotes* who fought the Rebellion of 1837 against the bureaucrats of the British Colonial Office and their tight, grafting little clique which is still remembered with hatred as the Family Compact. It is not wholly a coincidence that the Liberal leader and present Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, is grandson of the rebel leader William Lyon Mackenzie.

Conservatives, equally, can trace their ancestry to the other faction in the 1837 Rebellion — not only to the Family Compact itself, but to those who put loyalty to the Crown and the established government above every other consideration and who, incidentally, won. Then as now, the core and spinal column of this faction were sons of the Tories whose lands and goods in the Thirteen Colonies were confiscated in 1783, and who fled the rebellious United States to a British domain where they became United Empire Loyalists. Also, then as now, their faction had the support of the Loyal Orange Lodge. In Canada as in Ulster, Orangemen tend to compound their anti-Catholic feeling with a chauvinism which is Imperial rather than national.

But no Canadian party can hold lasting power without support in French, Catholic Quebec, where a third of the nation clings resolutely to the language, the faith and the folkways of the pre-revolutionary colony of New France. Curiously enough, in the heyday of Conservative power, 50 to 85 years ago, the Conservatives struck their alliance with the most extreme French-Canadian Catholics, ultramontane clericals who regarded the mildly anti-clerical, Gallican Liberals as little better than atheists and heathen. In the days before press associations and radio, no discord marred this queer union between those who were more royalist than the King and those who were more Catholic than the Pope.

Liberals, on the other hand, have an anti-clerical tradition in Quebec, a tradition somewhat overlaid by age and respectability in recent decades, but one which still smoulders. The anomaly that an anti-clerical party should have and hold power in a passionately Catholic province is only one of the little puzzles that confuse the observer of Canadian affairs. It derives from two historical circumstances.

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First is the Liberal decision, 50-odd years ago, to name as their national leader Wilfrid Laurier, French Canada's most distinguished son up to the present time. Confronted with a choice between voting the clerical ticket and electing one of *les nôtres* Prime Minister of Canada, the French-Canadian did not hesitate — he voted Liberal for Laurier, and to a large extent he has been doing so ever since.

The other linchpin of Liberal power in Quebec is, or was, the conscription issue in the last war. French-Canadians are naturally isolationist. Owing no loyalty to a France which deserted them and which thereafter became revolutionary and anti-clerical, and regarding their conqueror England with feelings that vary from a mildly benevolent neutrality to an active dislike, they want no part in Imperial wars. That they, as Canadian citizens, should be conscripted against their will to fight in such wars impresses them as tyranny.

In 1917, conscription was imposed by the Government of Sir Robert Borden, a Government which became Union by acquisition of a number of English-speaking Liberals but which was, and remained, Conservative in root and leadership. Since then, Conservatives have not stood a chance of election in Quebec. They were ruined there as a party, and have since virtually disappeared. The Liberals for 25 years carried Quebec in every federal election by waving the bloody shirt and incanting the magic word "conscription." Now, of course, this broad but curving highway has led them to perdition. Now *they* are the war party, *they* are the conscriptionists. True, they have not imposed conscription for overseas service — Canadian draftees are only compelled to serve for home defense — but the effect nevertheless has been to make Quebec sullen and resentful. There is none of the violent opposition of 1917, when Quebec was openly rebellious and had to be held down by machine guns, but it is not yet certain that this war will not leave a considerable legacy of distrust, disunity and political estrangement. Certainly it has caused in Quebec considerable disenchantment with both the old-line parties.

Meanwhile, the amputated Quebec wing of the old Conservative Party has not died, but has become a political entity in itself. Maurice Duplessis, who had languished for years as leader of the tiny Conservative group in the Quebec Legislature, catapulted into power after forming, in 1935, his *Union Nationale* with a group of younger, nationalist Liberals who rebelled at the older party moguls' monopoly on party jobs, and also at the gen-

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eral corruption and decay of the barnacle-ridden Liberal régime. Duplessis was no success as Premier of Quebec and was tossed out of power as soon as he called an election, which was in 1939. But it is a measure of Quebec's discontent that in spite of his personal unpopularity, Duplessis was elected Premier once more in August of this year, over the Liberal Government of Adélard Godbout — though by a narrow margin.

The present war also created in Quebec another nationalist, anti-war party which was formed in 1942 under the title *Le Bloc Populaire Canadien*. It is headed by Maxime Raymond, a former Liberal M.P. who has consistently opposed the Government's war policy and was one of a handful to speak for complete neutrality in September 1939. Its provincial leader, André Laurendeau, is a very young and ardent nationalist; he and the young men around him are pupils and followers of the separatist historian, Canon Lionel Groulx. *Le Bloc* does not go so far as to urge that Quebec break off from Confederation and form a state of its own, but most of its younger men wish that such a policy were feasible.

For a while after its formation, *Le Bloc* looked like a real threat to Liberal control, and indeed to political stability, in the Province of Quebec. However, it ran into personnel trouble within a year of its foundation. Three of its strongest and best-known adherents walked out, rebelling against the domination of *Le Bloc's* only big-money man and chief source of revenue. Then during the Quebec campaign many *Bloc* speakers alienated supporters by their immoderate statements. In the event, *Le Bloc* was almost completely demolished at the August election, returning only four deputies to the Legislature and collecting a total popular vote of only 180,000, less than 15 percent of the votes cast. Almost certainly, this defeat will eliminate *Le Bloc* as a serious political threat in the future.

However, that is not the end of the complications in Quebec politics. Further fog is created by the presence of two dominant, dissident personalities. One is P. J. A. Cardin, a lifelong Liberal who rather belatedly split from his party on the conscription issue; his plans for the future are still secret, but he retains considerable personal influence whenever he decides to use it. The other is the famous Camillien Houde, ex-Mayor of Canada's largest city, Montreal. Houde is a curious figure, a combination of Huey Long and Jimmy Walker. A complete and successful demagogue, he has little talent for administration and none for

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teamwork, so that his career has been a steady alternation of victories and defeats — he can always get himself elected when he's out, but can't retain power when he's in. Moreover, his faculty for quarrelling with other politicians has created feuds between him and virtually every political leader in Canada. He hates them all, and they have no use for him.

Houde won some notoriety shortly before the war with a speech in which he said that if war should come between Britain and Fascist Italy, French-Canadian sympathies would be with Italy. But he did not become a really national figure until August 1940, when the Canadian Government introduced its home-defense conscription law and ordered national registration. Houde publicly counselled the people of Montreal to defy the law and refuse to register, as he said he intended doing himself. For this utterance the Liberal Government clapped him into an internment camp. Last August, just after the election, they let him out. He came back to Montreal in triumph, greeted by a cheering crowd of about 30,000 people, and assured them on the spot that he was going into politics in a big way. How much weight he will swing, and in what direction he will swing it, is anybody's guess. A good bet would be that Houde will have no trouble getting himself elected to a federal seat, but that he will fail if he tries to found and lead a party.

It will be obvious by this time that Quebec's immediate political future is difficult to predict, to put it mildly. This means that the political future of the Dominion is equally unpredictable, for Quebec is the centre and focus of Canada's major, perennial problem in statesmanship, the problem of reconciling two alien cultures and traditions within a single national framework. Never, except for that dreadful period of storm and schism between 1917 and 1919, has a Canadian Government tried to function without representatives of both major ethnic groups. Few Canadians would wish for such a Government. Almost the definition of a "national" party in Canada has been "a party with support from both races." But at the present moment the Liberals are the only national party with any considerable backing in Quebec. Should they lose that backing at the next election, a one-race Government becomes a possibility, or at best an inquiet coalition of parties whose fundamental beliefs and aims are sharply divergent. And even if the Liberals should hold Quebec, or a reasonably large section thereof, they have still the task of holding the rest of the country. This, by present indication, will

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be even more difficult and dubious than the fight in Quebec. The politics of English-speaking Canada has become almost as riven and complex as that of Quebec, though its complexities are entirely different.

Outside Quebec the schisms are partly class, partly regional, partly a combination of both. British Columbia on the west coast, Manitoba and Saskatchewan on the prairies, are happy hunting grounds for the Socialist CCF, and the general tone of the population is radical. Many of the prairie Liberals are old-time Progressives who followed their leader, T. A. Crerar, into the Liberal fold when the Progressive wave receded 20 years ago. The typical prairie Conservative, in so far as he exists at all, is also a good deal to the Left of his party's rank and file.

Alberta, on the western edge of the prairie and in the foothills of the Rockies, has just reëlected the world's only Social Credit Government, nominally dedicated to the theories of the British currency eccentric, Major Douglas. Social Credit first came to power in Alberta in 1935. Led by the late schoolteacher and radio spellbinder William Aberhart, in a campaign like California's "ham and eggs" that promised $25 a month "social dividend" to every voter, the new party was swept in by a depression-bound, debt-ridden electorate ready to try anything once. Needless to say, nothing more was heard about the $25 a month, and little about Social Credit theories generally. But the new Government did proceed to hand out debt relief at the expense of the banks and mortgage companies. It gave the banks a kicking around which endeared it to the average elector, and its attempt to found a provincial bank was frustrated only by Ottawa's disallowing the legislation. Also, it gave the province a good, efficient, popular government, built up the best and most progressive school system in Canada, and generally led the way in health and social welfare. It is to this record, not to its monetary theories, that most people credit the Government's continuing hold on the Alberta electorate. At the last federal election in 1940, Alberta also sent a Social Credit bloc to Ottawa. However, the reëlection of the provincial Social Credit Government is no guarantee of victory for the party in the federal field, where most voters prefer to rely on a party of national status. Many votes which went Social Credit in the provincial field will go CCF in the federal.

West of the Great Lakes, therefore, it may be expected that the Conservatives will win virtually none of the 71 federal seats, that

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Liberals and Social Credit will each win a few, and that the CCF will win most, if present political trends continue through the election campaign.

Next we come to industrial Ontario, the largest, richest province in the Dominion. What will Ontario do?

Traditionally, of course, Ontario is the citadel of old true-blue Toryism. Its Progressive Conservative Government, one of the two now in power in Canadian provinces, is headed by Colonel George A. Drew, a man who is outspoken in his loyalty to the British Empire (he seldom says "Commonwealth") and the only Canadian public man of any stature who still refers to himself and his party as Tory. Drew is the idol of those old-line Conservatives whose dominant political emotions are their hatred of Catholic Quebec and their Imperial, not national, patriotism.

Lately there has been talk of a "plot" to oust the mild Progressive, John Bracken, from Progressive Conservative leadership and replace him with the more colorful Drew. The latter has denied these stories categorically with his customary vigor, and indeed there has never been any evidence that he personally had anything to do with such a project. It is, however, indisputable that many individual Conservatives regard this change as a consummation devoutly to be wished. If John Bracken fails to carry his party to victory at the next election, a movement will almost certainly arise to depose him from party leadership in favor of Colonel Drew. Mr. Bracken so far has had no trouble maintaining his superiority over the old Tory faction within his party. But his position will be weakened if, as expected, the old Tory faction turns out to be stronger, in terms of M.P.'s elected, than the Progressive wing of the Progressive Conservative Party.

But even in its own Ontario, old-line Toryism has been heavily challenged — not by the Liberals, who are probably less popular in Ontario than anywhere else, but by the Socialist CCF. The CCF, which started out as a party of long-haired intellectuals and prairie farmers, lately captured the support of huge segments of the Canadian labor movement, especially among the more radical CIO-affiliated unions. In the Ontario provincial election last year, they elected the astonishing total of 34 deputies to a Legislature in which they had formerly had no seats at all; this was only four less than the victorious Progressive Conservatives.

Premier Drew, therefore, has to govern without an over-all majority, which he does by relying on support from the little six-

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seat remnant of the Liberal Party in the Legislature. He got through one session successfully by this method, but his chances of getting through another are slight. There is considerable reason to doubt that he even wants to. Lately he has been acting more and more like a Premier in search of an election issue.

When Prime Minister Mackenzie King brought down his Family Allowances Act, under which a cash monthly benefit will be paid to parents for every child under 16 whom they support, the Progressive Conservatives in Parliament voted in favor of it. But shortly thereafter Colonel Drew went on the radio to proclaim his intention as Premier of Ontario of fighting the Family Allowances Act by every means within his power — means which he did not specify, but which could include a challenge in the courts of the validity of the law under Canada's federal constitution. This stand by Ontario Conservatives, if tested in the Legislature, would unite the Liberals and the CCF in a vote of nonconfidence against the Drew Government. An election would follow automatically.

Drew's opposition to family allowances was expressed with a bitter attack upon Quebec. This makes it an ideal issue not only for a provincial but for a federal election — a challenge which Mackenzie King said next day he will be delighted to accept when an election is called, as it will be whenever European hostilities end, or at latest when Parliament's life expires next spring. But of that, more anon.

East of Ontario and Quebec are the small, remote Maritime Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and tiny Prince Edward Island, which together elect about two dozen M.P.'s to Ottawa. Little PEI remained Liberal in a recent provincial election, will probably do so again in a federal. New Brunswick, settled by United Empire Loyalists in 1784, had always been a stronghold of Toryism and the Liberal government of Premier McNair was considered to be personally weak. The blow was all the more shattering, then, when the election of August 28 returned McNair and his Liberals to power. Whether the federal Liberals can do as well remains to be seen.

As for Nova Scotia, the nozzle of Canada's war supply pipeline and the embarkation point for Canada's troops, it has developed a vast weariness and dislike for the Liberal wartime bureaucracy. Also, as a habitually depressed province whose industries even war has not fully revived, it is in a sore, Socialist mood in its industrial areas. But the Liberal tradition elsewhere in the

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province is strong, the Conservative woefully weak. Federal results there are anyone's guess.

For the country as a whole, about the only political forecast which this confusion seems to warrant is the probability that no one party will command Parliament with any degree of assurance. To do so requires a minimum of 125 seats, and as things stand today any of the three major groups will do well to win 100.

If the Liberals can hold Quebec, and win, say, 45 or 50 of its 65 seats, they will probably carry on as Government in the same way Colonel Drew is now doing in Ontario; *i.e.*, bring down a legislative program which will be supported either by the CCF on the Left or the Progressive Conservatives on the Right. Even at worst, they could probably count on assembling another 50 seats from the various battlefields of the other provinces, which would give them a compact, reasonably powerful group. But if they lose Quebec, which is by no means impossible or even improbable, they are done for.

Should the Progressive Conservatives win 100 seats — and even Mr. Bracken has admitted publicly they have little chance of winning more — they might conceivably try to form a government of their own, but its chances of survival would be slight. It might, however, effect some kind of alliance with some group from Quebec. Once the war is over and the conscription issue out of the way, such an alliance would become feasible; it would not be the first such ill-assorted but temporarily effective union of extremes.

CCF hopes of winning as many as 100 seats are not high. Their leaders would be well content with 75 to 90, with which they would form a powerful Opposition and settle down to learn the technique of parliamentary government and generally groom themselves for power. The CCF is short of trained personnel, and knows it. Its present parliamentary group numbers only about a dozen, and it has no experience of actual government even in the provincial field; its first Cabinet took office, in Saskatchewan, only last June. And it has no support in Quebec; in the provincial election there it took only one riding.

M. J. Coldwell, national leader of the CCF, is a man of rare abilities. He is by long odds the best speaker and debater now in Canadian public life. A moderate man, whose Socialism is only slightly to the Left of a Left-wing Liberalism, he enjoys the liking and respect of all parties in the House of Commons. But Coldwell has too few able, experienced men around him, and he knows it.

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Doubtless he would not refuse the responsibilities of power if they were thrust upon him, but he would not be avid for it at the present time. He almost certainly would not accept coalition, compromise or a precarious minority rule just to enjoy the sweets of office. What he would like best, probably would be to force the two old parties into a permanent coalition of the Right, and there are many Rightists in Canada who think this would be a good idea. This does not seem likely to happen — not, at any rate, while 70-year-old Mackenzie King is alive to lead the Liberals. On paper the differences between the two old parties may appear slight; their platforms sound much the same, their ancient wrangle about tariffs was their only economic dispute for years and very little came of it; and their financial support comes from the same quarters. But as already indicated, in their history, their traditions and their approach to public questions the two parties are profoundly different, and they attract different types of men to their ranks. No one in Canada is more keenly aware of these differences than Mr. King. And he is not only aware, he is proud of them.

Mackenzie King entered public life to create the Canadian Department of Labor, and he drafted the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act which is still, after nearly 40 years, the cornerstone of Canadian labor legislation. He first entered Parliament as Minister of Labor. He regards himself, not without reason, as a lifelong radical at heart. In temperament at least, he would find the average CCF Socialist far more congenial than the average Tory. So that although Progressive Conservatives would gladly coalesce with Liberals, especially if the Liberals were fewer than they, Mackenzie King most probably would not have them. It is conceivable that Liberals, if pressed to the wall, might be willing to coalesce on some terms with the CCF, but the CCF in its present mood would not have *them*. The outlook for stable coalition, therefore, is not bright.

What does all this mean in terms of Canadian policy?

So far as internal policy is concerned, it means any government will have to operate with a maximum of regard for public opinion. Whatever its color, the next Canadian Government will almost certainly have a precarious majority if it has one at all. It will be treading a narrow and treacherous path, beset by rivals alert for every favorable opportunity for a no-confidence vote and an election. Since the Canadian people have declared themselves unmistakably for reform and social security, reform and social

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security they will have — provided no method is employed that is unpopular with a large mass of the electorate. That proviso probably rules out any large degree of socialization, even if the CCF should form a government. But it equally rules out retrenchment, budget-balancing, unrestricted "free enterprise" and the other attributes of old-fashioned "sound" government. Canada's next government will have a mandate for economic adventure.

In foreign policy, on the other hand, the broad lines of Canada's course can be charted with considerable assurance. There is virtually no difference between the Liberals and the CCF on foreign policy. Both are for full partnership in a postwar system of collective security, with Canada playing her rôle as a sovereign nation. Both are for the closest friendship and coöperation with the United States, though not necessarily with American business and financial interests. Both are against any significant change in Canada's relation to the British Commonwealth. They want no return to a centralized Empire or even to anything that looks like it. They are content with the present system — an association of free and sovereign nations, equal in status, united only by their common cultural background and their common loyalty to the Crown.

Progressive Conservatives, on this question of Commonwealth relations and of foreign policy generally, are divided. Some, including John Bracken himself, see eye to eye with the Liberals and the CCF on this point, though they do not always admit the identity of their views. However, Prime Minister King was able during a recent foreign policy debate to produce a long, detailed statement which John Bracken had made on Commonwealth policy in answer to a questionnaire interview by *Maclean's Magazine*, a statement which differed in no essential from the views Mr. King himself was then expressing.

Another Progressive Conservative group, which includes but is not limited to the old-line Tories, disagrees rather hotly with the Liberal-CCF-Bracken position. This group wants something tangible done to strengthen the British Commonwealth in the eyes of the world, something to declare in unmistakable terms that British nations will stand together on all important questions in their relation to the rest of the world. It tends to regard the United States with suspicion.

However, this group has been a diminishing minority in Canada ever since the last Great War. It suffered a further set-

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back with the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London last May, which revealed that this view of the British Imperial relation is equally a minority opinion in the Commonwealth as a whole. It can be predicted with assurance that Canadian foreign and Commonwealth policy will not change, no matter who wins the next election.

If the Liberals can so arrange it, the chief issue at that election will be neither external nor economic, but constitutional. The depression showed that Canada's present constitution is no longer workable, that by giving tax power to the federal Government and administrative power to the provinces it creates a virtual paralysis in the whole field of social legislation. Also, it necessitates a clumsy, uneconomic, unfair tax structure which is a burden and a halter on the Canadian economy. One conference was called to fix it in 1941. It failed, torpedoed when Ontario's Mitch Hepburn and two other provincial premiers walked out. A second conference has been called for next year; it must not fail if Canada's ambitious postwar reconstruction plans are to succeed.

On this issue, too, the Liberals and the CCF will stand more or less together. And here, too, the Progressive Conservatives may turn out to be divided — John Bracken, when he was Premier of Manitoba, was one of the strongest advocates of the Sirois Report on the reform of the Constitution which the 1941 conference was called to consider and adopt. But it looks as though Premier George Drew might lead at least part, if not all, of the party into an opposite stand. Colonel Drew's blast against the Family Allowances Act contained all the fertile seeds of a states-rights issue. He complained because family allowances would take most money from richest Ontario, give most to the big families of Catholic Quebec. Actually, wealthy Quebec would pay its own way and Ontario's surplus payments would go mostly to the poorer western and Maritime provinces. That, however, is not the point. The point is that Drew's argument is identical with the argument by which Mitch Hepburn, a rebel Liberal, justified his sabotage of the Sirois Conference in 1941.

On this one issue of provincial rights, Tory Drew and Nationalist Duplessis would probably stand together, in spite of their mutual dislike and disagreement on everything else. A federal-provincial conference could not possibly succeed with Ontario and Quebec dissenting. Again, the outlook is dark.

In this constitutional issue lies the one threat to the basic

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order and good government of Canada, the one danger that "revolt in Canada" might become more than a windy phrase. When the servicemen come back and the war workers go looking for peacetime jobs they will demand a better, more secure life than the dreary, dole-ridden thirties. They are convinced such an improvement is feasible — "we've done it in war, we can do it in peace" is an argument which takes a lot of answering.

War solved Canada's constitutional deadlock, temporarily, through the overriding power that "emergency" gives to the federal Government. Provincial rights are suspended for the duration. With peace, these rights will come back into force and the old paralysis, unless forestalled by immediate action, will descend on the Dominion once more. There is some reason to doubt that a war-wearied electorate, determined on a more abundant life, would tolerate a return to that legislative impotence. There is some doubt that they would heed legalistic excuses about constitutional process. There is danger — fairly remote, but danger — that discontent and disenchantment might then promote the kind of change that goes farther than anyone can foresee.

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CAN THE PHILIPPINES STAND ALONE?

By H. Foster Bain

SINCE the magnificent and tragic days of Bataan the emotions of every American have been charged with pride and good will toward the Filipinos. We are sincere in our pleasure at the expected establishment of the free and independent Philippine Republic. But since the war began our minds have scarcely touched the problems with which it will have to deal.

In the years before the war we knew that Philippine independence presented real questions for us and for the Filipinos. We know that the problems are still there, though we choose not to examine them. There are three such questions in particular — one political, one military and one economic. The political question is, "Can the Filipinos maintain a stable government?" The military question is, "Can the Filipinos defend themselves?" The economic question is, "Have the Filipinos the resources to maintain a sound economy when deprived of a favored position in the American market?" The first two questions are relatively easy to answer, but the third, which provoked more and more discussion before the war as the date for the final granting of independence to the Filipinos came closer, is complex and demands careful analysis. This paper is intended chiefly to examine certain of the features of that economic problem, touching first and more briefly upon aspects of the postwar political and military situation.

II

It has been the settled policy of the United States to regard the American rôle in the Philippines as one of temporary trusteeship. At times the will-o'-the-wisp of "manifest destiny" has beckoned down the road of imperialism and permanent occupation, but such fancies never obtained a strong hold on American public opinion. It is significant that we have never seriously considered giving the Filipinos the status of American citizens, as we did the Puerto Ricans. To make the Filipinos American citizens would bring a large undigestible body into our national life, we feared, and would create an alien political bloc which, like the Irish bloc in Parliament, might even hold the balance of power at some critical time. It was equally impossible for us to imagine holding any people in permanent subjection. And we had no wish whatever to have two grades of citizens. The

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Negroes, who were here before our government was formed, provided one major problem of that kind, and one was enough. Such considerations reached so deeply into our subconscious fears that we even placed the same high bars against the naturalization of Filipinos as we had raised against that of other Asiatics. This was unnecessary and not altogether wise, but it reflected a deep instinct of the American people. The only attitude toward the Philippines which we found bearable was to think of ourselves as but temporarily in occupation, guardians but not rulers.

We need not be ashamed of the way in which we acquitted ourselves of this responsibility. Among those of us who migrated to the Philippines only a minor fraction were angels, but the civil government we established there put Filipino rights first with remarkable consistency. Restrictions on land ownership were applied to Americans as rigorously as to others. The conservation clauses in the present Commonwealth Constitution are direct descendants of executive orders issued here by Theodore Roosevelt. We guarded rather than exploited the Filipinos in many other particulars, frequently over the loud protest of adventurous Americans who had become accustomed to taking what they wanted from our own public land. The Filipinos now very generally acknowledge the benefits of the 40 years of American occupation; that is especially evident to anyone who has lived among them in these war years, as the writer has.

It is human nature to procrastinate about relinquishing any position of power, however. We cannot take much pride in the way the final date of our departure from the Philippines was fixed. We had set "the establishment of a stable government" as one index of the proper time for us to get out; and we apparently found it hard to convince ourselves of the fact of Philippine political stability.

When Admiral Dewey and President McKinley took us into the Philippines, political conditions there offered slight cause for optimism as to the chances of building a democracy. The Filipinos had inherited the fundamental democratic idea from their Malay ancestors, and from that fine tradition of the dignity of the individual which the Spaniards had brought to the islands. (One of the causes of the failure of the Japanese there now is that they have no realization of how deeply the Filipinos resent being slapped and ordered around. Their sense of outrage goes to the very depths of their souls.) But the old *cacique* system, the poverty of the people and the concentration of wealth in a com-

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paratively few hands had put the government in the control of a selfish oligarchy. The *taos*, the great body of farmers and workers, had no practice in political self-government, or understanding of it, and the leaders had rarely learned the lessons of compromise so necessary to the successful working of democracy.

Under our guidance the practice of political democracy spread from the municipalities to the provinces and then to the national government. By the time the Commonwealth was established in 1935, the forms of democratic government were familiar to the great body of its citizens and the ideal of democracy was firmly fixed in the minds of the people. Leaders had been trained and had acquired experience, and a considerable body of men and women had been inducted into the civil service. Not enough experienced executives and administrators are even yet available and many minor mistakes have been made, but by 1935 a stable and reasonably competent government was in operation.

There was still a question whether a strong leader or party would always be content with constitutional means of opposition. A partial and reassuring answer to this question was given by the quick suppression of the Sakdalista insurrection in 1935 by the Filipino constabulary, and the resumption of harmonious relationships between the two great political leaders of the Filipinos, Quezon and Osmeña, following a political disagreement. After the recent, sad death of Señor Quezon, Señor Osmeña succeeded to the presidency in due course and without incident, in accord with regular American traditions. The social causes which led to the Sakdalista insurrection still exist in the great central plain of Luzon, with its large estates and many poor tenants. But though possible trouble cannot be entirely left out of account, it seems altogether probable that the Filipinos can and will maintain a stable government.

The problem of the military defense of the Philippines will be settled by the war, at least for as long a period as such matters seem likely to remain settled elsewhere in this world. With Japan out of the picture as an aggressive neighbor, the Filipinos feel that one generation of peace and a reasonable opportunity for economic development will make them as able to defend themselves as the people of any other small nation. Surely we cannot ask more than that. The Great Powers will certainly insure peace in the Pacific in the immediate future. The existence of the Philippine Republic will assure us of the help of a loyal friend in the Far East, one able and willing to put half a million good

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soldiers into the field. From our point of view, maintenance of peace in the Pacific is no longer exclusively a problem of sending American boys to the Far East. If necessary, we will fight in our own interest, but we shall have friends fighting with us in their interest. We would both be fighting also for the general good. The problem of naval and air bases will be solved very simply, since the Philippine Republic as well as ourselves will be represented on the Pacific Council which will, presumably, be the policy-forming body back of an inter-Allied staff. All such bases will be placed at the service of the combined general staff without impairment of the sovereignty of the particular country concerned.

III

The economic problems of an independent Philippine republic do not lend themselves to so quick a solution. The original economy of the islands was based upon agriculture and fishing. In pre-Spanish times, the Chinese were the chief traders and to this day they have a strong hold on the retail business of the country. Agriculture was greatly developed in the four centuries of Spanish domination, but little industrialization took place. Spain's gifts to the Philippines were chiefly spiritual. The Filipinos received their religion from Spain, and the upper classes received education and culture; the bulk of the people remained farmers, living just above the subsistence level. The visible signs of Spanish occupation of the islands are the big churches in all the cities and small villages, a few universities and schools, numerous convents and monasteries, the great stone houses of the upper classes, the walls around Manila, a few stone forts, and a very few narrow public roads and stone bridges.

The Americans brought modern industrialization, but industrial enterprises now occupy but a small sector in the Philippine economy. One of the first bureaus organized by the new Government, and one of the most effective, was the Forestry Bureau. The great national forests were placed under scientific management, sawmills were established on many of the islands, and an export lumber business developed. Sugar "centrals" were built, and the American market opened to free entry of Philippine sugar and certain other products. Leaders of the Filipinos vigorously opposed this enmeshing of Philippine economy with that of the United States, foreseeing that it would make the achievement of political independence more difficult. The American administrators, deeply impressed by the widespread poverty in

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the islands, saw that the standard of living could be raised only by stimulating trade and industry, and knew that the development of a democratic way of life depended upon an improvement in the economic condition of the people. A great sugar industry, with a productive capacity of a million and a half tons per year, was therefore built up. Sugar became the largest item in Philippine exports, and the industry was the chief source of revenue and one of the largest fields of employment.

A major economic problem of an independent republic will be readjustment of the sugar industry to a restricted market. Inevitably there will be a considerable shrinkage in output when free access to the American market is cut off, but progress in technology and, in a lefthanded fashion, the war, may make the adjustment easier than was expected. A number of the sugar centrals were destroyed in the earlier fighting on the islands, and others may disappear in the fighting to come. It seems taken for granted that the owners of the plants will be compensated for damage through the war insurance act. But it is probable that many of the plants will not be rebuilt, particularly those of the marginal producers. This of course will not help the planters. The sugar business everywhere seems headed for a change, however. Refining as a separate industry may shrink or even disappear, and beet sugar and corn products, and other substitutes used during the war may hold a larger place. Changes in the manufacture of sugar, faster transportation and the growth of the chain stores will make direct marketing much more possible. A large part of the sugar marketed is now consumed within a year of the time it is made, and no longer needs to be refined "hard." Its preparation is well within the capacity of a modern central. Changes in beet cultivation point the way to freedom from the necessity of "stoop labor" and all the social disadvantages which were inherent in it, and will undoubtedly stimulate sugar production in the United States. We shall have a smaller need to import sugar, but direct marketing will be advantageous to the Philippine producers who do send it to us.

Coconut growing is one of the most widespread industries in the Philippines. Nearly every farmer has a few trees, and there are whole districts where the nuts are the chief crop. With the American occupation, oil pressing and refining mills were built, coco butter and coco honey were manufactured on a commercial scale, soap making and preparation of dried coconut were undertaken. Many of the new plants erected for these industries were

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established by American companies as branch factories; others were put up by local residents, American, Filipino, or Spanish. The restriction on imports of coconut products to the United States fell like a blight on whole areas, and it is commonly believed that the restrictions to come will all but extinguish the new industries and drive the farmers back to the ancient industry of the Pacific islands, that of making copra only.

A third great industry based on agriculture is pineapple growing and canning, built up under the leadership of the California-Hawaiian financial group. With scientific management, a quota in the international market, and adequate financial backing, the Del Monte pineapple plantation in Mindanao expected to harvest 30,000,000 plants in 1942. Its output occupied fourth place among Philippine exports. Similar large-scale production of other fruits and vegetables in the islands might be organized. An excellent rubber industry has been established which now supplies local demand and has started a trickle of exports. Benefiting by a knowledge of what has been done in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere, and with high-grade technical management, local plantations have developed therms and nursery stock which, they believe, will enable them to meet the competition of rubber growers anywhere in the world.

The Philippines have a natural monopoly of abaca, or Manila hemp. Growing and preparing it was an ancient small-scale industry. This has been transformed into a modern business, mainly, it must be confessed, as a result of the excellent technical work and good management of the Japanese. The social and political results of Japanese initiative have not been so satisfactory. Davao, the abaca center, has become a little Tokyo, and a distinctly alien and unassimilated element has been introduced into the population. While wartime substitutes for Manila hemp will probably retain part of the field after the war, the abaca industry should continue to flourish, because of the unique properties of the rope made from it.

There is little reason to doubt that the Philippine farms, forests and fisheries will, as time goes on, contribute more importantly to both domestic and export markets. Experimental work on quinine production has been started, under direction of the Forestry Bureau. The National Development Company, a government-owned corporation, has taken the lead in establishing canning plants for fruit, vegetables, fish and other products. This modernization of ancient local industries is perhaps the most

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hopeful field for development of an economy yielding a richer life for the people. There are great areas available, including a considerable acreage of excellent land which will be ready for new crops as the sugar industry is contracted. Good soil, abundant labor which likes to farm, adequate rainfall, and a suitable climate all favor larger development of agriculture. The population must be better distributed, and there must be changes in land ownership and crop financing; but these, being systems made by man, can be changed by man.

IV

The Philippines have important and varied mineral deposits on which to base industry. Gold mining has grown apace in the past ten years and production amounted to more than $40,000,000 in the last year before the war. Gold ranked third among exports and one year's output was, in fact, about equal to the total public debt of the country. Production had started its sensational climb before the American increase in the price of gold and some gold mining would continue if the price were reduced to the old figure.

There is a well-established Portland cement manufacturing business in the hands of one government owned and one privately owned plant. There is a beginning of a modern ceramic industry. Asbestos, sulphur and other industrial minerals occur, although whether they are present in commercial quantities remains to be demonstrated. Limestone and solar salt are abundant and, with charcoal, afford a sound basis for chemical industries.

Of the metallic minerals other than gold which are present and are now being mined, the usual sulphides of copper, lead and zinc seem to be of limited extent. There is one copper mine, now being vigorously exploited by the Japanese, which will probably prove of increasing importance. Other copper-bearing ore bodies are known but have not as yet proved to be of size and grade to warrant extensive development. Lead and zinc are known only as accessory minerals in the gold mines.

The really important deposits of metal-bearing ores are those which yield iron and the ferro-alloys — chromite and manganese. Iron ore is widespread. Though most of the deposits are small and inaccessible, there are three exceptions, one of them extremely important. Two sizeable deposits, situated near the sea, are those of the Larup mine of the Philippine Iron Mining Company on the east coast of Luzon which shipped nearly a million tons in a

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single year and has satisfactory though not enormous reserves, and of the Samar Mining Company which has a small but well-equipped harbor on the island from which the company takes its name. Its output was about 200,000 tons per year. Both mines were developed by local capital and both shipped to Japan, the only market in the Far East for iron ore. A third and much larger deposit of iron ore is present within a government reservation along the northeast coast of Mindanao and on adjacent islands. Here something more than a billion tons of ore is spread out and can be cheaply mined and delivered to an excellent harbor.

Unfortunately, exhaustive studies of Philippine coalfields show that there is no local source of fuel adequate to work up such a large body of iron. The development of this Surigao deposit, as it is called, has also been blocked by the fact that the ore is contaminated by the presence of small percentages of nickel and chrome. In themselves these are valuable alloys, but they occur in this ore in such proportions as to detract from the quality of the steel, if the standard methods of manufacture be used. Known methods of eliminating them are expensive, but extensive research is under way in various parts of the world directed toward finding a cheaper way of removing them and of obtaining important revenue from them on their own account. Whatever may come out of this research, there can be little doubt that the Surigao iron ore deposit is destined to play an important part in the economy of the Far East and that it is one of the great natural resources of the Philippines.

The chromite and manganese deposits are already under exploitation. Both are essential to any large steel industry and both are minerals which the United States must import. Two grades of chromite are shipped from the Philippines. The Masinloc deposit, one of the large ones of the world, sends out refractory ore only, but refractories are as badly needed in metallurgy as is fuel or the ore to be smelted. The other grade is adapted to use in metallurgy itself or in the chemical industries. Two large and rich mines of this grade of ore are present near the Masinloc in Zambales province of Luzon, and other important deposits have been opened up in both eastern and western Mindanao. Manganese is known in a number of the provinces but has been mined so far chiefly in the Visayan or middle belt of islands. How important the mines will prove to be cannot now be foretold.

As has already been stated, coal is scarce in the Philippines and a big coal mining industry is not to be anticipated. Wood and

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charcoal are used for household purposes and locally mined coal is supplemented by imports for locomotives, steamers, making of gas and cement, and in power plants. Formerly 500,000 tons or more of coal were imported, but the use of petroleum, particularly on steamers and in isolated power plants which have adopted Diesel engines, has cut this figure to about 300,000 tons.

The shortage of coal has spurred efforts to find petroleum fields and to develop hydroelectric power. A comprehensive petroleum survey of the islands was completed by the Bureau of Mines and the National Development Company in 1941. The results were felt to be so encouraging that exploratory drilling was begun, and at the time the Japanese occupied the country two wells were being put down on the island of Cebu, one for the government and the other by a Philippine company in which there is an American interest. The prospects already seemed most hopeful in one of them.

A beginning has been made in the development of hydroelectric power. What power Manila gets at present comes from the new Caloraya plant, and there is another small plant near Baguio. A general grid covering any large area is unlikely, however, since transmission of current from one island to another is not commercially feasible. Fortunately, the largest potential power center is on the largest island, Mindanao. Here the big central upland drains into Lake Lanao, which finds outlet to the sea through a short river broken by numerous rapids, which finally plunges over the cliff in the great Maria Christina falls. The situation is almost ideal for the development and use of power. Good harbors are available nearby, and on the flat land between falls and sea there is ample space for factory sites to which power can be delivered at switchboard costs lower than at Niagara. A helpful consideration is that while the amount of potential power is large, all of it need not be developed at once in order to get it at a low cost. This industrial center can grow naturally as markets are found for its manufactured products. The whole project has been surveyed by the Water Power Commission and it is only a matter of time until a beginning in developing it is made.

V

Sufficient has been said, I believe, to justify a plain answer to the question with which this analysis began. The Philippine Republic can stand on its own feet. The Philippine Islands contain natural resources sufficient to sustain an independent and

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balanced economy, so far, of course, as that is a possibility for any nation in the modern world. Perhaps it is pertinent to add that, through the depression years when many other governments were depending on deficit spending, the Commonwealth of the Philippines lived within its income, had a surplus each year and steadily decreased its public debt. During this period the Commonwealth expanded its school and road systems and began to build a national defense system. Despite the admittedly grave problems still to be met, there seems no reason for pessimism about the future of the Philippine Republic. No little economic readjustment will be needed, and its hardship can be lessened only by the sympathetic interest of the United States. The ten-year period allowed for readjustment was plainly too short, and even that period has been grievously cut into by the war. Likewise it was unfair to expect the Commonwealth to transfer its foreign trade from American markets to others when it had no power to negotiate or even to be represented in foreign countries. As things now go, government must play a considerable part in such matters, and the Philippine Government was forbidden even to raise its voice. Time and patient negotiation will be required to effect the changes, wise or foolish as they may be, called for by the Independence Act.

In 1937 a joint Preparatory Commission studied these matters and recommended a period of adjustment extending to 1960. Congress refused to grant this, but softened the immediate hardships by substituting a decreasing quota system for the increasing tax. This had the effect of permitting trade to be profitable when it survived at all, but it nonetheless insisted upon the impossibly quick final adjustment. It was an ungenerous solution of the difficulty; surely a better one can be found. Congress recently made possible a new approach to the problem by passing a Joint Resolution and an Act under which the date of independence is moved forward and made to depend upon the effective recovery of the islands from Japanese depredations. Generous provision is made for recompense for the actual losses of the war and a new commission is established to recommend adjustments of trade and other economic relations between the two countries.

The new commission consists of three Senators, three members of the House and three Presidential appointees. The men selected are in each case especially well chosen. An equal number of Filipinos serve on the commission under the able chairmanship of the new President of the Commonwealth, Serge Osmeña. Two

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vacancies have been left to be filled by men not now available.

An attempt to forecast the decisions of this commission would be unwarranted, but a few possible actions to ameliorate the situation may be mentioned. For one thing a moratorium might be declared on further changes in quota of free shipments into the United States, for a reasonable period though not necessarily a protracted one. The war has disturbed the whole world so profoundly that a breathing spell would seem to be warranted in this matter as in others. The major difficulty in the past was the sugar quota. The Filipinos feel, rightly or wrongly, that their interests were sacrificed to the interests of Cuba and those who had made investments there. And it seems reasonable to believe that we ourselves have acquired a new point of view about this, in the light of Filipino loyalty and bravery. A satisfactory solution may be expected. Meanwhile, if the present quota of 850,000 tons or even less can be maintained, it will help mightily.

The second field in which particular hardship has occurred and in which more impends is that of coconut products. Grayson Kirk has shown how false the premises were on which Congress was induced to place severe restrictions on the entry of these products and how badly the American farmer was misled into supporting this action.[1] Why, for example, was it necessary to kill the dried coconut industry? In some of these actions we seem to have cut off our noses to spite our own faces. The powers of the new commission and action within the broad limits of the Trade Agreements Act seem to offer possibilities for a much better adjustment. In the long run the Philippine coconut industry will probably find its salvation in making and supplying much more soap and coco butter to the peoples of the Far East. There is an unlimited need for the one and no prejudice against the other, since eastern peoples are accustomed to use vegetable fats and not meat products.

There is one American interest that is fundamental in all these details of our relationship with the Islands: it is to our advantage that the Philippine Republic be a success. A strong and sturdy Republic will be a bulwark of peace and stability in the Far East. It will likewise be the most conspicuous contribution we can make to the idea that the democratic American way of life is a sound one for all peoples.

[1] *Cf.* "Philippine Independence," by Grayson Kirk. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1936.

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THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY OF FRANCE

By P. O. Lapie

"COLONIZATION seeks to establish a living balance among all the groups that constitute humanity." This definition by Jean Rémy Ayouné, a Negro intellectual from Brazzaville, in French Equatorial Africa, is imperfect but significant nevertheless. It is inadequate because other acts besides colonization aim at attaining the equilibrium mentioned — war for instance; yet it reveals that in the eyes of a French African Negro the aim of France in colonizing his country has been to achieve a common level of civilization between the colonized and the colonizer. Each nation has its own civilizing genius; each advances on the road of human progress by its own particular methods. How does France intend to share her special genius with the peoples of her possessions? That is the question I shall try to answer.

But first let me recall a few familiar basic facts. France's colonizing experience dates back to the French states established in the Levant at the time of the first crusade, in 1099. The fifteenth century was a period of discoveries. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the vast French undertakings in the Americas and the Indies. The colonial empire of the present day was founded under the Third Republic, mostly since 1875.

This empire is very diversified, embracing all races and the principal religions and spreading over all latitudes. In Africa, the French possessions stretch from the Mediterranean to the Congo. In the Indian Ocean are Madagascar, Djibouti and the Establishments of India; in the Pacific, Indo-China, New Caledonia, Tahiti and many other islands; in the western hemisphere, Guiana, the French West Indies, St. Pierre and Miquelon. The judicial status of these colonies differs. Algeria, a Government General, divided into three French departments, comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Morocco and Tunisia, international protectorates, are under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Numerous territories are colonial protectorates, and thus under the Ministry of the Colonies. Some of the colonies send elected representatives to the French Parliament. Members of the colored races have at all times sat in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and at least three have been Cabinet members.

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II

My title states that I propose to describe a French colonial policy which is "new." I refer principally to the policy instituted in Central Africa by the late Governor General Eboué, in his instructions dated November 9, 1941. Today this policy is being pushed forward by René Pleven, Commissioner of Colonies since 1940, and by Governor Henri Laurentie, Director of Political Affairs in the Colonial Commissariat.

In recent years, French colonial policy in general has come to have a strongly liberal cast. General de Gaulle's address of December 12, 1943, promising French citizenship to Moslems, and General Catroux's declaration of June 9, 1941, clearing the way to independent statehood for Syria and Lebanon, are two examples of the trend. The remarkable loyalty which the colonial peoples have shown toward France since 1940 made a liberal policy of this sort inevitable. There was no revolt at the time of French weakness, and in Central Africa, indeed, the native peoples rose of their own accord against the Nazis. And such a liberal policy was warmly recognized as proper by the Free French who had continued to fight on the side of the Allies, inspired by the democratic ideal of human freedom which the Vichy régime denied. But the "new" policy, in a specific sense, is the one outlined by this Guiana Negro, raised by France, whom General de Gaulle appointed Governor General of French Equatorial Africa in Brazzaville — Félix Eboué.

The new French colonial policy is this: a clearer realization than ever before that the colonizing nation's sole aim is to transform the colonized areas into states which will some day be its own equals. The policy seeks the vital equilibrium described by Mr. Ayouné. I do not know when the day of equality will arrive; but it is the ideal to be attained everywhere, and in some places it has in fact already been achieved. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations set equality as the goal. France alone among the mandatory nations has realized it by elevating Syria and Lebanon to the rank of independent states.

All French colonies must some day be freed from their link to France, if such is their wish. But France ought to do her utmost to render the link, while it lasts, both pleasant and helpful. This is why, voicing the opinion of the Overseas Commission, I proposed to the Provisional Consultative Assembly the formula of a French Federation. This also is why the Assembly recommended

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to the future French Constituent Assembly that a study be made as to how the next French constitution ought to strengthen the bonds between Metropolitan France and Overseas France and among all French territories.[1]

In order to have a country, one must first have citizens. But to make citizens, one must first make men. In Africa at the present time we have Negroes who are French citizens and who are represented in the French Chamber of Deputies, *e.g.* those born in the four counties of Senegal — Dakar, St. Louis, Rufisque and Gorée. But we also have black feudal lords and their vassals, and we have groups which gave up cannibalism and slavery only very lately. How are we to create men out of those which are not yet men, and then to make citizens out of them and the others who are already more advanced in civilization? That is the dual task. For success in the second part of it we must understand what kind of citizens we want to make. French citizens? Cameroonians? Sudanese? Citizens of Tchad? Or Franco-African citizens?

Contrary to popular belief, it is not so difficult to "make a man." The primary requisite of manhood is ownership of one's own body. In an individualist society such as ours the first step toward civilization must be the abolition of slavery. This objective was systematically pursued by the early Frenchmen — a few dozen men — who conquered the center of Africa. I have read the treaties which were made with the local sultans, for instance that with Gaourang, Sultan of Baguirmi in 1905, or that with the small Sultan of Sila in 1912; Article 1 always abolishes slave-trading. After the suppression of the slave market comes the abolition of slavery, the ownership of one man by another.

At the same time, private wars were prohibited. Incidentally, the trade in men had been one of the reasons for war between African tribes, numerous slaves being acquired in a profitable raid. Peace makes possible regular work, agriculture and the moving of flocks. "Since Frenchmen have been here, the children in our villages are no longer afraid," an old man of the Sara tribe in the Logone region told me. The next steps in colonization are the establishment of police security and the improvement of food supplies. Seeds are distributed, the growing of vegetables is encouraged — in Central Africa, millet, manioc (a root from which tapioca is made), sweet potatoes, various spices — and improvident tribes are taught the value of a granary.

[1] *Cf. Journal Officiel de la République Française.* Analytical minutes of proceedings of the Provisional Consultative Assembly, Session of January 13, 1944.

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By these stages we develop lands that are free from slavery and from the fear of war and famine. The people live, eat and reproduce: a human minimum has been realized. The achievement even of this minimum requires great and continuing efforts. What the results have been in the case of France are manifest in a territory like Algeria. It is fashionable now to speak ill of conditions there, but the fact remains that the native population has doubled in the last 40 years. In French West Africa peace brought about a sizeable increase in population within 20 years.

If men are to advance beyond what may be called the human minimum, the doctor and the schoolteacher must be brought in. This also has been done by the French. I am not writing an apology for French colonization in Africa. My purpose is merely to suggest, very briefly, the steps leading to the creation of a normal human being — a man whose body moves in freedom, health and dignity. Before the war this antecedent condition of all political progress was by way of being realized.

III

We want these men to become members of "the city" in the large sense of the word — citizens. But how bring this about?

We start from the principle which, to any Frenchman, is immutable: equality. All men, irrespective of their race, color or religion, are considered equal. This conception was stated metaphysically by Christianity in terms of the equality of souls and their susceptibility to salvation. It was resolved into a political formula and applied to practical life by the French Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens, which is also a preface to the first French constitution, begins "Men are born free and equal in rights." Once this principle has been accepted, does it follow that any man, regardless of his degree of civilization, is automatically entitled to the same judicial and political institutions possessed by individuals of a civilization more advanced than his own or different from his own? The answer to this question can be found only by making a careful distinction between the terms "advanced" and "different."

The old French colonial policy revolved about the conception of more and less *advanced* civilizations. The new policy revolves about the idea of *different* civilizations.

The French Revolution, and even more the Revolution of 1848 which gave universal suffrage to France, established the principle that any man, whoever he is, may enjoy the same political institu-

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tions that Frenchmen do. That was the source of the doctrine of "assimilation" in French colonial policy and the origin of the flattering reputation of Frenchmen as "assimilators." Following the tradition of 1789, every Frenchman was disposed to share with all colonized peoples the institutions he enjoyed himself. He considered that his highest moral duty was to transform Africans, Malgaches and Tonkinese into French citizens as rapidly as possible and to duplicate for them the political conditions of Metropolitan France. To give a few instances: Algeria was divided into departments, with general councils and elected deputies and senators; the French West Indies, Martinique and Guadeloupe, with their Negro population, were granted representatives in Parliament; so were Guiana, four counties of Senegal (since 1916), the Island of Reunion and the Establishments of India and Cochin-China (with a few slight reservations). Frenchmen are proud of this reputation as "assimilators;" and it was precisely because they were proud of their democratic institutions that they wished to share them.

There is another tendency in French colonial tradition, however, and it is from this that the new policy derives. Lyautey and his master Galliéni realized perfectly well that every group of men possesses a civilization of its own. It may be relative in value to others; but it is one to which the group clings and which, therefore, the colonizer must respect. Civilizations are not merely more or less backward, or more or less advanced. Types of civilization differ: there is a European civilization and there are others, and colonization brings them into contact and conflict. This truth, which Galliéni discovered first-hand in Indo-China and later in Madagascar, and which Lyautey learned from him there and then found for himself in Algeria and above all in Morocco, is the truth which Governor General Eboué stressed in Africa. Even in the "darkest" and most primitive parts of Africa, France has never found a political vacuum; everywhere are ancestral habits, political customs, a judicial or religious code — all the elements of civilization. From this truth comes a colonial doctrine of inner progress patterned after nature, as opposed to the doctrine of assimilation with all that it entails of fabrication and artificiality. I cannot express it better than by repeating the words used by Fily Dabo Sissoko, a county chieftain of Niamba, French West Africa: "The basic elements of his [the native's] society, however rudimentary, constitute his personality and give him the same right as any other individual

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to trace his line of ascent leading to the Divine." I do not believe that Eboué had read these lines, written at some distance and under a different political régime, before he died; yet he would have felt happy to have heard such a noble echo of his own thought emanating from a Negro who, while raised by France as he was, had remained in his native Africa.

Here is a passage which well expresses Eboué's ideas, spoken at the Conference of African Governors and intended as a guide for their political thinking: "The more a native feels that he is at home, the greater will be his aptitude for progress. If we can induce him to develop his knowledge and his sense of responsibility within the framework of his own institutions, we shall have accomplished more for his happiness and for his moral conscience than if we offered him the hazards of individual civilization."

As this inquiry calls for facts, the reader will forgive me if I quote the instructions I drew up for the Tchad on April 20, 1942:

The basic approach for us Frenchmen, in our colonial policy, is a desire to recognize those traits in the natives that are common to all men.

But the foundation on which this policy rests must be an understanding of the relation between such universality and the nature of things distinctively African — in other words, a perception of the inner differences to be found in men, in their degree of civilization, in their ancestral customs, in their traditional commandments.

There can be no question of transforming a native of Central Africa into a Frenchman of Central France at one stroke. . . .

Whenever a new civilization appears next to a civilization which is different, even if it does not try to force itself upon the old and is satisfied to remain discreetly alongside, it nevertheless causes profound repercussions that are dangerous for the equilibrium of the old environment. It matters little that the new civilization is bringing to the old one things which a higher society considers beneficial; the presence of men who are at another stage of development is bound to disturb the old social order.

It is our duty to restore the balance of these indigenous societies which our presence has unstabilized. We wanted these primitive or feudal peoples to attain at once the level of institutions that had been evolving for several centuries. In order to bring about this change we disregarded native institutions and shocked individuals by using means that were our own. From now on, without abandoning our ideal, we intend to lead the native societies on their way to a higher plane by means that are their own. . . .

Thus our present colonial policy is based not on the principle of a colonizing civilization, but on the reality of an existing civilization in the colonies. Instead of bending over something loved yet slightly despised, however gently and paternally, Frenchmen now start from the primitive and solid foundation which they find in the colonies and elevate it together with

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themselves. The whole moral value of this new policy is defined by this change in attitude.

The native needs to feel that he is at home in his own country; and as for us, we must accept that country as it is, once it has been rid of slavery, war, famine and tortures. We are convinced that the native can acquire a sense of civic duty. The source of the idea of civic duty is love for one's country and a sense of responsibility toward it; obviously, it can develop only in a man who is not cut off from his emotional and traditional roots.

But some natives are certain to be drawn from their natural environment by our presence, however unobtrusive. What should be our attitude toward them? Félix Eboué says: "Such an individual . . . if he is no longer satisfied with his usual life, if he tries to emulate us, will find an organization within his reach in which he can progressively learn and grow, and we shall see that the responsibilities placed upon his shoulders are the test of the rights and honors that will be conferred upon him."

The goal is to change the African into a citizen of Africa. Many distinctions must of course be made among Africans. The native of the brush, still a primitive, must be distinguished from the native of the towns, already developed; and in our policy we must differentiate also between the man whose intelligence has been awakened and the one who is already a "man of position," a notable, someone who is responsible. A decree of July 19, 1942, determined the status of a man of position, and might almost be considered as the preliminary first draft giving the outline of what local African citizenship may be some day.

IV

The consequences of such a French colonial policy are far-reaching and can be suggested here only summarily. The necessity of including the French possessions within the general terms of the constitution by means of a federation may be one result, as I have already said. A second is that the new policy makes "indirect" administration in the colonies imperative.[2] It implies important developments in education, not only as regards primary schooling, but also civic education and the revival of liberal education: letters, arts, sciences. Economic consequences will be significant. We shall not be able to continue to look upon

[2] It has already been instituted in Tchad, for example. Because of the existing sultanates and other local governments this territory has always been the one in French Equatorial Africa which has lent itself best to indirect rule.

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the colonies merely as a reservoir of raw material to be exchanged for the manufactured products of Metropolitan France. The political and intellectual evolution of the population depends not only on an improvement in economic conditions, but above all on the degree to which such improvement is a result of direct participation by the natives. That means, for example, the development of communications, of handicrafts, of trade unions and of a native capacity for the management of business and industry.

A final product of the new policy will be the most difficult to perfect, yet it is the one from which all the others derive: changed relationships between natives and Europeans. Europeans will be coming to Africa in ever-increasing numbers. All parts of it have been made accessible by air transport; and science has improved living conditions in the colonies with its vitamins, electric refrigerators, air-conditioning devices and so on. For a long time Europeans will be indispensable in administrative units and in developing industry, exploring natural resources and improving agriculture. European capital, mechanical aptitude and inventive turn of mind are needed in Africa. But the principle now underlying commercial concessions will doubtless be gradually discarded to make room for a system of partnership within coöperative enterprises called *sociétés de prévoyance*. These societies will perhaps work in association with native communities or even with the government.[3]

France began to create an Africa for the Africans as early as 1940, before the Atlantic Charter was drawn up. She did it during the terrible and lonely years when the soul of occupied France seemed to have taken refuge in Africa. Since then a good deal has also been written and spoken about the idea of French Empire citizenship. Progress has been made in that direction, but the idea is still mainly in the stage of theory.

The new colonial policy has already left its mark on the soil of Africa, however. Its objective is to raise the people to the high road on which we are traveling, but to let them follow their own way up instead of separating them from their roots. It hopes to use the sap of these deep-seated roots to invigorate the consciousness these people have of their own country and of their own poetry. And it wishes their future course to develop in harmony with the fundamental liberties of man. Under such a policy, France is sure that to the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity the colonial peoples will add a fourth — loyalty to France.

[3] See the recommendations of the Brazzaville Conference of February 1944.

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ICELAND, GREENLAND AND THE UNITED STATES

By Hans W. Weigert

THE consciousness that the far north is an area of great strategic importance to the United States is no longer limited to the small group of men who began to listen to Vilhjalmur Stefansson's gospel of the "northward course" more than twenty years ago. These men did not then pretend to be advancing thoughts which were entirely new. They aimed at a rebirth of the visions which led William Henry Seward to purchase Alaska in the middle of the nineteenth century and made him wish to secure America's position in the North Atlantic through the purchase of Iceland and Greenland from Denmark. For a long time the concept of the American Far North had little effect on our foreign policy. But airmindedness has brought about a revival of Seward's ideas and has given them wide popularity and a new meaning. It is no longer necessary to deplore the lack of a national awareness of the north, but rather to warn against over-enthusiastic generalizations which threaten to cloud realities. The strategy of this war has accelerated the pace of Arctic progress, but there are certain barriers raised by nature against the development of this area; and political realities set limits to the possibilities of an American march northward.

Iceland is today an outpost of our strategic system as a result of agreements which are clearly understood as having only temporary validity. There is no warrant for our looking upon her bastions as an automatic part of our permanent defense position. The relationship of Greenland with the United States creates a comparable situation there. What, then, are the specific conditions in these zones with which our need for military security in the northern sector and for the development of commercial air transportation in the north must be harmonized?

II

Iceland is a vital link in the relations of North America and Eurasia. From her shores much of the North Atlantic can be controlled. The effort to transform the island into a great naval base, undertaken jointly by the United States and British Navies, reflected its geographic and strategic importance. Since then the ports of Iceland, which do not freeze in winter, have played a

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paramount rôle in the lend-lease operations between this country and the U.S.S.R. via the Murmansk route; they have also made it possible for convoys sailing to the United Kingdom to be well protected during the first long reach of their voyage, which comprises more than two-thirds of the crossing.

The island is also of great importance in air communications. Several of the vital great circle air routes from American and Canadian airfields to the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are dependent upon bases in Iceland. Air power based in Iceland not only controls communications via these routes and dominates the sea lanes in the North Atlantic, but also controls the air bases and weather observation stations in Greenland. This war has taught the British and ourselves that Iceland must remain forever an integral part of the mutual defense system of the two countries and must never be permitted to fall into the hands or under the influence of a potential enemy.

As was noted above, the agreements with Iceland by which the United States has protected her interests in the North Atlantic are, however, emergency measures strictly limited to wartime. After the war they will have to be replaced by new arrangements. In these, the American desire for absolute security will be only one factor. By a process of compromise we shall have to bring that factor into harmony with another of equal significance: the intention of the Icelanders to guard the sovereignty of their republic.

Before examining the question of Iceland's political objectives, we should note a relevant economic fact. In normal times, Iceland's economic relations with Europe are much more important to her than her trade relations with the United States and Canada. After the war, commercial air traffic will tend to bring the United States and Iceland closer together. But the bulk of her trade will, as in the past, continue to be with Denmark, Great Britain and Spain. Before the war Denmark and Great Britain sold her the most goods. Spain took more of her products than any other country, absorbing one-third of her exports, with Norway, Sweden and Portugal next in order.

Iceland's pivotal location and her close ties with Europe and with all the Powers in the North Atlantic make it impossible to appraise her rôle in world politics and strategy merely from an American point of view. The arrangements in the North Atlantic must of necessity be international. Their form will be determined, to a considerable extent, by Iceland's own foreign policy.

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The events which gave Iceland her present status in the family of sovereign nations and shaped her present relations with the Anglo-American Powers make it plain that the people of Iceland are resolved to remain a sovereign nation. Iceland has been preparing for sovereignty since December 1, 1918, when, by the "Law of Union," she gained independence from Denmark. During the period when she was a daughter-nation of Denmark, her position in regard to the mother country was even stronger than that of the Dominions of the United Kingdom toward Great Britain under the Statute of Westminster. The kingship of Iceland, held by the King of Denmark, was not subordinate to the kingship of Denmark. The Union Act, moreover, provided for the eventual termination of this allegiance. After December 31, 1940, both Denmark and Iceland were free to demand a plebiscite to determine the final relations between the two nations.

The invasion of Denmark by Germany accelerated Iceland's aspirations for complete independence. On April 10, 1940, the Althing, Iceland's 1010-year-old General Assembly, declared that the King of Iceland was unable to execute his royal power and that the Icelandic Government was, therefore, for the time being to be entrusted with the royal prerogative. One year later, the Althing passed a resolution in which it announced that a republic would be declared as soon as the Union Act expired. The four political parties — Conservative, Progressive, Communist, Social Democrat — which support a non-political government, voiced by joint statement their opposition to a renewal of the union.

On May 24, 1944, the people of Iceland decided in a referendum to sever all ties with the Danish Crown. The voters were asked whether they were in favor of the abrogation of the Union Act, and whether they approved of the bill for a republican constitution. The referendum brought 98 percent of the electorate to the polls, and showed that 70,725 voters were for severance of all political ties with Denmark and only 370 against it; 69,048 were in favor of the republican constitution, 1,042 against it, and 2,550 cast votes that were declared invalid. On June 17, 1944, the republic was formally proclaimed, and as the republic's first President the Althing named Sveinn Björnsson for a one-year term. The new republic was immediately promised recognition by the United States. Iceland has so far carefully avoided any declaration by which she could be classified as being either part of Europe or of the western hemisphere. She desires above all to be looked upon as the Republic of Iceland in the North Atlantic.

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From the time American troops took over the protection of the island on July 7, 1941, following the occupation by the British and Canadians in May and June 1940, the United States supported Iceland's movement for independence. A Presidential message to Congress of July 7, 1941, deserves to be noted for its outline of the obligations of the United States toward Iceland. "The United States," said President Roosevelt, "cannot permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Arctic for eventual attack against the western hemisphere. We have no desire to see any change in the present sovereignty of these regions. . . . Assurance that such outposts in our defense frontier remain in friendly hands is the very foundation of our national security. . . . [We] have given the people of Iceland the assurance that the American forces sent there would in no way interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of that country, and that immediately upon the termination of the present emergency all American forces will be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their government in full and sovereign control of their own territory."

The intention of the Icelandic people to preserve their newly-won independence needs to be emphasized, since it is overlooked in many plans for her future which others propose. Iceland, "kingpin of the Atlantic," is certainly not for sale. If there ever was a possibility that the United States could buy Iceland from Denmark, as Seward hoped, it obviously no longer exists. The suggestion has been made that Iceland would serve her interests best after the war by applying for statehood in the American Union. This idea is even more fantastic. It is also said that she could choose a middle way to safety by placing herself under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. If Iceland identified herself with the American republics she would thus join the family of nations which by the Act of Havana are pledged to defend the territorial integrity or the political independence of every American state. It is also argued that Iceland might become a member of a Scandinavian union, on the assumption that a commonwealth of Scandinavian nations may be set up. But none of these possibilities seems likely in the light of Iceland's actions and of the psychology of her people.

Icelanders believe that the policy of the United States toward all the smaller countries is a guarantee of their own future as a sovereign nation. This policy was clearly outlined in the Presidential message to Congress of April 9, 1940, after the fall of

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Denmark. Mr. Roosevelt declared at that time that "if civilization is to survive, the rights of the smaller nations to independence . . . must be respected by their more powerful neighbors." These principles were reiterated at Teheran and strengthened by the fact that Britain and the U.S.S.R. joined the United States in assuring Iran (a geopolitical keystone like Iceland) that her sovereignty and territorial integrity would be safeguarded. It is true that an interpretation is sometimes placed upon these statements of principle which seems to imply that small nations deserve and have been guaranteed immunity from the forces which make for change in the present world, simply on the ground that they are small, and regardless of whether they are willing to observe the obligations for sensible and coöperative behavior which will determine the future security and well-being of nations both large and small. But there is no danger that Icelanders will take any such extreme position.

III

One particular proposal for incorporating Iceland's strategic advantages in a program of American security deserves special analysis. Those who advance it usually proceed from the thesis that the United States should establish herself in positions from which her power can be used as a direct leverage upon the nations of the Old World. In furtherance of this objective it is argued that American naval and air bases in Iceland and Greenland would be more advantageous to us than alliances with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. To anchor American power in Greenland and Iceland would, it is reasoned, give us the strength necessary to "make possible an equilibrium of power" among the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.[1] This goal, we are told, can be achieved in the same manner by which our power has been extended to the Bahamas and South America — that is, by the leasing of land for bases but without the assumption of sovereignty over the leased territory.

Recommendations of this kind embody a point of view which looks beyond the problems of a limited regional sphere. They reflect a world-wide program, and a philosophy of power politics for the United States. The aims of such a philosophy were candidly expressed by the late Nicholas J. Spykman when he suggested the permanent establishment of new bases by the United States in the transatlantic and transpacific zones "in order to

[1] Nicholas J. Spykman, "The Geography of the Peace," New York: Harcourt, 1944, p. 58.

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bring her power closer to the area where it may be exerted." Only by establishing effective bases within striking distance of the "rimlands," Spykman maintains, would this country be able to control the balance of power in Europe and Asia, as he believes we must do.

In the opinion of the writer, the simple and sufficient objection to such a program is expressed by the old adage that "more than one can play at that game." How can we doubt that other Great Powers would organize their spheres of influence in similar terms if confronted with an American foreign policy of this kind? Prime Minister Smuts expressed an attitude corresponding to that of Spykman's when he urged Britain to draw within her orbit the small democracies of western Europe, to counterbalance the growing might of the United States and the Soviet Union. And it is not difficult to imagine the reaction of the U.S.S.R. to such schemes in strategically important regions of eastern Europe, the Middle East, the north Pacific, and the Arctic. Her geographical position would enable her to establish new bases more efficiently and threateningly than could any other of the United Nations. Of one thing we may be certain: "United Nations" will quickly become an outmoded term if each Great Power pursues such a program.

If we leave the realm of generalizations on power politics and examine instead the realities in a given case, Iceland offers a good illustration of some of the immediate difficulties of such a policy. Signing a lease is an act of contract. The United States cannot lease land from Iceland without Iceland's consent. (That we had built the bases which we wished to acquire permanently would make no difference in this respect.) But the Republic of Iceland will have no desire to be used as a pawn in the balance-of-power game of the Great Powers. Nor will she be interested in playing one Power against another. In neither case would the odds favor her welfare. It is unlikely that Iceland would collaborate in a scheme which aimed at the expansion of American military power and which did not provide for participation or consent by other of the United Nations.

The compromise between the valid interests of the small nation, Iceland, and the equally valid interests of the United States cannot be reached through bilateral pacts. Harmony can be found only in agreements of a wider scope.

Iceland is the pivot of only one of several zones in which the United Nations must control strategic bases, if a stable new

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order is to be built. If it were possible to internationalize such bases all over the world, or to bring them under the trusteeship of the United Nations family, Iceland could not refuse her coöperation. She could not oppose a program which included her bases in a world-wide organization to preserve peace, but which did not violate her territorial integrity. Under such a program those nations whose interests are paramount in a given area would be mainly responsible for the military protection of such bastions. A regional trusteeship for Iceland might embrace the United States, Canada, Britain, Denmark (Greenland), and possibly Norway (Spitsbergen). Whether or not the U.S.S.R. participated would perhaps depend largely on whether arrangements were made for a corresponding internationalization of zones which the Soviet Union regards as vital for her security.

It is obvious that problems of the use of Iceland's bases for commercial aviation are closely linked with the military question, although such military pacts as are made will not necessarily cover questions of landing rights and landing fields in Iceland for commercial air services. The present air bases in Iceland may or may not be considered suitable for commercial aviation; for reasons of security the common use of these bases by military and commercial craft may be undesirable. Our air transportation industry looks upon Iceland as a keystone in its system, however. The cheapest air route from the United Kingdom to North America would run by way of Glasgow to Iceland (920 miles), Greenland, Newfoundland (distance Reykjavik–Botwood 1487 miles), or via Labrador (Goose Bay). A skyway proposed by Northeast Airlines, Inc., linking Boston with Scandinavia and the Soviet Union touches the southern tip of Greenland, Reykjavik, the Faroe Islands (though that seems an impractical base, as the Faroes have about the worst weather in the world), Oslo, Stockholm, Leningrad and Moscow.

The development of Iceland's landing fields as part of a net of global skyways depends also on the solution which the United Nations find for the riddle of the freedom of the air. Iceland will be a partner in the coming discussions on that subject, and there is no reason to doubt that she will subscribe to the principles which are laid down. The question of internationalization of ground facilities in Iceland is a crucial one for all governments and private enterprises which plan to operate postwar commercial air transport. Iceland figures importantly in the request by 18 American airlines that "airports and bases throughout the

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world financed in whole or in part with United States funds be made available to American flag carriers on a non-exclusive basis." If the "closed sky" principle is generally abandoned, Iceland will not oppose the "innocent passage" over her territory by American carriers or their use of her landing facilities for purposes of fueling and repair. The answer to this question, as to all other problems discussed above, lies in an agreement by all the Powers concerned.

Neither in the realm of military strategy nor that of commercial aviation will Iceland become some sort of an American dependency. The questions which are raised by an attempt to forecast her future status illustrate one of the truly significant facts which the events of this war have made plain: the peoples of certain pivotal areas cannot survive in independent isolation, yet these areas are too important to many nations to make it possible for any one powerful neighbor to treat them as its dependencies. In the literal sense of the word they must become the bases — the foundations — of a new international organization which will some day transcend the era of nationalism and imperialism.

IV

The problems of Iceland cannot be separated from those of Greenland. Strategically, the islands are a unit. At the nearest point, Greenland's island-continent of 736,518 square miles is only 180 miles distant from Iceland. We have been brought up to think of Greenland as the easternmost outpost of the western hemisphere and of Iceland as the westernmost part of Europe. But the northeastern tip of Greenland is actually more easterly than any spot in Iceland. Iceland can be characterized as an offshore bastion of Greenland, which protects her ice-free harbors in the south as well as the weather stations which are so essential in our air operations over northwestern Europe. Thus Greenland and Iceland together form the nucleus of America's northern security zone, which protects the approaches from the north and east and balances Alaska on the west.

Like Iceland, Greenland looms large in plans for northern air transportation. The most direct routes from the cities of western North America to the capitals of western Europe and of Russia lead across southern Greenland. On the other hand, climatic conditions and the lack of populated centers within the Arctic Circle (Murmansk, with a population of 117,000, is the only

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exception) will for a time prevent the extensive use of skyways over northern Greenland. The importance of these northerly routes is, however, gradually increasing. "Direct routes linking important centers across the Arctic might be justified despite the lack of important cities in between. . . . There will undoubtedly be a substantial amount of commercial operation over northerly routes within a decade or so after the war. This development is bound to have an important effect on the orientation of our national interests."[2]

The Greenland of tomorrow, with its fleet and air bases, weather and radio stations and great circle skyways, will little resemble the Greenland which Seward dreamed of adding to an American empire. After Seward's day, the United States acquired indefinite rights in Greenland, as a result of Robert E. Peary's and A. W. Greeley's expeditions, but they were surrendered to Denmark in 1916 in connection with the purchase of the Danish West Indies. President Wilson, pondering the possibility of a German victory and German expansion in the Caribbean, was determined to obtain the strategically important Danish Caribbean islands. To speed up the transfer of the Danish West Indies to the United States, he overruled Secretary Lansing's Open Door proposals for Greenland. To Wilson the danger of German expansion took the form of a threat against the Panama Canal Zone; the possibility of a German threat from the north did not even occur to him.

Admiral Peary was strongly opposed to our retreat from Greenland. "Greenland's possession by us," he wrote, "will be in line with the Monroe Doctrine. Will turning Greenland over to Denmark mean our repurchase of it later?" Another world war was needed to make us realize the weight of Peary's question. Greenland was remembered when hasty schemes were devised by those who believed that America's isolation could be maintained behind a far-flung Maginot Line of our own. On April 19, 1939, Senator Lundeen introduced a resolution in the Senate advocating the purchase of the island. And there were also irresponsible demands for annexation. But when the problem was seen in its true light and the United States acted to make Greenland an integral part of her security system, there was no more talk of purchase or annexation. As in the case of Iceland, the protective occupation of Greenland was wisely made, not as a step in a new

[2] W. A. Burden, Under Secretary, Department of Commerce, in "Compass of the World," by Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Macmillan, 1944, p. 146.

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American imperialism in the Arctic, but in harmonious coöperation with the directly interested United Nations.

The "Agreement relating to the defense of Greenland" was signed on April 9, 1941, by the Secretary of State and the Danish Minister, Henrik de Kauffmann. This agreement, as well as statements released by the President and the State Department, leave no doubt that the United States explicitly recognizes Danish sovereignty over Greenland. The President pointed out that the Danish Government could not at present "act in respect of its territory in the western hemisphere, but we propose to make sure that when the German invasion of Denmark has ended, Greenland will remain a Danish colony."

Greenland's international status thus rests on two pillars. One is Denmark's sovereignty in Greenland. The other is the recognition, by both the United States and Denmark, of the fact that Greenland is within the area of the Monroe Doctrine. In order to protect the status quo in the western hemisphere, the United States has acquired the right "to construct, maintain, and operate such landing fields, seaplane facilities, and radio and meteorological installations as may be necessary." These facilities must be made available to the airplanes and vessels of "all the American Nations" for purposes connected with the common defense of the western hemisphere.

A comparison of the arrangements made with Greenland and Iceland shows that the United States subscribes in both cases to the principle of full recognition of the established sovereignties of the smaller nations in the northern sector. There is a difference between the two agreements, however. In his message to Congress of July 7, 1941, President Roosevelt declared that immediately upon the termination of the "present international emergency" all American forces will be at once withdrawn from Iceland. The Greenland Agreement opens the door for negotiations regarding the future of Greenland. It is specified that the pact "shall remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and the security of the American Continent have passed. At that time the modification or termination of the Agreement will be the subject of consultation between the Government of the United States and the Government of Denmark."

The postwar development of the two islands can also be expected to follow different courses, conditioned by physical differences between Iceland and Greenland and differences in their populations. The Republic of Iceland has a population of

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120,000; her citizens are proud of her cultural and political traditions. The colony of Greenland has 500 Danes and 18,000 natives. The provisions of the Greenland agreement indicate that its parties are responding, not only to the interests of the United Nations as a whole, but to the immediate interest of the United States in a Greenland located within the area subject to the Monroe Doctrine. The United States and Denmark concur in the opinion that Greenland is so important a part of this country's security belt that no potential foe of the United States may ever be permitted to occupy territory on any part of the island.

In its dealings with both Denmark and Iceland the State Department has shown that it is thoroughly aware of certain intangibles of international politics which must determine the relations of a Great Power with the smaller nations. A Denmark bleeding from the wounds of war would little appreciate an American offer to purchase Greenland, even if this colony is more of an economic responsibility to Denmark than an asset. It is reasonable to believe that the emergency agreements between the two nations have paved the way for a permanent solution which will satisfy the interests of both parties. Greenland is so vast that defense measures undertaken by this country can be continued without interfering with the administrative interests of Denmark. Denmark's economic interests can be fully safeguarded. The United States will not interfere with Denmark's cultural policies toward the native population. No conflicting interests of importance exist between the two nations. Nor should a source of conflict arise from their mutual dealings with Iceland in the organization of America's Arctic and sub-Arctic defense belt.

The stage is set, in Greenland and Iceland, for the United Nations to organize their program for the enforcement of world peace. The considerations which will determine Iceland's future part in a world-wide organization of commercial skyways, air bases, and weather stations hold true for Greenland as well. Denmark will be a partner in international agreements which will establish new concepts of international law for air transport in general and for aviation in the Arctic in particular.

American foreign policy has steered a cautious course northward. Action which seemed at first dictated merely by the needs of military strategy has gradually become the basis of a more stable peacetime structure. Now Iceland and Greenland may be the testing ground for international coöperation on a larger scale.

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THE THIRD SPANISH REPUBLIC

By José Bergamín

I ONCE had occasion to suggest a title for a book that a fellow-countryman was doing on the tragic events of 1936–40. I told him he ought to call it "The War Began in Spain," and then found myself wondering in the back of my mind where and how the war that began in Spain might finish, whether it might not finish in Spain and also whether it might not finish Spain. But now I find myself thinking that the bitter trials undergone by Spain all these years may turn out to have been a purgatory from which she will emerge a stronger and more vital nation.

Prognostications are not easy at this stage. But my confidence in the Spanish people leads me to believe that when the democracies have won their victory over international Nazi-Fascism, the Spanish horizon will be freed of the terrible phantom that for the past eight years has held our people in thrall. Thus the war, far from finishing Spain, could actually finish in Spain. For a time one doubted that the Franco régime and the Hitlerian *Falange* would leave Spain with any vitality; but now we see that the Spanish people are indeed alive and are in the immense majority hostile to Franco, and that his régime must go, for the reasons that it is Fascist, that it signifies submission to a foreign Power and that Spaniards do not want it. But this does not mean that its liquidation will not prove a deadly serious matter.

The most serious problem facing Spaniards is how to avoid bloodshed at the funeral after the Franco régime has died. There are various influences at work to forestall a bloody denouement or, to state it more accurately, to forestall a resumption of the civil war — if it can be said ever to have stopped. But the possibility of a bloody liquidation is of course being exploited, both inside Spain and in foreign countries, by Franco and the *Falange* in order to maintain themselves in power. They are setting forth the usual claims that they alone are capable of holding down the latent revolution. And they are also doing their best to maintain that revolution in order to contain it, or rather to set forth the claim that they will contain it. In raising the anti-Communist banner which served Hitler and Mussolini so well for so many years, they have falsely proclaimed a division of Spaniards into two breeds, the good and the bad, the white and the red. The trick is an old one and should by now be transparent. What the

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Franco régime can really be said to maintain is a poorly dissimulated state of anarchy. On this point a Catholic conservative politician has given evidence. José Maria Gil Robles, writing last winter from his exile in Portugal to Franco's Minister of War, called on the military to throw out Franco and restore the monarchy to save the country from anarchy. And the word revolution, so effective in Franco's mouth to frighten people in and out of Spain into support of him, was there used in connection with Franco himself. In Gil Robles' eye, the Franco régime is revolutionary. What is clear and indisputable is that the heritage of Francoism will be a heavy one and that the task of liquidating it must fall to none but a government with strongly pacific intentions, one that will know how to impose on all Spaniards what is the undoubted will of the vast majority of them — a peaceful transition. What would this government be? On what would its power be based? On the Army, with an inevitable succession of *pronunciamentos* in the tradition of the nineteenth century? On a restored Monarchy? On the Republic? Let us examine these three possibilities.

First the Army. No one could deny that it is the principal foundation of the present régime. By military force the faction which was victorious in the Civil War is maintained in power. The reasons for that victory we do not have to go into here, nor into the shameful and frightful conditions in which it was won and consolidated. But what one must point out is that the Franco régime remains essentially what it was when it won the Civil War in 1939 with the help and with the partnerships that everyone knows. Many, then, will find it natural to feel that once the Nazi-Fascist Axis has been defeated the Spanish military régime which is its adopted child must not be thought of as offering any guarantees of peace, whether in or out of Spain. Another military dictator, a new *Caudillo* in Franco's place, would offer all the drawbacks and none of the few advantages of the present incumbent, and would also excite the personal ambitions of his fellows. This would be as sure a way as any of provoking the very civil war that we are trying to avoid, because it would destroy what unity there remains within the Army, today maintained by the mere fact of continuity in power that allows no openings to ambitious rivals. A government based on military force would contain corruption within itself, would fall into divisions and would cease to be. And a civil war provoked by the rivalries of the generals would bring on the worst anarchy, which could easily

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give way to other varieties. So the Army alone would offer no assurance whatsoever of internal peace or even of superficial order, much less of the durable authority needed in the dangerous transition period.

What, then, could we expect from a restoration of the Monarchy? As Gil Robles has pointed out, it would not suffice merely to place a king in residence in the great eighteenth century palace facing the Plaza de Oriente in Madrid. "The monarch," he wrote in his appeal to the generals to abandon the *Caudillo*, "would have to be surrounded with institutions of some sort of stability." But what elements would go into the establishment of institutions of government to buttress the Monarch? Those which collaborated in sustaining the Fascist régime? By no means, for they are too worn out and discredited to exercise any kind of effective power. Our conservative Catholic *politico* claims that the Army, once freed of the influence of Franco and of the *Falange*, would fill the bill. It must be supposed he means that it would serve as the nucleus for other institutions, since he uses the word in the plural. Thus we see that the second hypothesis, the Monarchy, cannot be considered alone but only in combination with the Army as its principal bulwark. Here, too, one is compelled to ask, with what Army and what Monarchy? It is hard to see how either could be presented as distinct from the Army and Monarchy which planned for the dictatorship, worked for it and collaborated actively with it in their separate ways. The Army's rôle in provoking the Civil War everyone knows. And some may remember that the late Alfonso gave his active support from exile, and that his son Don Juan, the present claimant to the throne, tried to enlist in the Franco forces. How, then, could either be thought of as distinct from the system they would be called upon to renounce? To cite an old Spanish saying, we would be getting the same dogs with different collars. A Monarchy restored on the foundation of an Army which is more or less the personal property of a group of generals in every way equivalent to the present *Caudillo* would embody precisely the same weaknesses and dangers as an Army dictatorship without the royal label. The dynasty which would inherit, or rather share, the military's monopoly of power could not be other than that of the Bourbons, which the Spanish people cast off in 1931. Its restoration would have only the reality of a scene enacted before a painted backdrop. It would amount to the enthronement of a corpse — not that of the lovely Queen of the Portuguese legend who is restored to life, but an old

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corpse — even though the King himself be called Juan instead of Alfonso. How could a system grow strong when it is born of nothing but the exhaustion, impotence and failure of its component parts — Army and Bourbon King?

Of the three possibilities mentioned above there remains the Republic. But what Republic? Would it be that of 1931, with its legality reëstablished — in other words a republican restoration that would revive the democratic constitutional régime overthrown in the Civil War? This solution would seem to me a mistake. It would seem to me to offer only the prospect of battening down the real will of the Spanish people under legalisms and juridical formulas. The people do not want the restoration of that Republic much more than they want the restoration of the Monarchy. They want something else, another Republic. But what kind? This is the crux of the matter.

The Republic of 1931 was full of good intentions and, as we also say in Spanish, the road to its inferno was paved with them. The errors of its leaders, both of Left and Right, were so very serious that it was soon placed in the situation in which its fall became possible. If we turn back to it, might we not be exposing Spain to the same dangers? Might we not be turning back onto the old road to civil war? Franco has been condemned because of his inability or unwillingness to bring true pacification to Spain. Might not the Republic, if restored, prove similarly inept? The danger would be the greater if the restoration turned out also to be a dynastic affair in the sense that it handed back authority to another faction which also was defeated in 1936.

It is commonly said that the Spanish people never knows what it wants but is very sure about what it does not want. So let it be said here and now that what the Spanish people clearly does not want is a continuation of the Franco régime which has maintained itself all these years by terror within and the support of Nazi-Fascism from without. Suppose there were an attempt to change this situation for another, essentially equivalent even though of slightly different form in externals, and otherwise subservient to foreign influences? To speak bluntly, suppose either an imperialist or a democratic England were substituted as the dominant factor for Hitlerian Germany? I can only say that this should not be, could not be, if the victory of the democracies is to be truly a victory. The Spanish people would never agree to a mere change of masters.

There can be no doubt at all that if an attempt were made to

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impose on Spain any change that was one more in appearance than in reality — to saddle her with a new *Caudillo*, perhaps, or a different façade for dictatorship — the Spanish people would go on fighting for its independence, as it has been doing these many years. It simply would not submit. And then the war would not finish in Spain, where it began, nor would it finish for Spain, but it might well finish Spain. This would be a tragic portent, for both Europe and America.

The Spanish people, then, will not go on suffering the humiliating rule of these past five years. Nor does it want to see this dictatorship given a new face to enable it to survive the Nazi-Fascist collapse. Nor does it want to see the heritage of Franco's years in power handed to some absolute military dictatorship which would evolve from violent change through violent change to anarchy, any more than it wants to see the result a military rule intertwined with a dynastic restoration in an attempt to hold an impossible equilibrium. The Spanish people does not want any of these solutions, for any would mean only the continuation of civil war, and of civil war they have had enough. But also, and here I repeat, the Spanish people does not place its hopes in a mere Republican restoration. With this by itself the embers of civil war would burst into flame again. To stir this bed of coals would be to send Spain into a phase of suicidal destruction and to engender a constant peril to the peace of Europe. The Spanish people wants something else.

That something else is another Republic with the accent on *another* — the third Republic. This should be possible. The world climate following the victory will be propitious. As for Spain herself, her recent experience of civil war serves as a lesson. What she wants is a strong provisional government that will bring together the widest possible representation of Spaniards of differing creeds and awaken throughout the nation a new confidence and will to unity. It should be created from organisms taking shape inside the country in the struggle against the Franco variety of Nazi-Fascism. Call it or not a *Junta Suprema* (the word *Junta* has a long and glorious association with all the great crises of government in Spanish history). Whatever it is called, it could undertake the political direction of the country immediately with a program of national reconstruction. Such a government would not have to rush, as is usually done, to affirm its legality with paper declarations. Let there come together in this truly national effort all Spaniards, without regard to their religious or political

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beliefs. A most useful contribution on a personal basis could be made by many of the people who now belong to the different Republican groups and parties, especially if they return to Spain with no other title than that of men exiled and persecuted by Nazi-Fascism, both inside the country and out. These are the only legitimate titles there are. Let the Spanish people itself inspect and revalidate them. We do not doubt, further, that just as among the Republicans, there are also to be found among the Monarchists and Catholics, and among the Socialists and Communists, Spaniards with capacities for the task of constituting a strong national government. In the common effort their feeling for their country should keep them in harmony.

Only such a government could undertake the task of pacification with sufficient authority to carry it out fairly and without any taint of individual vengeance. Only such a government could undertake the essential transformations in the daily life of the country. It would have the power to check decomposition within the Army or within the Catholic clergy, in Spain long corrupted by the ignorance and egoism of its heads. It could create a strong provisional mechanism of state, without making concessions to any belligerent faction, nor to anarchy either. The creation of an apparatus of government out of the ruins might seem to superficial observers a most difficult task; I think, on the contrary, it should prove fairly easy. What is essential is that the historic genius of the Spanish people be allowed to express itself. This is what the great majority of Spaniards want, a policy wholly and truly Spanish, to be carried out provisionally by a government of national union which would have eventually to answer for its trusteeship before a general constituent assembly.

The creation of this third Republic would coincide, in European time and space, with analogous efforts in France and Italy. The reconstruction of these two countries should coincide in all respects with that of Spain. All three are wrecked. A natural, fraternal and unbreakable alliance should emerge — France, Italy, Spain — under the aegis of liberty and devoted to the peace of Europe and of the world. Efforts on the part of any nation to subjugate or in any way diminish Spain would be most unwise. Her personality will be born anew, as it was in the great days of the past, not a sterile imperialism but an imperishable part of civilization, alongside France and Italy, and united to them. This personality will assert itself regardless of opposition, and it will know how to obstruct an unjust peace.

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To keep Spain in the peace, Spain must be at peace with herself. For this, the good will of the majority of Spaniards must be relied upon and not, as has been attempted in the recent past, the bad faith of some among them. In other words, the Spaniards who must be counted upon are those who desire a just peace, within and without their country, one that answers their vital needs and affords them the freedom to become, outside of their own borders, what Spaniards once were during the glorious and generous centuries of their history. It will not do either to exasperate Spain, forcing her outside herself, or to attempt to insulate her, for then, locked within herself, she will turn her back on Europe, will disinterest herself from the general good and withdraw into a proud, egotistical and, in the long run, suicidal isolation. Spain will have her voice in the coming concert of the nations; but it must not be the one that has rasped on our ears during the years Nazi-Fascism has ruled on our Spanish soil. Nor should it be the voice of any other of the factions inside her atomized and sometimes fratricidal self. Rather it must be a new voice expressing her personality entire and true, and, while new, also expressing her permanent historic values.

The Spanish democracy can be allowed to follow its natural channels, or, as Unamuno said, its "*rastro y reguero*" (thinking of well-worn forest trails and the watercourses that establish a land's real character). Our friend Jacques Maritain has written that the peace to come should see an end to Machiavellism. To try to isolate Spain from the new life of Europe on pretexts of one kind or another, even in the name of her own supposed free will, would be to revive the Machiavellism of the past, but in a poorer, less efficacious way. It would be wrong and also dangerous, for it would create inside Spain a deep and permanent discontent which would be the seed of future trouble in Europe. On the other hand, if Spain is enabled to recover her own personality in close relationship with France and Italy, she will help guarantee, not a false international equilibrium of the sort which has always led to war, but a fruitful coöperation towards the establishment of a human community that will be more free, more happy and thus more peaceful.

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CHINA'S MINERAL WEALTH

By Charles H. Behre, Jr., and Kung-Ping Wang

CHINA, fourth among the United Nations in military strength, is the only one of the chief anti-Fascist Powers whose rôle in the postwar era is still shrouded in uncertainty. Will this great nation remain in general an exploited country with a low standard of living and an economy dependent upon the initiative and capital of other lands? Or will it become economically independent and self-supporting?

Political stability is of course one of the preconditions for economic health in China; but an analysis of China's political problems lies outside the province of the present inquiry. It has been rightly argued that the great hope for the amelioration of poverty in China lies in industrialization. If it be granted that China will turn to a more liberal social pattern and that the misunderstandings between the Generalissimo and the Communist elements are susceptible of solution, what then are China's potentialities for industrial power?

The two economic prerequisites for industrialization are an abundant supply of labor and the necessary raw materials. And if raw materials are present in such quantities that they can be exported as well as converted into finished products at home, the process of industrialization becomes easier. Such exports provide foreign exchange with which to purchase machinery for further enlarging the domestic industrial plant.

China has the manpower. The word "coolie" which to foreigners connotes a hard-working but bare-handed laborer, means in Chinese "bitter effort." It exactly describes the type of labor available. Such workers, if they are willing as they are in China, and if they are physically able, can be technologically trained. The physical capacity of China's millions for efficient industrial work, however, should not be too readily assumed; for example, certain important reforms of diet are essential, as will be noted below.

What of China's raw materials? There is a divergence of opinion about their extent. Some people discuss the alleged enormous figures with bated breath, while others maintain that they have been exaggerated. It should be emphasized at once that although dependable information about Chinese mineral resources is available, not more than one-third of the territory of China has been geologically explored, in the sense in which Europe and the United States have been. Future exploration may greatly change the present picture. The large western province of Sinkiang, for example, which borders upon the territory of the U.S.S.R., may contain much more natural wealth than has so far been located. The rest of western China — Tsinghai, Sikang and Tibet — may likewise yield important discoveries. But enough is now known to draw the main outlines of China's industrial resources.

II

It is fashionable to maintain that iron and steel will not be the basic materials

Note: The senior author alone is responsible for the economic and political interpretations advanced in this paper. The junior author is responsible only for a large part of the factual data.

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for heavy industry in the future, but the forecast is valid only if we measure time in an almost geologic sense. The light metals, aluminum and magnesium, have certainly mounted fabulously in importance with the growth of air transportation; copper and zinc are likewise used on an increasing scale, and plywood and synthetic plastics have been rapidly developed during the war. But no material available in quantity today can be substituted for iron and steel in the myriad uses to which they are put. We understand the alloying, processing and fabricating of iron and steel far better than we do those of the light metals. Plywood and plastics may displace steel as covering materials when only moderate rigidity is required, but their low tensile strengths and their destructibility make it improbable that they will serve as substitutes in boilers and pistons, tool steels and dies for some time to come. And steel and the other ferrous alloys are overwhelmingly in demand as structural materials.

Iron ore and coal are the major raw materials of a great steel industry. Coal furnishes carbon, an essential alloy in most steel. It yields the gas that is the commonest fuel in modern open hearths, rolling mills and steel fabricating plants; and coal converted to coke is the almost irreplaceable reducing agent in the blast furnace. Iron ore, coal and food crops are the foundations of national strength in the modern world. The United States, England and Germany (which export surplus coal in exchange for iron ore), and more recently Russia, have built their power on the two minerals. Coal and iron ore come first in an analysis of China's mineral resources.[1]

Chinese coal deposits are admittedly rich and widespread, though the estimates of the total quantity vary. Minimum figures are 234 billion metric tons; maximum, 997 billion tons;[2] and it has recently been suggested that estimates of the reserve in Manchuria should be raised another 10 billion tons. By way of comparison, estimates for the United States and Canada are, respectively, 3,536 billion metric tons as of 1919,[3] and 1,234 billion tons as of 1915.[4] The reserves of Soviet Russia are apparently about equal to those of Canada or slightly greater. German reserve tonnages are comparable to those of Canada and Russia, but only if much low-grade coal (lignite) is included. The reserves of Great Britain are only approximately 190 billion tons as of 1913,[5] a fact that appears noteworthy when it is recalled that Great Britain actually produces the third largest amount of coal mined in the world. In brief, Chinese total reserves are apparently very great, exceeded at most by those of only three countries.

Coal is technically classified by "rank." Anthracite or hard coal is the least common and the highest in combustible matter, and hence of first value. Bituminous, or soft coal, is next in rank and is followed by lignite and peat.

[1] See T. T. Read, "Economic-Geographic Aspects of China's Iron Industry," *Geographical Review*, v. 33, p. 42–55, for details concerning iron and coal deposits and an excellent description of recent developments.

[2] H. Foster Bain, "Ores and Industry in the Far East." New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933. W. H. Wong, "The China Year Book, 1935." Shanghai: *North-China Daily News and Herald, Ltd.*

[3] M. R. Campbell, "The Coal Fields of the United States." Washington: U. S. Geological Survey, 1919.

[4] D. B. Dowling, "Coal Fields and Coal Resources of Canada." Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915.

[5] A. Strahan, "The Coal Resources of Great Britain," in 12th International Geological Congress, "Coal Resources of the World." Toronto: Morang and Co., Ltd., 1913, v. II.

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Chinese coals are of high rank for the most part. Of the 234 billion tons previously mentioned, about 45 billions are anthracite, 185 billions are bituminous, and only the small remainder is lignite.

Most of the coal production of free China comes from Szechwan province: 2,552,000 tons were produced there in 1939. The major part of the Chinese coal reserves may be described as lying mainly in four regions (see map): Shansi (wholly in Japanese hands) and Shensi (now partly under Japanese control) in northern China; southern Manchuria near Peiping (also in Japanese hands); Chekiang and Kiangsu in east central China; and southwestern China, especially Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan and Szechwan. The northerly fields have been actively exploited by the Japanese, especially the area around Chopeh and the fields in the southerly and eastern parts of Liaoning. In general, the northern coals are of higher rank than those farther south. By far the greatest Chinese coal reserves — more than half the total tonnage — are in Shansi province; the Japanese invasion of this province was an especially severe blow to the Chinese coal mining and steel industries. The next largest reserves are in Shensi, however, and a major part of them, as well as those of Szechwan, are still in Chinese hands.

The coal fields of east central China produce good, inexpensive bunker coal for coastal shipping and have been highly productive. But the fields farther west, now being actively mined because of the military situation, may be expected to rival and in time even to displace the eastern regions in importance. A westward movement of industrialization is already well advanced in Szechwan and has been accelerated by the fact that much of the coal produced there cokes better than coals mined farther east, is cleaner and is of somewhat higher rank.

Estimates of China's reserves of iron ore vary greatly. It has been reported that Japanese exploration in Manchuria has lately uncovered new deposits containing 100,000,000 tons of high-grade ore, making a total for all grades of 1.218 billion tons. The dependability of this estimate is an open question. We know with considerable certainty, however, that at least three ore-bearing areas in southern Manchuria are of great magnitude.[6] There are large reserves along the Yalu River, just north of the Korean boundary, in which good replacement ore occurs in limestone. The largest deposits appear to be those of Anshan in Liaoning, southeastern Manchuria, but these ores are lean, bearing only somewhat more than 30 percent metallic iron. And there are fields with richer ores farther west and northwest in Manchuria, around Hsuan-Lung in Chahar and Chengteh in Jehol. The relative flatness of the beds in Chahar which makes mining more easy, and especially the high grade of the ores (50 percent metallic iron), favor operations in that field.

The total reserves for China, exclusive of Manchuria, are believed to be between 250 and 500 million metric tons of good grade ore.[7] Especially in central and eastern China along the Yangtze there are many deposits which in the aggregate are large but which in themselves are small and widely scattered.[8]

[6] H. M. Mikami, map of world iron ore. *Economic Geology*, v. 39, 1944, p. 14, 22. Charles Hart, "Known Iron Ore Reserves of the World and Their Significance," *Iron and Steel Engineer*, May 1939, p. 18.

[7] H. M. Mikami, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[8] F. R. Tegengren, "The Iron Ores and Iron Industry of China." Peking: Geological Survey of China, Memoirs, Series A, No. 2, 1921–24, p. 457.

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Those at Tayeh are an outstanding example. Shortages in higher grade iron ore will ultimately force the Chinese to look for a supplementary supply. It will probably be imported from the Philippines and perhaps also from the great deposits of east-central India, which can be made available to Chinese coastal steel centers by ocean shipment.

As is customary everywhere, Chinese centers of pig iron production are mostly near the iron ore deposits or near the coal fields or assembly centers accessible to both raw materials. The larger furnaces have hitherto been located in Liaoning, Hupeh, Hopeh, Shansi, Honan and Kiangsu (Shanghai). But the capture of Manchuria by the Japanese forced the Chinese Government to stimulate production of steel, as well as of coal, in areas less accessible to the invaders. There has been a noteworthy shift in both iron ore mining and iron smelting to the region around Chungking and to Luku, west of that city. Luku is said to be the largest and most important source of ore and of unfabricated pig iron and steel in independent China today, despite the presence of more extensive and more easily worked deposits farther north. This shift marks the beginning of the industrialization of southwestern China, which will make the badly needed machined products available to the potentially great markets of west China. Hitherto these markets were poorly served by the coastal steel centers of the east and north.

In summary, then, it may be said that China has the coal and iron ore necessary for a growing if not an immense steel industry. The coal supplies are exceptionally large and high grade. The iron ores are far less promising, but, as we have noted, may be supplemented by imports from the Philippines and India. The maximum development of the steel industry of course awaits the expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria and the northern provinces of China proper; and it also depends upon the construction of a net of railways, especially in western China.

III

An industrialized country can, if forced to do so, import the various subsidiary metals used in the manufacture of standard and alloy steel. The major non-ferrous metals employed in industry, such as the light metals aluminum and magnesium and the base metals copper, zinc and lead can also be obtained from abroad. Before the war, for example, as highly industrialized a nation as Germany imported 80 percent of her copper; England imported all of her copper (though about half came from other parts of the empire); and France was compelled to purchase abroad virtually every ton of it she used.

China fortunately has supplies of tin and of one important ferro-alloy metal, tungsten, far in excess of her needs. Noteworthy amounts of copper may be available. And it is legitimate to hope that a country as large as China will, upon adequate exploration, yield manganese for steel making, bauxite deposits and other aluminum sources, and zinc and lead in quantities sufficient to meet her domestic needs for some time to come.

In 1939, free China produced only 706 tons of metallic copper,[9] and in 1940 China and Manchuria together yielded only about 1500 tons of metallic copper. By comparison, Japan produced 100,000 metric tons, the Philippines 35,000 tons and India and Burma 10,000 tons. China's annual consumption of

[9] "China Handbook, 1937–1943." New York: Macmillan, 1943, p. 488.

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metallic copper is usually only slightly less that 10,000 tons. There are some copper deposits of fair size and grade in south-central China, notably in Yunnan at Tungchuan. These mines, controlled by the Government until recently, unfortunately seem to be approaching exhaustion.[10] Other deposits of moderate richness and quantity are reported in Szechwan; and still others, in which ores of lead and zinc are mixed with the copper, are in Kirin, northeastern Manchuria. A large deposit of rich ore is said to have been found recently in Fencheng-Hsien. Probably the greatest hope for copper production in China, however, is offered by the disseminated deposits, somewhat like those of northern Chile and the southwestern United States. These are low-grade ores which can be profitably extracted only by large-scale operations.

Chinese consumption of zinc and lead is about 7,000 to 10,000 tons of each metal annually. Some production has been recently reported by the Japanese in Liaoning, near the Korean border. One large deposit has been developed at Shuikoushan, near Changsha, in Hunan. Despite these and smaller mining operations in scattered localities, domestic production satisfies only about a tenth of the Chinese demand, and no large body of ore of either metal has yet been reported. Further careful exploration for lead and zinc as well as copper is still needed.

Mineable sources of magnesium (magnesium brines, magnesium salts in salt beds, and magnesite or magnesium carbonate deposits) and of aluminum (at present, chiefly bauxite ore) are not yet well known in China. Aluminum plants under Japanese control are now said to be in operation in Manchuria, using bauxite taken chiefly from Liaoning; other reserves of bauxite are known to exist in Shantung, Yunnan and Kansu.[11] Magnesium brines might profitably be sought by drilling; here again exploration is needed.

China is rich in deposits of three somewhat rarer metals: tungsten, tin and antimony. Tungsten is especially valuable as an ingredient of high grade steel and is used in electric light filaments. Geologic conditions in China are exceptionally favorable for tungsten mining, since the climate is warm enough to produce heavy rock decay and thus to free the ore from the containing rock, and to make work feasible all year around. These circumstances, plus cheap labor and the rich deposits, have made the country the arbiter of the world's market of this important metal. A table of the yields of the leading producing countries in 1940, in metric tons of concentrate bearing 60 percent tungstic oxide, puts China at the top with an estimated yield of 14,500 tons, followed by Burma (9,000 tons estimated), United States (4,825 tons estimated), Bolivia (4,183 tons exported) and the Japanese Empire (2,000 tons estimated).[12]

The workable tungsten deposits of China are chiefly in Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Yunnan and Kwangsi. Two belts parallel the southeastern coast, turning westward to enter Indo-China after following the southern border of China; of these the northwesterly is the more productive now and is probably the more promising one for the future. Tayu in Kiangsi is the best-known single district and is believed to be the richest.

The world's major deposits of tin are found in the Malayan region, China and

[10] H. Foster Bain, *op. cit.*

[11] Ching-chao Wu, "Minerals in the Industrialization of China," *Contemporary China*, May 15, 1944, p. 3.

[12] "The Mineral Industry Covering 1940." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941, v. XLIX, p. 610.

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Bolivia. China usually occupies fourth or fifth place in annual world production, preceded by Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Bolivia and Siam in the order named. The chief mining areas in China today are in Yunnan. The relatively primitive methods heretofore in use are now being improved. The newly-established governmental Yunnan Engineering Bureau has fostered a program looking to the adoption of modern techniques.

Chinese antimony production almost completely dominates the world market, usually accounting for 75 – 80 percent of the total. Some is shipped to Europe, but most goes to the United States for use with other metals in babbit and bearing alloys, hard lead and type metals. The chief center of production is in Hunan.[13] The Chinese Government has repeatedly sought to stabilize production of antimony and to create a kind of government monopoly.

To complete the record, a word should be said about the production of mercury or quicksilver, valuable as a constituent in pigments, chemicals and explosives. Though its production in China is not large it has been steady and may increase in the future. Mercury ore has been found in several areas, notably Kweichow province. Further search for it appears justified, since the war has largely depleted the reserves of Spain, northeastern Italy and the United States, hitherto the most important world sources; but it is doubtful that mercury will ever become a mineral for Chinese export. The production of the precious metals, silver and especially gold, is widespread though not conspicuous in China and has little bearing on the industrialization of the country.[14]

Certain non-metallic minerals such as limestone, salt, gypsum, building stone and cement materials are of great value in construction and in the manufacture of chemicals. In an industrially undeveloped country such as China these products are chiefly of local use; as China becomes more of a manufacturing nation and the standard of living rises, there will be a wider domestic market for them. And the probable development of heavy chemical industries which produce such basic materials as sulphuric acid, simple lime compounds and soda ash will likewise create a heavier demand for the above group of non-metallic minerals.

The exploitation of certain of the industrial minerals is already under way. Among such products are magnesite or magnesium carbonate, greatly needed not only as a source of magnesium metal but also as a refractory and flux in steel making and as a raw material in the chemical and cement industries; fluorspar, used as a flux in metallurgy and in glass manufacture; gypsum, essential in most high-grade plasters; and salt, that most important of chemical raw materials, now derived from the sea in the eastern provinces and from mines in Szechwan and Yunnan. China is the greatest producer of high-grade talc, an industrially valuable lubricant, filler and refractory. And she has clay of unusual purity, from which our term "china" for high-grade crockery orginated.

The magnesite deposits in southern Liaoning, Manchuria, may prove to be the world's largest. As early as 1925 they were estimated to contain 200,000,000

[13] A. S. Wheeler, "Antimony Production in Hunan Province, China," Transactions of American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, v. 25, 1915–1916, p. 366–389.

[14] For further details on the non-ferrous mineral resources of China see an article by Kung-Ping Wang in the October 1944 issue of the *Geographical Review* entitled "Mineral Resources of China, with Special Reference to the Non-Ferrous Metals."

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tons of this valuable material [15] and in 1937 they yielded 331,000 metric tons,[16] rivalling the deposits of Austria and Soviet Russia. Fluorspar is being produced by Japanese interests from mines in Chekiang; other deposits of this mineral, as yet apparently unworked, are known in Shantung. The other mineral products mentioned are widespread in China, being found in southern Manchuria, where they are now worked by the Japanese, and in east-central China, especially in Honan, Hupeh and Chekiang.

It is customary to expect any country as little known geologically as China to yield petroleum. To date, however, only a few producing districts have been found, and these are of little significance in the huge petroleum production of the world. The most promising producing area at present is in southwestern China, extending from Sinkiang through Kansu, Shensi and Szechwan. Sikang, only very recently explored, probably has a larger reserve and its output might attain world importance.[17] Manchuria may also produce petroleum but, so far as known, no exploratory drilling has been done there. Most of China's present production comes from northern Shensi and western Szechwan; a minor quantity comes from Sinkiang and a little more comes from Kansu. The Sinkiang region offers promise, though little is actually known about the possibilities of petroleum in this westerly part of China. In recent years the total annual output for the nation was not more than 70,000 barrels. Three refineries are now in operation or under construction, two in Kansu, and one in Sinkiang.[18]

Manchurian shale oil is of more immediate significance as a source of petroleum, gasoline or lubricants than Chinese petroleum, and appears to have been of great and immediate value to the Japanese during the current war. The reserves are chiefly near Manchuli in Heilungkiang and Fushun in Liaoning. Figures such as three billion barrels are quoted, but a more reasonable estimate for the only fields so far productive, those in Liaoning, would probably be upward of 200,000,000 barrels under economical conditions of production. By 1939 Japanese installations in this region had an annual yield of about 360,000 metric tons of crude oil, largely for ultimate export to Japan.

IV

This brief survey of China's mineral resources leads back to the original question. It may be concluded that China is potentially an important and reasonably self-sufficient industrial nation. The national reserves of coal are immense, and those of iron fair. The supplies of copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, manganese and other subsidiary metals seem limited, but they are also insufficiently explored. Of this group of minerals, China seems to be best supplied with copper. She is rich in tin, tungsten and antimony and can expect to ship these metals abroad. Her supplies of mercury, gold and silver are considerable, though not exceptional. She will have export surpluses of three industrial minerals — magnesite, talc and China clay — and she appears to

[15] S. H. Dolbear, "China as a Field for Industrial Minerals," 1944 (unpublished report, courteously made available to the present authors).

[16] Kunitaro Niionomy, "The Magnesite Deposits of Manchuria," *Economic Geology*, v. 20, 1925, p. 25–53, especially p. 52.

[17] M. L. Fuller and F. G. Clapp, "Oil Prospects in Northeastern China," Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, v. 20, 1926, p. 1073–1117. W. B. Heroy, "Petroleum" in H. Foster Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 123–133.

[18] "China Handbook, 1937–1943." New York: Macmillan, 1943, p. 483–484.

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have enough reserves of most other common industrial minerals and structural materials to meet the increased domestic requirements which would accompany rising living standards. Petroleum will probably not be of great importance as a Chinese mineral product for some time to come, although continued exploration in western China may yield much greater reserves.

In concluding this survey, certain comments may be ventured as to actions which need to be taken by China and by other nations to expedite China's industrialization. The achievement of victory and then of political stability are of course the great prerequisites for China's economic development. On the large subject of political stability we are able to note here only that the condition of the Chinese masses is not favorable to industrial development, and that reform of various kinds is needed. As stated, the Chinese diet is poorly balanced and undernourishment is the rule among the Chinese. The Chinese people depend too much upon plant foods, especially cereals, and obtain too little dairy and meat foods; the implications of this fact no doubt go deep into the structure of Chinese society, but they cannot be analyzed here. The individual Chinese is quick to learn industrial techniques, by all accounts, but the "cheap" labor of China may need a generation of education and readjustment before it can approach the efficiency of western workmen. And a better nutritional level is certainly a prerequisite to the arduous physical labor needed to run machines efficiently, despite the most advanced mechanization.[19] "Cheap" labor may be inexpensive in terms of cost per hour of work, but it is frequently very expensive in terms of cost per task accomplished, as has been demonstrated in many industries in various countries.

Extensive comment on the present policies of the Chinese Government toward the country's mineral resources are scarcely warranted; internal development has of course been hamstrung by the recurring emergencies of the last 20 years of warfare. The creation of an active federal geological survey three decades ago was intended to be the first of a series of measures designed to put China's mineral resources to use. The Chungking Administration has recently taken several highly constructive steps; we may note in particular the work of the National Resources Commission since 1938 in searching for petroleum, and the studies of lead and zinc smelting, antimony and tin production, and tungsten marketing fostered by the Chinese Ministry of Economics. The promising program of railroad building planned in 1920 has largely gone by the board in the period of civil and foreign wars,[20] but the Chinese Government seems aware of the crucial need for the development of communications in China, especially the need for a railway net in western China which has been emphasized in this paper.

What can the Great Powers do to help China forward on the road to industrialization? Only a few aspects of this broad question can be considered here. A philanthropic approach toward China's financial needs is sometimes recommended for the United States, and perhaps for the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. But a "big brother" rôle is politically feasible only to a moderate degree. American and British citizens, with their own pyramided war debts, will not favor foreign loans which have the appearance of gifts — despite the example of the excellent intangible profits yielded by the generous attitude of

[19] See especially the excellent discussion by H. Foster Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 237–242.

[20] *Cf.* Chang Kia-ngau, "China's Struggle for Railroad Development." New York: John Day, 1943.

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the United States in the case of the Boxer indemnities. Although China asks for understanding, she will not ask for charity. The American Government, or, more wisely, private capital, may justifiably undertake moderate-interest, long-term loans for development in China. Loans to further the rehabilitation and extension of the Chinese railways in western and southwestern China would be especially helpful. The question of collateral for such loans is a delicate one; loans with large collateral are always open to the charge of imperialism, however farsighted and fair the terms may be. The recent revision of certain laws governing foreign capital in China will, at any rate, simplify this problem. In the past foreign capital has been discouraged from investing in exploratory mining ventures in China by laws so framed that all mining corporations were controlled by Chinese capital and directors. It is understandable that the Chinese Republic felt the need of such measures — after all, China was freed from the limitations of extraterritoriality only a year ago. But the revision of the laws was a wise and constructive action.[21]

Export of antimony, tungsten and tin will be an important source of foreign exchange for China after the war, and "cartels"— or some type of producers' associations — to stabilize these industries and reduce sources of international conflict would be useful. Whether such organizations would act to help hundreds of small mine operators and their numerous employees and would regulate prices in the interest of consumers, or would merely raise and maintain artificial price levels, is of course a relevant question. The problem can perhaps be solved only by the creation of an international board of mineral control, functioning as part of a larger international organization.

The United States and the British Commonwealth could usefully expedite the development of Chinese mineral resources by making technical advice and services available to the Chinese. Government engineers, geologists and economists could be loaned to the Chinese, much as the United States now exchanges them with the Latin American countries. The younger Americans, Canadians, Australians and Europeans who served in such capacities would gain valuable experience while rendering aid to China. Perhaps educational and philanthropic foundations in the United States will send competent and understanding young Americans with special scientific training to China, extending the help which has been given to China in the field of medicine. If such engineering fellowships are arranged, however, we must take care to see that the arrangements are not one-sided. The form is as important as the substance if good feeling is to be fostered.

Finally, we must revert to the truism that world policies which make international trade easy are basically necessary for China's industrial development and hence for peace and stability in the Far East. It was noted above, for example, that the iron ore of India and the Philippines supplements the coal of China; the welfare of this whole vast area will be forwarded by governmental actions which make such a natural union of economic resources possible. China is conspicuously dependent upon foreign exchange in the development of a modern industrial plant. She must trade with the United States, with Great Britain and probably with Japan. Trade with the U.S.S.R. may contribute to Chinese exchange in Russia, although at present the exportable surpluses of Russia and China are similar rather than supplementary: coal is the chief sur-

[21] *Cf.* "The Prospect of Foreign Investment in China," *Contemporary China*, February 7, 1944.

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plus raw material of both eastern Russia and China and both are short of iron ore and, of course, of consumers goods.

The United States can look forward to fruitful and mutually beneficial trade relationships with an industrialized China. We need her tin, tungsten and antimony. We can use her talc, clay, possibly her magnesite and certainly her crude oil, if it is found in sufficient quantities. And though Chinese bunker coal does not actually enter this country, its use by American ships in Chinese ports is valuable to American commerce.

China has in the past received 15 to 20 percent of her imports from the United States, mostly in the form of fabricated goods, but also including petroleum and petroleum products, pig iron, steel billets, and copper bars and ingots. Shipments of these products would doubtless decline if China measurably increased domestic mineral production and fabrication. But the industrialization of China would not mean that her total imports from the United States would decrease. The primary result of the development of a modern economy in China would be a rise in the Chinese standard of living and a great increase in the demand for consumers goods. The development of Chinese resources, the growth of Chinese industry, the rising purchasing power and living standards of the Chinese citizenry will be immensely helpful to the foreign trade and basic economy of the nations of Europe, Asia and the New World.

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THE FUTURE OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA

By Gaston Rueff

ON APRIL 13, 1942, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles made a very important declaration in a letter to the French Ambassador, Gaston Henry Haye, to the effect that the United States "recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over the territories of France and over French possessions overseas" and "fervently hopes that it may see the reëstablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory." The meaning of this statement is crystal clear. It applies without ambiguity to French Indo-China, which both technically and in practice was, and is, considered a French possession.

But the people of Indo-China will certainly not be satisfied with a mere return to the old established forms of colonial government. How will France reëstablish her jurisdiction once the Japanese are expelled from the country and Admiral Decoux's puppet government has been ousted? And in what way will she give the native people a fair chance to prepare themselves for self-government? These questions must be carefully examined.

II

French Indo-China, it is interesting to note, is unique among the colonies of southeast Asia in that it has remained under the administration of its prewar government even though the substance of power has passed to the Japanese invaders. The French community is largely anti-Vichy and anti-Japanese, as are most of the officials and certainly all the petty officials. We can therefore justifiably expect that the reconquest of this territory will be facilitated by the attitude and the actions of the French community and of the French officials and that they will be eager to collaborate with the forces of the United Nations.

It is generally said that Indo-China yielded readily to the Japanese in 1940–41, or even that the French handed over the colony to enable the Japanese to use it as a base of operations for their subsequent moves south. The facts are very far from corroborating such a supposition.

As a result of the increased tension in southeast Asia, a parley was held in Singapore in July 1939 between British and French officials, accompanied by military and naval staffs. A joint plan for the defense of Singapore, Hong Kong and French Indo-China was worked out. Unfortunately it was never put into practice. When the war broke out in Europe, Indo-China still was inadequately armed, as were Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila and the Netherlands East Indies.

The French at once mobilized all their nationals and a certain number of natives. The equipment available included light arms and some field artillery, but the supply of ammunition was very small. There were a few obsolete tanks and planes, no medium artillery and not a single modern plane. By the spring of 1940, approximately 18,000 French troops and 75,000 natives were under arms. Their artillery was composed solely of 75 mm. batteries, with at the most 70 to 80 rounds per gun. There still were no medium or heavy guns in Indo-China. There were one modern tank and five armored cars, three of them outmoded; nine modern fighters (Morane 406); six reconnaissance float-planes;

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one light cruiser (four 6-inch guns), two or three river gunboats, and one submarine. There was not a single bomber.

When France collapsed in June 1940, the Governor-General, Georges Catroux, already a supporter of General Charles de Gaulle, looked to the British for aid. He secretly sent his personal secretary and *officier d'ordonnance* to Singapore to plead for help. But in Singapore the military outlook was far from bright. As Andrew Roth puts it: "In the early summer of 1940, however, the British were in no position to extend the naval coöperation envisaged in the Singapore Agreement of July 1939," nor "in a position to support Hanoi's resistance to Japan, despite Indo-China's strategic position with regard to Burma, Hong Kong, Malaysia and other British possessions in that area." [1] Then on July 17, 1940, the British closed the Burma Road, hoping that this concession might keep Japan from joining the Axis. Governor-General Catroux saw that there was no chance of help from the outside and realized that it was impossible to fight the Japanese with his own forces. On July 20 he handed over his duties to the appointee of the Vichy Government, Admiral Decoux.

Admiral Decoux hoped to limit the scope of Japanese encroachments by surrendering on questions of minor importance but refusing to give in on any major issue. Through Vichy and directly through the French Ambassador in Washington, Count de Saint-Quentin, he appealed to the American Government for assistance, "but apparently American Far Eastern policy was in a somewhat hesitant stage." [2] On July 26, 1940, the United States extended its export license system to include aviation gasoline and scrap iron, which was meant of course to handicap Japan; however, this license system did not apply either to ordinary gasoline or to high octane gasoline, which could be turned into aviation gasoline. No positive help was given to French Indo-China. A French mission, headed by Colonel H. Jacomy, had meanwhile been sent to the United States to purchase planes, guns and ammunition; it arrived in San Francisco on July 28, but ran into difficulties and was not allowed to buy a single plane or a single gun.

The struggle against the Japanese seemed more and more hopeless. Nevertheless, Decoux persisted in his appeals to America. In late August he is reported to have sent three telegrams to Washington requesting assistance. Apparently Washington was more receptive at this time, for it is said that on September 4 Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that if reports were true that the Japanese Government had served a virtual ultimatum on Indo-China, the action would have an unfortunate effect on American public opinion.[3] Despite this encouraging statement, the Jacomy mission got nowhere.

Meanwhile, on August 30, 1940, the Vichy Government, probably under German pressure, had signed an agreement in Tokyo. Up to now its clauses have remained secret. Allegedly the agreement was a pact of mutual assistance, allowing Japan to send troops to Indo-China to defend the integrity of the country against foreign aggression. Vichy is supposed to have allowed the stationing of 8,000 Japanese troops in Tongking and to have granted the Japanese the exclusive use of three of the Tongking airports. One of them was

[1] Andrew Roth, "Japan Strikes South." New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, p. 49 and 56.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 58.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 64.

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the Gia-Lâm airport, the main air base in Hanoi. The agreement is supposed also to have contained a clause providing for the development of commercial relations of the two countries.

Decoux was supposed to sign an agreement implementing the Tokyo arrangement, but he was doing his best to postpone this action. As Foreign Minister Matsuoka put it, in a conversation with Ambassador Grew, "the Governor General continued to be uncoöperative . . . and since the Governor General was evidently not acting in good faith and since the Japanese authorities were aware that to foreign consuls stationed in Indo-China the Governor had boasted that he was using obstructive tactics, the Japanese felt it necessary to present an ultimatum." [4]

Decoux finally gave in on September 22. Events now moved fast. Though Decoux had accepted the ultimatum, the Japanese Canton Army crossed the Tongking border that same night. Fighting immediately broke out between French and Japanese troops, and for three days, 2,000 Frenchmen on the Chinese-Tongking border, at Lang-son, Dong-Dang, and Than-Moi, fought the 30,000 men of the Canton Army. But the struggle was too uneven to last long. On September 26, the Japanese landed trained shock troops in Haiphong and battle planes at Hanoi. The fighting ended and Decoux yielded to all the Japanese demands.

At present, the native people are reportedly in incipient revolt against the Japanese rule. Furthermore, despite the fact that Decoux and various high government officials are Japanese puppets, the petty French officials, as we have noted, can be counted upon to help overthrow the Japanese rule when the time of invasion comes.

III

French Indo-China is unique from another point of view. Unlike other colonies of southeast Asia — the Philippines, Burma, Java and Malaysia, for example — it is not a single, homogeneous country, but a federation of five countries in which at least three major races live side by side.

Before the arrival of the French, these five countries — Cochin-China, Annam, Tongking, Cambodia, Laos — had no relationship save that of constant warfare. At the beginning of the Christian era, the dominant race, the Annamite, was a savage and primitive tribe of farmers living in Tongking and northern Annam. In the first century A.D., the Chinese conquered Tongking, subjecting it to Chinese rule and to the authority of the Emperor. Not until a thousand years later did the Annamites shake off the Chinese yoke and live again as an independent people. Their lands were overcrowded, however, and they in turn pushed southward, attacking the powerful Empire of Champa. Little by little they conquered it, destroying its inhabitants, and thus came into contact with the Kingdom of Cambodia, whose inhabitants descended from the famous Khmers. Up to the fifteenth century, the Khmer kingdom was a strong and independent country, but later, with the decay of the Khmer civilization, Cambodia was attacked not only by the Annamites on her southern border but by the Siamese on her western border. These wars continued up to the second half of the nineteenth century, when Cambodia asked France to take her under her protection. The wars then ceased. Cochin-China, which had become a French colony, Cambodia, Annam and Tongking,

[4] Joseph C. Grew, "Ten Years in Japan." New York: Simon and Shuster, 1944, p. 331.

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which had become protectorates, lived together in peace under French rule. Laos, another French protectorate, also combines territories never before brought together under the same rule, such as the Kingdom of Luang-Prabang, and the Princedoms of Vientiane and Bassac.

France has thus established what the French call the *Union Indochinoise*. It is a country united politically and economically. Despite some past errors and failures, French rule has, on the whole, brought it peace and a certain degree of culture, health and prosperity. The abrupt ending of this rule would make new wars between the different Indo-Chinese peoples inevitable, with chaos the certain result.

The white man has lost face throughout the whole of Asia in the last few years; and in this respect the French in Indo-China are no exception. In the past, the white man's rule has rested largely on "prestige," and this prestige will have to be restored if the French are to pursue their policy of educating the natives and hastening their cultural, political and economic advancement. For this purpose it is essential that French troops participate in the expulsion of the Japanese from Indo-China, and certainly it is the intention and the desire of the Provisional Government of the French Republic in Algiers that they should do so. On December 8, 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation declared: "In conjunction with the United Nations, she [France] will fight at their side until complete defeat of the enemy [Japan] has been achieved and complete liberation of Indo-China accomplished."

French intentions for the period of guardianship during which the natives will be made ready to take over the government of Indo-China have also been made clear. On December 8, 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation referred to the future of the natives in the following terms: "France intends to give them in the bosom of the French community a new political status, in which the liberties of the different countries composing Indo-China will be extended and consecrated in the framework of a federal organization; in which the liberal character of the ways of living will be accentuated, without losing the original stamp of the Indo-Chinese civilization and traditions; in which, lastly, the Indo-Chinese will be able to occupy all ranks and functions in the government offices." At the Colonial Conference held at Brazzaville in January–February 1944, the late Governor-General Eboué of French Equatorial Africa, whose death is so much to be regretted, laid down certain principles to be applied to French African colonies. They likewise definitely describe the policy envisaged for Indo-China: "Treat the less progressive native not as an isolated and interchangeable individual, but as a human being, heavy with traditions, a member of a family, of a village, of a tribe, capable of progress in his own sphere, but probably lost if extracted from it." For the progressive natives, Governor-General Eboué outlined a status "by which they will become real citizens of the colony, and as such called upon to prove their worth in the administration of their community." And for those who no longer fit into the native society because they have progressed more rapidly than it did, and for those who feel ill at ease in it, this expert administrator, himself a Negro, pointed out that the granting of the right to French citizenship constitutes an avenue of access to a different level of civilization.

Traditionally the French have taken great pride in the fact that there has been little racial antagonism between them and the natives in their colonies. They also can be proud of the extent to which French thought and culture have

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stimulated brilliant students in Indo-China. Native painters, sculptors, writers and scientists have also had a rebirth of their own great traditions. France has welcomed and encouraged this new spirit in Indo-China, not only through her support of such institutions as the School of the Beaux Arts at Hanoi but through many technical, industrial and medical schools and schools of the applied arts. Many promising Indo-Chinese have also been brought to study in Metropolitan France. The interpenetration of French and Far Eastern ways of life is of great value to both.

The best proof of how attached the natives of Indo-China are to France is that in 1940, when France was defeated and her military strength in the Far East was practically non-existent, no insurrections occurred in the country. If the nearly 24,000,000 natives of Indo-China had really wanted to get rid of the 40,000 French, they had a splendid opportunity to do so. But though they were deluged with Japanese propaganda urging them to overthrow the French and take the government into their own hands they remained loyal.

France is aware that mistakes have been made in the past and that conditions, particularly of an economic nature, are seriously in need of improvement. There have been some bloody revolts. The Yen-bai revolt of 1930, for instance, and the repression which followed, left a general sense of dissatisfaction and uneasiness. All such outbursts have resulted from the poverty of the people in certain districts, and their low standard of living. Practically all the popular uprisings in Indo-China in the last 50 years have started in northern Annam and in the Tongkinese delta, the most closely populated, poorest and most backward parts of the country. The average density of population in those regions is 450 to the square kilometer, but in some it is much higher — for instance, 2,300 per square kilometer in the Quang-Yen Province. Nearly all the uprisings took place in periods of world-wide depression.

France will have to change her economic policy in Indo-China drastically after the war. The only way to effect a permanent increase in the purchasing power of the people in the over-populated districts of Tongking and northern Annam is to introduce industrialization there on a large scale. French economic policy in the past has been directed mainly to the production of raw materials for use in France or for sale in other countries. Emphasis has been placed on agriculture and mining, and, with one or two exceptions, modern industrial developments have been devoted to the extractive type of industry or to the preliminary processing of raw materials for export. Steep tariffs have been applied to keep cheap products out of the country and to allow high-priced French products to be sold. In short, Indo-China has been tied to the French custom system.

This tie must be severed after the war. Indo-China must be given the right to fix and modify locally her custom tariffs and regulations, without having to take into account the French home tariffs. Preferential rates will have to be abolished. An Open Door policy must be adopted, permitting foreign as well as French capital to enter; and all possible encouragement must be given to the creation of the types of modern industrial enterprise which seem best adapted to the country. The existing modern textile industry is an example of the sort of enterprise that could be expanded, even though at present only 5 percent of the yarn used in the cotton mills of Tongking and Annam is of local origin while 95 percent is imported. The resulting stimulus to the cultivation of cotton, in Cambodia especially, would be of great and general benefit. The manufacture

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of tires, from rubber produced in Cochin-China and Cambodia, and of jute bags, necessary for the rice exports, the development of the paper industry, the manufacture of certain chemicals and of artificial fertilizers, and the processing and refining of all the mineral ores produced in the Indo-Chinese mines — such are some of the other possibilities for industrialization. Later on can come the expansion of industrialization to include certain heavy industries.

Such a program will require large investments and French capital will not suffice. The Open Door policy for foreign capital will therefore have to be initiated immediately after the war.

Even so, industrialization will not be accomplished overnight. In the interval, the French will have to take provisional measures to help the overcrowded areas of Tongking and Annam. A certain number of families must be transferred from these districts each year to Cochin-China, and perhaps to certain parts of Cambodia, where they will find more decent living conditions and will also be able to increase the production of agricultural products such as cotton, hemp, jute, corn, copra and tobacco. At the same time, a program of public works must be undertaken in order to equip the whole country with modern facilities — in transportation, for example — as well as a development of the mining industry on a large scale, aimed at giving employment to the peoples of the Tongkinese Delta and northern An'nam.

IV

To summarize. Independence cannot be granted Indo-China in the country's present stage of development. France will have to continue her guardianship, but must change certain of her policies, notably her economic policy. In addition, however, it seems plain that some sort of international system will have to be devised to guarantee that the older forms of imperialism have been mitigated and that henceforth serious, consciously-directed and widely-progressive efforts will be made to advance the social and economic well-being of the native peoples and to prepare them for eventual self-government.

Such an international system might operate through a regional organization, perhaps in the form of a Coördinating Council of the Southwest Pacific.[5] Reports from Algiers indicate that the French Provisional Government is considering such an organization and that it is inclined to favor a system of collective security in the Pacific area. What nations should be the members of such a Council? What functions should it have? How should it carry them out?

The membership should include Australia, China, France, French Indo-China, Great Britain, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Netherlands East Indies, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand and the United States.

The functions of the Council are less easily specified. First of all, the duties of the Council, apart from its police functions, should be strictly of a *supervisory* type. Under no condition should the Council be allowed to have executive functions. Government in the various areas of the southwest Pacific is sufficiently delicate and ticklish without being complicated still more by the direct interference of the Council. The country which has administrative jurisdiction over a colony must definitely have sovereign rights over that

[5] In the opinion of the author, the Coördinating Council of the Southwest Pacific would be only one of the four Regional Councils (European, Pan American, African, Southwest Pacific) and would have to be linked to a World Council.

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country; under no other conditions would normal government of that colony be possible.

The primary function of the Council should be to organize, among the member nations, collective security to avert war. This means that the member nations would have to be bound by a pact of non-aggression and mutual assistance. All disputes between two or more member nations would be arbitrated by a Judiciary Committee and all its decisions would be binding, although there would be the possibility of lodging an appeal directly with the Council in case one or more of the member nations should consider the judgment rendered by the Judiciary Committee unjust. To enforce its decisions, the Council should have at its disposal both economic and military sanctions. The economic sanctions would be applied to a nation which refused to abide by the decision taken by the Judiciary Committee. If they failed to produce the desired result, the Council would have to use force. For this purpose, each member nation should make the appropriate contribution — some would put bases at the disposal of the Council, others would furnish ships, planes, matériel or men. All would share in the expenses of maintenance. Each member nation would have to allow its territories to be used for the establishment of the necessary international bases.

The Council should also have supervisory functions in certain specific fields, such as education, public health, labor regulations and economic relations. To exercise these functions properly it would have to set up a certain number of committees, each sufficiently large to enable at least one member to visit each of the different colonies annually. Once a year, the committees would receive reports from the member nations exercising administrative jurisdiction over a colony. At least once a year (and oftener in cases of emergency) one or two members of each Committee should visit each colonial area and make a report to the Council on the methods by which the member nations are exercising their rule over the colonies which they administer.

The principal function of the Council, in this respect, should be to coördinate the different ways and means by which the member nations are applying in the areas under their jurisdiction the different political, cultural and economic policies advocated by the Council. But the Council should not have the power to enforce directly the Committee's conclusions. This should be left to the member nation in charge of the particular area.

If a member nation refuses to follow the policies recommended by the Council, the latter would have to take measures to enforce acquiescence. However, this step would be taken only after the member nation had the opportunity of explaining its attitude at a general meeting of the Council. Should these explanations not be satisfactory, the Council would then take action. The first measure of enforcement would be the exclusion of the recalcitrant member nation from the Coördinating Council; next the Council would pronounce and put into effect financial and economic sanctions, which would last as long as the member nation refused to alter its policies.

Under such a system, France would have sovereign jurisdiction and administration over French Indo-China, under the supervision of the Coördinating Council of the Southwest Pacific. The machinery described would enable the Indo-Chinese people to move steadily in the direction of social and economic independence and ensure them of eventually achieving their ultimate goal, self-government.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE GREAT DECISION. By JAMES T. SHOTWELL. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 268 p. $3.00.

This book, the fruit of long experience and study, sets forth the general conditions and describes the institutions under which Professor Shotwell believes the world may have a chance to enjoy lasting peace. He favors an organization of the national states in something like a revived League, plus an international air force for police purposes.

THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. By ANDRE VISSON. New York: Viking, 1944, 301 p. $3.00.

An able European journalist describes and analyzes the problems, primarily political, which the end of the war will bring to each of the countries of Europe, North Africa and the Near East. He finds no cause for undue optimism.

THE SUPER-POWERS. By WILLIAM T. R. FOX. New York: Harcourt, 1944, 184 p. $2.00.

The author holds that the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union must, in the nature of things, bear the primary burden of establishing and maintaining peace. He canvasses the problems which such an attempt at coöperation will create.

HOW TO END THE GERMAN MENACE: A POLITICAL PROPOSAL. By FIVE HOLLANDERS. New York: Querido, 1944, 92 p. $1.25.

A specific plan is set forth including the partition of Germany into three or four separate and independent states.

PRELUDE TO PEACE. By SIR ROWLAND EVANS. London: Hutchinson, 1943, 148 p. 10/6.

A review of peace plans put forward by others, including various Germans. Among the proposals the author considers the partition of Germany into separate states or at least into a federated state.

KEEP THE PEACE THROUGH AIR POWER. By ALLAN MICHIE. New York: Holt, 1944, 196 p. $2.00.

Having urged us to win the war with air power, Mr. Michie now exhorts us to use it as the chosen instrument for preventing World War III.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE. COMPILED BY JULIA E. JOHNSEN. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1944, 253 p. $1.25.

Material selected to illustrate various points of view.

THE WORLD WITHOUT NATIONS. By ARTHUR FREUD. Cynthiana (Ky.): Hobson Book Press, 1943, 208 p. $2.00.

National states being the root of evil, the author of this somewhat extraordinary book abolishes them in favor of several supranational states.

NO NATION ALONE. By LINUS R. FIKE. New York: Philosophical Library, 1943, 96 p. $1.50.

The author seeks in this plan to reconcile the national state with one for some over-all international organization.

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WORLD REPUBLIC. By Charles A. Gill. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1943, 119 p. $1.00.

A proposal to supplant the many nation-states with a single centralized federal republic.

APPROACHES TO WORLD PEACE. Edited by Lyman Bryson and Others. New York: Harper, 1944, 973 p. $5.00.

Some three score men and women — for the most part from American academic life — contribute papers and discussions to this Fourth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, held at Columbia University in September 1943.

THEY WORK FOR TOMORROW. By Robert M. Bartlett. New York: Association Press and Revell, 1943, 144 p. $1.50.

Opinions on the shape of the postwar world expressed by some fifteen Americans.

TWENTY-FIVE TROUBLED YEARS 1918–1943. By F. H. Soward. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 437 p. $3.00.

A careful, unemotional interpretation of the recent history of Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Russia, as well as of international relations in general.

DEMOCRACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. By Carleton Kemp Allen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 109 p. $1.00.

A thoughtful little book on some of the fundamental political problems of our day, by the Warden of Rhodes House at Oxford.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT. By Charles Edward Merriam. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, 78 p. $1.75.

Lectures delivered at the University of Indiana in March 1943.

WHO ARE 'THE PEOPLE'? By Colm Brogan. London: Hollis, 1943, 156 p. 8/6.

The author has a good deal of fault to find with many personages, contemporary and otherwise, and with some of the current political hypocrisies — without, however, telling us just what he means by "the people."

GEOPOLITICS: THE NEW GERMAN SCIENCE. By Andrew Gyorgy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944, $1.50.

In his search for the "precursors" of geopolitics, the author goes back to classical antiquity. He finds that geopolitics ceased being a science under the Nazi dispensation and became a weapon for German world domination.

GEOPOLITICS IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE. By Russell H. Fifield and G. Etzel Pearcy. Boston: Ginn, 1944, 203 p. $2.75.

A systematic text illustrated with several maps.

LOOK AT THE WORLD. By Richard Edes Harrison. New York: Knopf, 1944, 66 p. $3.50.

Most of the highly original and beautifully prepared maps in this atlas first appeared in *Fortune* magazine. They will be of interest and use to any mentally agile reader who doesn't object to unconventional cartography.

A WAR ATLAS FOR AMERICANS. Prepared with the Assistance of the Office of War Information. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944, 86 p. $2.50.

This atlas has several times as many maps as the Harrison work; and, though they do not represent such cartographic virtuosity as the latter, they will be found to offer a much more complete repertory. The text — compiled under the direction of Professor Harold Sprout of Princeton — is a gold mine of information on the chronology and strategy of the war. The editorial and map research was under the direction of Barbara Wendell Soule.

ATLAS OF GLOBAL GEOGRAPHY. By Erwin Raisz. New York: Harper, 1944, 64 p. $3.50.

In some respects this compilation is of wider and of more durable value than either

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of the two previous works, for it covers economic and social as well as locational geography. The author is a lecturer at the Harvard Institute of Geographical Exploration.

A GUIDE TO NAVAL STRATEGY. By Bernard Brodie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 313 p. $2.75.

This thoroughly revised version of a first-rate treatise contains new illustrative material from World War II.

WARSHIPS OF THE WORLD. Edited by Roger Kafka and Roy L. Pepperburg. New York: Cornell Maritime Press, 1944, 1,038 p. $15.00.

This reference work was apparently conceived as an American competitor to "Jane's Fighting Ships." In addition to statistical and historical data of all sorts, there are 500 photographs and 200 profile drawings.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TOTALITARIAN LAWLESSNESS. By Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Cape, 1943, 168 p. 10/6.

A recognized authority on international law presents an impressive documentation to prove the illegal behavior of the Axis Powers. He believes that these acts can be dealt with under existing international law. Those interested in the punishment of war criminals will find this argument illuminating.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA. By A. Pearce Higgins and C. John Colombos. London: Longmans, 1943, 647 p. 42/.

This authoritative treatise was begun by the late Professor Pearce Higgins, at one time a lecturer at the Naval War College in Greenwich and later occupant of the Whewell chair at Cambridge University. It was completed by his pupil, Dr. Colombos, himself an expert in the field of maritime law. The text consists of two fairly equal parts, one devoted to the law of peace and the other to the law of war.

THREE WARS WITH GERMANY. By Admiral Sir W. Reginald Hall and Amos J. Peaslee. New York: Putnam, 1944, 309 p. $3.00.

The director of British Naval Intelligence and the director of the American Courier Service in World War I collaborate in relating incidents of their work and publishing their correspondence during the Black Tom case.

VOICES OF HISTORY, 1943–1944. Edited by Franklin Watts. New York: Gramercy Publishing Co., 1944, 621 p. $3.50.

The texts of some 150 significant speeches and state papers arranged chronologically.

General: Economic and Social

COMMODITY CONTROL. By P. Lamartine Yates. London: Cape, 1943, 248 p. 15/.

Economists will welcome this discussion of the control schemes that were adopted during the inter-war period. On the basis of his review of previous experience the author ventures several suggestions for future practice.

POSTWAR MONETARY PLANS. By John H. Williams. New York: Knopf, 1944, 297 p. $2.50.

Collected writings on the question of economic stability — at home and abroad — by a distinguished American economist, professor at Harvard and Vice-President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.

GOLD: THE REAL RULER OF THE WORLD. By Franklyn Hobbs. Chicago: Business Foundation, 1943, 265 p. $3.50.

A quite amateurish review of the history and current status of the gold problem.

TEA UNDER INTERNATIONAL REGULATION. By V. D. Wickizer. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1944, 198 p. $2.50.

Another one of the Institute's excellent "Commodity Policy Studies."

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PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY. By Edwin C. Nourse. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1944, 541 p. $3.50.

A technical and somewhat theoretical study.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM. By Peter Nathan. London: Faber, 1943, 158 p. 8/6.

A psychologist seeks to explain the reasons which lead individuals and groups to become possessed of the Fascist state of mind. He stresses mental factors to the neglect of economic, social and political ones.

ISLAM TODAY. Edited by A. J. Arberry and Rom Landau. London: Faber, 1943, 258 p. 12/6.

Some 16 contributors review conditions in the principal Moslem countries. Their papers, though somewhat uneven, are on a generally high level.

MUST MEN HATE? By Sigmund Livingston. New York: Harper, 1944, 344 p. $2.50.

Among the numerous books which seek to explain — and combat — anti-Semitism, this is one of the sanest and most readable.

A CENTURY OF JEWISH LIFE. By Ismar Elbogen. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1944, 814 p. $3.00.

A scholarly annotated history of the position of the Jews throughout the world since the early nineteenth century.

THE JEWS, THE WAR, AND AFTER. By P. Horowitz. London: Cole, 1943, 138 p. 7/6.

Suggestions for coöperative Jewish action on an international level.

A SURVEY OF FACTS AND OPINIONS ON PROBLEMS OF POST-WAR JEWRY IN EUROPE AND PALESTINE. New York: American Jewish Conference, 1943, 143 p. $1.00.

Suggestions concerning the political and economic reconstruction of Europe's Jews, with particular emphasis on the rôle of Palestine.

NATIONAL PATRIOTISM IN PAPAL TEACHING. By John J. Wright. Westminster (Md.): Newman Bookshop, 1943, 358 p. $3.50.

A scholarly, documented monograph by a Catholic priest.

FABIAN SOCIALISM. By G. D. H. Cole. London: Allen and Unwin, 1943, 172 p. 7/6.

After reviewing the Socialist position, Mr. Cole applies it to the current international chaos. He finds that social security must be a goal for all nations if it is to be achieved by any one of them, particularly in Europe.

FAITH, REASON, AND CIVILIZATION. By Harold J. Laski. New York: Viking, 1944, 187 p. $2.50.

In pleasing and plausible prose, Mr. Laski expatiates on the shortcomings of contemporary capitalist civilization and the superior qualities of the Soviet way of doing things — which alone, he holds, can redeem mankind.

EDUCATION IN TRANSITION. By H. C. Dent. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 244 p. $3.00.

This "sociological study of the impact of war on English education 1939–1943" forms part of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction edited by Karl Mannheim.

ON LIVING IN A REVOLUTION. By Julian Huxley. New York: Harper, 1944, 242 p. $2.00.

A collection of essays on social and political problems raised by the war, by a distinguished British scientist.

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A GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION POLLS. By GEORGE GALLUP. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 104 p. $1.50.

One of the chief practitioners of the art of opinion-sampling answers a number of questions as to how it is done.

IN THE MARGINS OF CHAOS. By FRANCESCA M. WILSON. London: Murray, 1944, 287 p. 18/.

These appealing recollections of the author's participation in relief work during three decades take us into many stricken lands.

The Second World War

THE WAR: FOURTH YEAR. By EDGAR McINNIS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 409 p. $2.50.

The fourth volume in a useful series recording the course of the war in all its phases.

THE SIX WEEKS' WAR: FRANCE MAY 10–JUNE 25, 1940. By THEODORE DRAPER. New York: Viking, 1944, 346 p. $3.00.

Though the events of which he writes seem to have happened only yesterday, Mr. Draper has been remarkably successful in synthesizing all available information about the fall of France into a comprehensible and credible narrative. This is one of the better books of the year.

EUROPE RISES. By DOROTHY WOODMAN. London: Gollancz, 1943, 154 p. 4/6.

A description of conditions and the resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Greece and Jugoslavia. The author expresses the fear that the Allied Powers will find themselves impeding the truly popular forces in these countries when they have been freed.

EUROPE IN BONDAGE. EDITED BY JOHN ARMITAGE. London: Drummond, 1943, 98 p. 6/.

These brief descriptions of conditions in the occupied countries were based on reports made to the London International Assembly.

VOICES IN THE DARKNESS. By E. TANGYE LEAN. London: Secker and Warburg, 1943, 243 p. 15/.

The author has been associated with the radio propaganda campaign conducted by the B.B.C. in the air over Europe. In this interesting book he describes the methods and results, not only of the activities of his own organization but of the analogous agencies in Allied and Axis countries.

THE DEFENCE OF LENINGRAD. By NIKOLAI TIKHONOV. London: Hutchinson, 1943, 136 p. 2/6.

Several Russian writers have contributed graphic eyewitness stories of incidents in the Battle of Leningrad.

STALINGRAD: AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT BY SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS AND RED ARMY COMMANDERS. London: Hutchinson, 1943, 118 p. 2/6.

Another work of very much the same sort.

WIND OF FREEDOM. By COMPTON MACKENZIE. London: Chatto and Windus, 1943, 276 p. 15/.

A somewhat passionate description of the Axis invasion of Greece, by a writer who knows the country well, having been a British agent there during World War I.

GREECE FIGHTS ON. By "Symmachos." London: Drummond, 1943, 143 p. 6/.

A factual review of the terrible conditions prevailing in Greece as a result of the Nazi policy of starvation and plunder.

EAST OF MALTA, WEST OF SUEZ. By BARTIMEUS. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 221 p. $2.50.

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This is the official account of the activities of the British Mediterranean Fleet between 1939 and 1943, prepared by Captain Lewis Ritchie.

GUERRILLA WAR IN ABYSSINIA. By W. E. D. Allen. New York: Penguin, 1943, 126 p. 25 cents.

A British officer discusses General Wingate's campaign in relation to his own ideas on guerrilla tactics.

JAPAN'S SECRET WEAPON. By Barclay Moon Newman. New York: Current Publishing Co., 1944, 223 p. $2.50.

The author puts us on guard against the deadly warfare of bacteria which he believes Japan is preparing to launch on a large scale.

OUR HIDDEN FRONT. By William Gilman. New York: Reynal, 1944, 266 p. $3.00.

Keen reporting by an American journalist on wartime activities in Alaska and on the fighting in the Aleutians.

BATTLE OF THE OCEANS. By Warren Armstrong. New York: Liveright, 1944, 336 p. $2.50.

A somewhat popular description of the activities, primarily in this war, of the Royal Navy and the British Merchant Marine.

INFANTRY OFFICER. London: Batsford, 1943, 80 p. 6/.

The personal story of a young British officer who fought in Belgium and during the retreat to Dunkirk in 1940.

ESCAPE TO DANGER. By François Nattages. London: Harrap, 1943, 198 p. 8/6.

This is the story of how two young Frenchmen managed to work their way from Paris to de Gaulle's headquarters in London by way of the Sahara and West Africa. In the process of recording their adventures they shed many sidelights on native and political affairs in the West African colonies of France, Britain and Portugal.

FRONT LINE AND FRONT PAGE. By David Woodward. London: Eyre, 1943, 232 p. 10/6.

These eyewitness observations, by a London *News Chronicle* correspondent, run from August 1939 to the end of 1941 and embrace such scattered places as Britain, the Low Countries, the Eastern Mediterranean, West Africa, Abyssinia, India and China.

TELL THE FOLKS BACK HOME. By James M. Mead. New York: Appleton-Century, 1944, 298 p. $3.00.

The author was one of the five Senators who circled the globe last year visiting the various fronts on which American troops were fighting. Senator Mead reports what he saw and heard, and when he criticizes his own government and those of our Allies he does not always spare the horses.

MY UNCONSIDERED JUDGMENT. By Noel F. Busch. Boston: Houghton, 1944, 196 p. $2.00.

One of the editors of *Life* magazine returns from extensive wartime travels on five continents with these finely chiseled vignettes of picturesque persons and places.

A HISTORY OF THE WAR: IN MAPS, IN PICTOGRAPHS, IN WORDS. By Rudolph Modley. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1943, 177 p. 25 cents.

Various cartographic and pictographic devices employed to illustrate the strategy and course of the war up to the early part of 1943.

The United States

THE TIME FOR DECISION. By Sumner Welles. New York: Harper, 1944, 431 p. $3.00.

Here is unquestionably one of the more important books of the day. As Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943, Mr. Welles was in an unrivalled position to know what was going on in American and world diplomacy. This book, though it cannot be de-

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scribed as indiscreet, nevertheless abounds in hitherto unpublished information. After reviewing the mistakes of Versailles and the unhappy, often sordid, story of our interwar foreign policy, Mr. Welles takes us part way behind the scenes of his trip to Europe in the spring of 1940, the Good Neighbor Policy, and America's involvement in World War II. He concludes with a number of concrete suggestions for implementing a real peace, including the division of Germany into three separate parts and the creation of a world organization superimposed on regional arrangements.

U. S. WAR AIMS. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 235 p. $1.50.

In this sequel to his "U. S. Foreign Policy" Mr. Lippmann projects his analysis into the future. He finds that by the logic of history and geography there exist — already in being or potentially — four regional orbits: Atlantic, Russian, Chinese and Hindu-Moslem. He is especially emphatic on the necessity for the Atlantic Community (North America and western Europe) to refrain from fratricidal war. He also envisages a Universal Society, but not a world government. His rejection of the latter is categorical, and with his rejection he delivers an attack on Woodrow Wilson and "Wilsonianism."

AMERICA AND TWO WARS. By Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 213 p. $2.00.

The theme of this review of the last 50 years of American foreign policy is the ever-increasing involvement of the United States in world affairs and the end of its isolation — even if not of isolationism.

DURABLE PEACE: A STUDY OF AMERICAN NATIONAL POLICY. By Ross J. S. Hoffman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 120 p. $1.75.

After reviewing the record of the way we blundered into two wars, Professor Hoffman asks — and attempts to answer — some very pertinent questions as to how we can mend our ways. He believes that less Utopianism would help.

TEHERAN: OUR PATH IN WAR AND PEACE. By Earl Browder. New York: International Publishers, 1944, 128 p. $1.50.

Mr. Browder is nothing if not fast on his feet, and with his pen, in keeping up with the latest interpretations of Marxist doctrine invented to fit the expediencies of Soviet foreign policy.

MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE. By Jerome S. Bruner. New York: Duell, 1944, 278 p. $2.75.

The author, who is associate director of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University, has sought to sketch a composite picture of American opinion on the coming problems of peace, domestic and international. In constructing his picture he has relied on the findings of the four principal public opinion polls. He finds a heartening majority against isolation but considerable confusion, and even contradiction, as to how greater American participation in world affairs can be implemented.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ASSEMBLY HELD AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C. Edited by William Allan Neilson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 159 p. $1.75.

This record of the assembly, which met in September 1942, consists principally of summaries of the many talks delivered by some 50 speakers, American and foreign.

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE. By Ruhl J. Bartlett. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944, 252 p. $2.50.

A documented history of the League to Enforce Peace, which flourished briefly in the United States during and after the First World War.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE LOST PEACE. By Thomas A. Bailey. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 381 p. $3.00.

Professor Bailey is one of the leading authorities on American diplomatic history, in which field he has written several important books. The present volume he has devoted to a scholarly reconstruction and critical analysis of our foreign policy from

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the outbreak of World War I through the peace negotiations. Partisans of particular causes or statesmen will doubtless quarrel with some of his interpretations, though they will usually find it difficult to refute his ample documentation.

WOODROW WILSON. By Gerald W. Johnson. New York: Harper, 1944, 293 p. $2.00.

A vivid pictorial record of Wilson's career, with a brief introduction and sympathetic captions.

TWENTIETH CENTURY UNITED STATES. By Jeannette P. Nichols. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 435 p. $3.50.

A synthesis of economic and cultural as well as political history.

THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, 1789–1943. By George Fort Milton. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 349 p. $3.00.

This history of the American presidency is primarily concerned with those occupants of the office who have added to its power and influence.

PIONEERS! O PIONEERS! By Hilary St. George Saunders. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 185 p. $2.00.

The not too anonymous author of "Combined Operations" and "The Battle of Britain" reports most entertainingly and candidly on a quick but far-flung trip around the United States in 1943.

PUBLIC SPENDING AND POSTWAR ECONOMIC POLICY. By Sherwood M. Fine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, 177 p. $2.50.

An analytical review of the current literature on the New Deal's fiscal policy.

ALASKAN BACKDOOR TO JAPAN. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1943, 108 p. 5/.

A popular account of the strategic and economic significance of Alaska.

Western Europe

THE GRAVEDIGGERS OF FRANCE. By Pertinax. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 612 p. $6.00.

This is the expanded and corrected English version of the unhappy story of the fall of France first related by Pertinax (André Géraud) in his French text entitled "Les Fossoyeurs." The author has centered his narrative around the four key figures of Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud and Pétain. There is also an epilogue on Giraud and de Gaulle in North Africa. Though he does not pretend that this is definitive history it is inevitably going to be one of the prime sources on which future historians will rely, for the author's wide knowledge of the events and persons he describes is unsurpassed.

GIRAUD AND THE AFRICAN SCENE. By G. Ward Price. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 282 p. $3.00.

This would appear to be an authorized defense of the general's career, with emphasis on his rôle in North Africa. Mr. Price, formerly a confessed appeaser, still evinces a preference for Pétain and treats his subject most sympathetically.

FRANCE REVIEWS ITS REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS. By Paul Farmer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, 145 p. $2.25.

A scholarly analysis of the "social politics and historical opinion" of the leading historians of the Third Republic.

GALLIC CHARTER: FOUNDATIONS OF TOMORROW'S FRANCE. By J. C. Fernand-Laurent. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 280 p. $2.50.

A onetime editor of the Rightist newspaper *Le Jour* of Paris tells us how life under the Vichy régime taught him to value democracy at its true worth. He later joined the resistance movement in France, and finally escaped to London in 1943. While paying tribute to de Gaulle the soldier, he opposes de Gaulle the advocate of a "Fourth Republic." What is needed, he holds, is a reformation of the still existing Third Republic.

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LÉON BLUM BEFORE HIS JUDGES. London: Routledge, 1943, 159 p. 6/.

This English translation of Blum's statements made in his own defense before the court at Riom in March 1942 is an historical document of considerable importance.

NORWAY IS MY COUNTRY. By Synnove Christensen. London: Collins, 1943, 160 p. 7/6.

A graphic account of the terrors of life in Nazi-occupied Norway.

THE VOICE OF NORWAY. By Halvdan Koht and Sigmund Skard. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, 313 p. $3.50.

The first section, by Professor Koht, is a brief précis of Norwegian history; the second part, by his co-author, reviews the development of Norwegian literature.

VEM ÄR VEM I FOLKFRONTEN? Stockholm: Svea Rike, 1943, 376 p. 6 Kr.

This publication of the Swedish Nazi group pretends to list and describe the activities of all those in Sweden who disapprove of Germany or give aid and comfort to the Allies — notably to the British and the Russians.

NOBEL-PRIZE DONOR. By Michael Avlanoff. New York: Revell, 1943, 190 p. $2.50.

A conventional biography of Alfred Nobel which contains a list of all Nobel Prize winners to date.

GERMANY AND EUROPE: A SPIRITUAL DISSENSION. By Benedetto Croce. New York: Random House, 1944, 83 p. $1.25.

One of the foremost modern philosophers, and dean of Italian anti-Fascist statesmen, seeks to explain the behavior and ideas of the Germans within the context of European civilization and with particular relation to Italian culture. The book was translated by Vincent Sheean, who also contributes an introduction.

VIA DIPLOMATIC POUCH. By Douglas Miller. New York: Didier, 1944, 248 p. $3.00.

Douglas Miller, author of "You Can't Do Business with Hitler," has here assembled the cream of the confidential, fact-laden reports on Nazi economic aims and practices which he sent to the State and Commerce Departments in Washington while he was American Commercial Attaché in Berlin during the thirties.

GERMANY: THE LAST PHASE. By Gunnar T. Pihl. New York: Knopf, 1944, 322 p. $3.00.

The author is a Swedish journalist who, after having been stationed for many years in Germany, was expelled in August 1943. He shows in this account of affairs in the besieged *Lebensraum* that he is an acute observer.

STEPPING STONES TO PEACE. By Felix Langer. London: Drummond, 1943, 182 p. 10/6.

A Czech writer well acquainted with Germany has a number of things to say about the people of that country, what led them to accept Nazism and what should be done to "reëducate" them to the point where they can participate peacefully in European life.

NOT NAZIS BUT GERMANS. By Dimitri J. Tosevic. Boston: Humphries, 1944, 306 p. $4.50.

The underlying thesis of this volume on the responsibility for this war, by a Jugoslav journalist, is clear from its title.

NEED GERMANY SURVIVE? By Julius Braunthal. London: Gollancz, 1943, 256 p. 7/6.

The author answers in the affirmative, and gives his reasons why.

EAST PRUSSIA. By Robert Machray. London: Allen and Unwin, 1943, 112 p. 6/.

A strong statement of the case for uniting East Prussia with Poland and transferring the German population of that province to Germany proper.

PRELUDE TO SILENCE: THE END OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC. By Arnold Brecht. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 156 p. $2.00.

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The author of this book was for more than two decades an official in the upper reaches of the German civil service. In his book there is much interesting, and even valuable, information on the demise of the Weimar Republic. Where his analysis falls down is in his failure to comprehend the real nature of the Nazi movement and the causes for its triumph — which were not at all "accidental" as Dr. Brecht would have us think. This volume is only one more piece of evidence on the inability, or unwillingness, of even the "good Germans" to practise self-criticism.

HITLER'S GENERALS. By W. E. Hart. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 222 p. $2.75.

These sketches of several generals and two admirals were drawn by a onetime German officer, who more lately fought in the British Army. Though his portraits are fuzzy and lack the corroborative detail necessary to make them convincing, they at least serve to document the moral depravity into which the Prussian officer corps has sunk.

GERMAN RADIO PROPAGANDA. By Ernst Kris and Hans Speier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 529 p. $4.00.

This first-rate analysis and appraisal of the radio propaganda technique as practised by Goebbels and Company was prepared by seven scholars attached to the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research.

HITLER'S WORDS. Edited by Gordon W. Prange. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, 400 p. $3.75.

Some of the material in this anthology of the Fuehrer's *dicta* and *scripta* has never before appeared in English. The excerpts are organized under 20 topical headings.

THE GERMAN ARMY. By Herbert Rosinski. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1944, 220 p. $3.00.

A revised edition of an authoritative description of the development and organization of the German Army since the days of Frederick the Great.

THE NAZI ECONOMIC SYSTEM: GERMANY'S MOBILIZATION FOR WAR. By Otto Nathan. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1944, 378 p. $4.00.

A sound, annotated treatise stressing actual practice rather than mere theory, by a onetime official in the German Ministry of Economics.

WOMEN IN NAZI GERMANY. By Katherine Thomas. London: Gollancz, 1943, 102 p. 3/6.

This analysis and explanation of the rôle of women in creating, supporting and opposing the Nazi régime is, on the whole, adequate though not particularly new.

CHRISTIAN COUNTER-ATTACK. By Hugh Martin and Others. New York: Scribner, 1944, 125 p. $1.50.

Brief chapters on the anti-Nazi resistance activities of the churches, Protestant and Catholic, in the occupied and satellite countries.

THE GERMANS AND THE JEWS. By F. R. Bienenfeld. New York: Ungar, 1944, 265 p. $2.50.

A sincere attempt to discover and weigh the fundamental causes — economic, social and otherwise — for the antagonism of Germans toward their Jewish compatriots.

THE CASE OF THE GERMAN JEWS VS. GERMANY. By Hugo Marx. New York: Egmont Press, 1944, 124 p. $1.75.

An explanation of the legal basis for their claims against the German Government.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ITALY. By Cecil J. S. Sprigge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, 216 p. $2.75.

The author, onetime *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Rome, has produced a very timely review and appraisal of modern Italian history. Though not everyone will agree with his diagnosis of Italy's political malady, there can be no dissent from his conclusion that to create a new Italy will be a long and arduous task, and that this cannot be done simply by turning back the hands of time to the pre-Fascist era.

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ONE MAN ALONE: THE HISTORY OF MUSSOLINI AND THE AXIS. By Maxwell H. H. Macartney. London: Chatto and Windus, 1944, 183 p. 15/.

The title of this book — taken from one of Mr. Churchill's less happy speeches — is misleading, as the author himself demonstrates in this circumstantial and critical review of the history of the Fascist régime. Macartney was for a number of years the correspondent of the London *Times* in Italy.

TOWARDS THE NEW ITALY. By T. L. Gardini. London: Drummond, 1943, 203 p. 9/6.

This book is valuable because of the light it sheds on the state of affairs in Italy during the last months of the Fascist régime and during the period from the fall of Mussolini to the announcement of the Armistice (July 25 to September 8, 1943).

BEHIND THE SPANISH MASK. By Lawrence Dundas. London: Hale, 1943, 110 p. 5/.

The author holds Franco to be a willing puppet for Hitler and he therefore advocated — before the invasion of Italy — an Allied landing in Spain.

OUR OLDEST ALLY. By H. J. Greenwall. London: W. H. Allen, 1943, 112 p. 7/6.

A brief but on the whole reliable review of the historic relations between Britain and Portugal, together with an appraisal of the recent history of the latter.

Eastern Europe

U S S R: THE STORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By Walter Duranty. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1944, 293 p. $3.00.

For one who writes as he pleases, Mr. Duranty has managed to turn out a pretty sound review of the highlights of Soviet history. His version of the famous Moscow trials will be read with particular interest.

PEOPLE, CHURCH AND STATE IN MODERN RUSSIA. By Paul B. Anderson. New York: Macmillan, 240 p. $2.50.

The author presents a balanced review of the history of Church-State relations from late Tsarist times down to recent days. He shows clearly that, despite Communist hostility, the essential bases for real Christianity persist in Russia.

RUSSIA AND THE PEACE. By Sir Bernard Pares. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 293 p. $2.50.

The noted British authority on Russian affairs sketches in the historical backgrounds of the great questions now confronting Soviet diplomacy, and seeks to present the solutions which he believes are possible within that framework.

MY LIVES IN RUSSIA. By Markoosha Fischer. New York: Harper, 1944, 269 p. $2.75.

The author, wife of Louis Fischer, records the process by which, after long holding high hopes for the Soviet experiment, she became disillusioned.

BOOKS ON SOVIET RUSSIA 1917–1942. By Philip Grierson. London: Methuen, 1943, 354 p. 12/6.

This "bibliography and guide to reading" will be found of the utmost value by anyone who needs advice on the rapidly increasing mass of material on modern Russia.

FRÄN HAMMAREN TILL HAKKORSET. By Per Wiselgren. Stockholm: Idé och Form Förlag, 1942, 294 p. 12 Kr.

This first-hand description of affairs in Estonia during the years 1939–42 gives an unflattering picture of the Soviet occupation. The author left the country shortly after the Nazi "reconquest," of which he seems to have approved.

A HISTORY OF THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS. By R. W. Seton-Watson. London: Hutchinson, 1943, 413 p. 15/.

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The author, Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London, is one of the leading authorities in the English-speaking world on the Danube Basin. This history is the result of many years of study, much of it on the spot in Central Europe. On such a controversial subject no author, be he ever so profound an expert, can hope for unanimous assent to his interpretations. Though Professor Seton-Watson is not one to dodge an argument, this comprehensive and fair-minded volume would seem destined to stand the test of time.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SERBS. By K. St. Pavlowitch. London: Standard Art Book Co., 1943, 88 p. 5/.

After a very brief summary of Serbian history, the author presents a circumstantial and illustrated account of events of the last three years in war-torn Jugoslavia.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

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The Prime Minister's speeches, broadcasts and other declarations made during 1943.

CHURCHILL. By John Coulter. Boston: Humphries, 1944, 133 p. $2.50.

These scattered episodes from Churchill's life in no sense constitute a biography.

BRITAIN'S THIRD CHANCE. By Stephen King-Hall. London: Faber, 1943, 199 p. 8/6.

Commander King-Hall rebukes his fellow countrymen for having misused two chances to assume worldwide leadership for peace before and after World War I. He urges them not to let slip the present third — and perhaps last — opportunity.

THE BRITISH NAVY'S AIR ARM. By Owen Rutter. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1944, 248 p. 25 cents.

An illustrated account of the origins, development and current activities of the Fleet Air Arm.

OFF THE RECORD. By the Countess of Oxford and Asquith. London: Muller, 1943, 177 p. 7/6.

Random memoirs and observations on personages and events, by the widow of a onetime British Prime Minister.

CANADA AFTER THE WAR. Edited by Alexander Brady and F. R. Scott. Toronto: Macmillan, 1944, 348 p. $4.25.

These ten studies, by as many contributors, on the political, social and economic policies which Canada should pursue after the war were prepared for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

ARCTIC ELDORADO. By Raymond Arthur Davies. Boston: Humphries, 1944, 97 p. $1.50.

A first-hand, enthusiastic report on the Canadian Northland — "the greatest unexploited region in the world."

OLD MASTER: THE LIFE OF JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS. By René Kraus. New York: Dutton, 1944, 471 p. $3.50.

The worldwide career of Smuts set against its South African background. Interesting, well-written but hardly novel.

SMUTS AND SWASTIKA. By Alexander Campbell. London: Gollancz, 1943, 168 p. 6/.

This account of contemporary affairs in the Union of South Africa takes up such controversial matters as the native problem, the nationalist agitation and the prospects for placing the country's economy on a sounder basis.

THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN. By John Burger. London: Gollancz, 1943, 252 p. 7/6.

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An attempt, not entirely successful, to show that the color bar in South Africa is the result of exploitive capitalism.

AUSTRALIA AND THE PACIFIC. By Members of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 203 p. $2.50.

These papers are issued under the joint auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

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An introduction to the history and institutions of the Commonwealth.

UNDERSTANDING NEW ZEALAND. By Frederick L. W. Wood. New York: Coward-McCann, 1944, 267 p. $3.75.

A readable survey of the country, the people and their institutions, by a professor of history in Victoria University College.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM. By R. Coupland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 711 p. $5.00.

The author is Beit Professor of Colonial History at the University of Oxford, and his book is the result of an investigation which he undertook for Nuffield College. The volume consists of three parts, of which the first is a good review of Indian political history 1833–1935, and the second is a more detailed study of the Indian Problem from 1936 to 1942. In the third part Professor Coupland canvasses current proposals for getting out of the Indian impasse, and makes several constructive suggstions of his own. This is one of the best informed and most realistic books on India.

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA. By Kumar Goshal. New York: Sheridan, 1944, 375 p. $3.00.

The case for Indian independence restated within the framework of the country's political, economic and social evolution.

REVOLUTION IN INDIA. By Frances Gunther. New York: Island Press, 1944, 122 p. $2.00.

Occasional papers and speeches by one who is passionately devoted to the cause of Indian freedom.

The Near East

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The history, culture and political aspirations of the Arab peoples reviewed by a Hungarian student of Near Eastern affairs.

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"An outline of planned reconstruction" for the postwar period which naturally stresses the rôle of Palestine.

TURKEY: KEY TO THE EAST. By Chester M. Tobin. New York: Putnam, 1944, 170 p. $2.00.

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A number of papers on Palestinian problems by various authors commemorating the

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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